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. This study has attempted to investigate the rfidical change in the
Greater Portiand Council of Churches e (GPeG's) organitqtional goals and
actions--from its reiative uoinvoivement ove-r to its pr'eoccupation \tiith
local social, pol1tical and economic issues.

In the past, classical

sociologica'i theory of religion has placed great emphasis on re'i·igion's

integrative, or conservative functions in society.

Empirical studies

have documented the conservative socia-political v'ie\vs of the majority of

Protestant parishioners.

Knowing this, I expected to find a significant

2

conservative reaction swelling up from the lay parishioners of the
GPCC's member congregations.
assumption to be invalid.
became:

A preliminary investigation revealed this

The study's sociological problem then

(1) Wha t was the true character of the GPeC I s member react; on

to the organization's abrupt change to liberal action goals?

(2) If

there was a minimum of conservative reaction, as indicated, what are
the sociological reasons 'for this unexpected condition?
Further investigation showed that in the la.ter 1960 s, as the GPCCjs
1

social action involvements reached a climax, the GPeC also publicly
reinstituted older, congregational-centered programs that have been
neglected for several years.
hypothesis:

This dual action suggested the study's

An investigation of the relationship between the GPCC's

change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutralize lay
members' conservative reactions would shed light upon the GPee's self
insulation from conservative opposition.
Three basic strategies were used to gather data:

(1) organiza

tional records, (2) observation, and (3) personal, in-depth interviews.
Files and records were used largely to confirm and amplify interview
data.

I observed the GPCC and three of the church Community Action Pro

grams by regularly attending their meetings for approximately two years,
1969-1971.

The largest amount of data was secured from interviewing,

conducted on a representative sample of 20 active participants in the
GPCC.

Since the sample was not to be a random one, it was carefully

pre-constructed to be representative of the organization's informal
structure, i.e., active participants and leadership.

When the data

revealed the interviewees' unexpectedly mild negative reaction to the
GPeC's deep involvement in very controversial socio-political issues,

3

the sample was doubled to a total of 41 actual -interviews for the purpose
of checking the original results.

A content analysis was used to analyze

the data.
In order to find' out why there was such a lack of internal con
servat'jve'reaction, the investigation was turned to an extensive organi
zational analysis of the SPCC's power and authority structures.

Seven

categories of social insulation were found to provide protection and
organizational legitimation for the GPCC's socio-political involvements
and its CAP's programs~

The insulation categories are:

of the 1arge number of GPCC 1ay members:

(1) The apathy

Robert Mi che j • s ca tegory of

membership apathy in democratic organizations is especially applicable
to the GPCC, due to member churches' primary loyalty to their own goals,
finances and denominations.
govern; ng process,:

(2) The oligarchic

take-ov~r

of the GPCCls

Because the GPCC· s formal structure di d not clefi ne

executive authority, a vacuum of power existed.

The executive leaders

informally, but pragmatically, grasped the authority and guided ,the GPCC
toward its new course of social action.

with

th~

(3) The lack of communication

uninvolved member congregations; The leaders developed a

filtering system in the 1nter-organizational communications, which
reinterpreted their social actions into positive propaganda, and
a'bsorbed members cri ti ca,l feedback.
I

the GPCC's action programs:

(4) The fi nanci ali ndependence of

Independent foundations, individuals and

national-regional church bodies became'interested in social action in the
mid-1960's.

They made the CAP's financially independent for a time.

(5) The church CAP's semi-autonomous relationship to the GPCC made lay
men's attempts to criticize, the CApls social actions very difficult,
because they were unable to focus on the GPCC as the responsible agent.
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(6) The secularization of an increasing number of parish pastors within
member congregations:

IISecu"larization ll does not mean being more

materialistic, but being more sympathetic with social change through
the churches' involvement in social action.

(7) The GPCC's ambivalent

policies simultaneously presented to lay members and the public both
an. avowed conservative
liberal social actions.

postut~e,

while devoting its greatest efforts to

The various forms of insulation effectively

turned away critical challenges from the GPCC's conservative parish lay;

I
I
I
I
1

I

men .
As the GPCC·s social action activities had the effect of dealienating, some of the city's most lIestablished" institutions, i.e.,
1oca1

governmen~

(e. g., jaw enforcement), School Boa rd (through

advocacy of school busing for racial equality), local businesses
(through support of secondary local grape boycott), the GPeCts actions
had the latent effect of relativ;zing them.

The study indicates there

were definite negative reactions within the organizationJs general mem-

I
I

bership, but the insulation processes sufficiently muffled the challenges

I
I
I

covering up their increasing commitment to social action efforts with

servative-pleasing programs, the leaders largely maintained the appear

I

ance that the GPCC was not rejecting its traditional goals for radical

I

ones.

I

support of social change in the community.

I

I
I

i

I

I
I

to prevent an uprising.

The leaders sensed the muted reactions.

By

generous amounts of propaganda about their promoting a few old, con

This ambivalent appearance was an important aspect of the GPec's
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The year 1963 was distinguished by the most intense, massive pro
tests against ra-cial discrimination that had ever taken place throughout
the Uni ted Sta tas.

A1though Portl and was far removed from the' center of

the ci vi 1 l"i ghts movement in the South and East, the huge non-v; 01 ent
demonstrations

i~

Birmingham, Alabama, in the face of violent police

treatment set off a chain reaction of large racial protests across the
country--Tal1ahassee, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit and
elsewhere.

President Kennedy was caught up in the struggle when he

federalized the Alabama National Guard to open Alabama schools to black
students.

He addressed the nation

on

TV, saying the United States faced

"a moral crisis as a result of Negro discontent.

He sent a special

message to Congress, requesting enactment of broad civil
tion.

rtght~

legisla

In August, 1963, Portland and the nation watched on TV the

largest civil rights demonstration--over 200,000 people--ever to have
taken place in Washington, D. C., and heard Martin Luther King's call
to fulfill the American dream.

Black civil rights leader, Medgar Evers,

and William L. Moore, a white integration crusader, were both shot to
death.

Although not directly connected to civil rights, a great sobering

effect was left by the assassination of President J. F. Kennedy on
November 22.
Three weeks later, December 13, 1963, the Greater Portland Council
of Churches' (GPCC) Board of Directors voted to administer a new program
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that waS radically different from any organized effort the local Council
of Churches had before attempted.

The GPCC·s Board decided at that time

t6 be the "sponsori ng agent II for conducti ng a soci a 1 acti on type of w'ork

in the heart of the city's black community.
Il

No specific goals for

social action" were specified in the resolution, other than that the

project was to deal with the black people's socio-economic difficulties.
By April, 1964, a'full-time salaried head for the social action
project was signed, and in July the new leader had set up an office in a
store-front within the main business area of Portland's black community.
Almost everything about this new effort was different from all the pre
v; ous programs the 1oca1 Counci 1 of Churches had adnri nis tered.

For

,local councils of churches generally, as well as the National Council,
the stated primary purpose was to increase the amount of cooperative pro
grams among the churches, but in -the 1960·s most churches and local
councils understood this cooperativeness to be within very restricted
1imits.

The limits are, of course, determined theologically by

doc~rinal

differences; however, sociologically, the real limits are dete~mined by
the constant pressures of a highly competitive market. l In fact, most
congregations are in a constant life and death struggle for survival.
Each congregation is daily competing for people.

Although on the publi

cized face of things, each church is primarily trying to reach the
unchurched, underneath thi s facade is the ul1abi d-i ng ri va1ry to obtai n
advantage over other congregations in order to
stituency.

increas~

its own con

The rationale behind this intense competition is

t~at

each

church body teaches its congregations that its own form of bel iefs and
practices is closest to the biblical faith.

Each congregation operates

on the p-remi se tha tit offers somethi ng superi or to all other nei ghbor

.... /
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hood forms of the church.
The individual

WAO

feels the competitive strain most is the local

clergyman, whose success is measured in terms of increased members.
Increased membership of the congregation eventually means increased
monetary income and community influence for the congregation and clergy
man.

This

success~

or lack of it, is usually compared to the relative

success of the competitive neighborhood churches.
The, limits of the cooperativeness of the local congregations

within the local council of churches is usually circumscribed by the
amount each ccmgregation (or clergyman) feel s that the counci 1 can con
tribute to his competitive task--to obtain members.

Therefore, the pro

grams wnicn the Greater Portland Council of Churches had administered
from 19)9 until 1964 \vere the kind which increased in some way the
ability of each congregation to attract more members and still a110wed
the congregations to participate cooperative1y--without being threatened.
The cooperative versus the competitive purposes of the congrega
tions forced the GPCC to place its biggest efforts on an annual Sunday
school, or church school, teacher-training program.

This program lasted

several weeks and enrolled over 1,200 trainees each year from 1958 to
1964. Also in the church education field was a very successful
released-time church school once a week throughout the school year for a
wide number of public grade schools.

Other annual cooperative efforts

included a big, one day youth rally, a cooperative Easter service, and
a two day theological seminar, led by a "namell theologian or churchman.
Prior to 1964, the GPCC program closest to social action was the
chapla;"ncy program to local jails and juvenile detention homes.

The pre

scribed limits of cooperation by the congregations strictly disallowed,

,'1l
theref~re,

any kind of program which would contend witn the power struc

tures of the local (city) community.

Because of poss.ible controversy and

negative reaction, such a cooperative goal might very well detract from
t'he individual congregation's abi1ity to compete for members.
It 'is not difficult to understand why the GPCCis decision to take

on the social action project in the black comllunity was such a ra<iical
departure from its previ ous pol icy..

The end resul t of the GPCC I S new

program was not designed to increase cooperatively the ability of its
own member congregations to strengthen (obtain new members)
as separate institutions in a competitive market.

thems~lves

If the GPCCts new

Community Action Program was not going to increase the ability of each
member congregation to meet its own competitive problems, the question
forc€fully presents itself:

Why did the GPCC take this unprecedented

step into the community·s arena of conflicting power structures? Why
did the member churches vote to allow their local cooperative a·ssociation
-(GPCC) to intentionally move into the middle of the local civil rights
controversy?
The main purpose of this study is to explore and describe, rather
than to test, a possible theory for verification.
answer \'Jas a "working" hypothesis, which stated:

The preliminary
By understanding the

shift in the built-in conservative or liberal tendencies of many Portland
churches, we will be able to obtain more sociological light

~n

the social

change taking place in the Greater Portland Council of Churches.
Although the worldwide process of contemporary secularization i,s carrying
liberalization of old practices to most American churches, only a few 'of
the long-established Protestant denominations have enacted liberal social
policies into their official documents.

These churches are most active
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in the ecumenical movement, locally and nationally.
servativism continues within these same churches.

Yet, a latent con
Much of their nine

teenth century her; tage was conservati ve, and it is 'not yet erased.

The

two social tendencies of social conservativism and secularization remain
within the churches in a very ambivalent situation.
sis tries to take this into account.

The above hypothe

It refers to the "shiftingll from

conservative policies to liberal social involvement, followed by reac
tionary changes back toward conservativism.

My purpose was to document

those sociological factors which were crucial ·to the GPCCrs change in
i·ts organ i za ti ona 1 goa 1s .
It fs a paradoxical situation .. I knew' theoretically that this
situation applied to the GPCC, and my theory was further strengthened by
the evidence I had observed previous to commencing the study.

Wide

publicity had been given to the conservative reaction from the city
against botA the GPCC1s Youth Ministry program in the downtown area and
the Black Summer Crisis program in the Albina area. 2 I knew from both
recent research (see Chapter l) and experience about the generally con
servative nature of many Protestant churches.

Yet, ever since the

southern "sit-inll movement in the early 1960's and the Selma, Alabama,
Freedom March, I was aware of the increasing socia-political involve
me.nts by several church groups, especially ecumenical groups·.

The civil

rights movement was .reflected in the GPCC's specific change-over to
social action policies in the city.

From the time of the preliminary

; -preparations for the study, several kinds of clues came across that
local churches in the city were quite ambivalent toward the GPCC's
direct work within two of the city's most difficult social problem areas,
Albina and downtown, S.W.

"'1
I

It was in this frame of reference
sis was constructed.

ade~uate.

the original working hypothe

However, as I continued mY struggle for methodologi

cal direction during the research, I
was not

~hat

The data from

my

concl~ded

that

my

working hypothesis

interviews were consistently turning

out to refute mY subconscious expectation that there would be a strong
conservative reaction within the GPCC.
mY unstated assumptions.

I was forced to examine aRd face

I decided that I needed a new hypothesis which

stated more clearly the paradoxical movement of both the 1iberal and
·conservative social forces present In the GPCC.

As the GPCC increased

its involvement in liberal social action policies, it also publicly
reemphasized its older, conservative programs.
study's hypothesis:

This suggests the

By understanding the relationship between the

GPCC's change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutra
lize lay members' conservative reactions, sociological light will be
shed upon the GPCC's processes of insulating itself from conservative
opposition.
I came to see that in the early stages of this research I was
doing two things, methodologically, which could be called "errors."
First, I had mentally redefined both the 'independent and dependent vari
ables during the first stages of interviewing, without realizing it and
without stating the change on paper.

In trying to analyze it, I think

it gradually began during the early interviews, as I tried to explain
my

openning questions to interviewees.

I had unconsciously narrowed

the definition for the independent var·iable down to the. IIconser.vativism
of the GPCC's membershipll and the definition for the dependent variable
simply to their "conservative reaction within the GPCC.
ll

Unintefltion

ally, I had set up a testable hypothesis with an expected cause-effect

,8

relationship between these unstated variables.

I had failed to remain

open during the first half of the research to the other side of the
working hypothesis--that the independent variable could also reveal it
self to be a "liberal" constitutency in the GPCC and tnat the dependent
variable 'could also oe a strong support for the GPCC's liberal changes,
as well as a reaction against it.
Since the largest number of published sociological investigations
are conducted on the basis of nypotheses that are to be tested and veri
fied by the evidence,turned up bY,the study, this "error!! I admit to is
not usually considered a poor research method.

However, because I had

come to assume there was an automatic cause-effect chain between the
variables--between the GPCC's liberal sO-cial actions and the church con
servatives' reaction--I now feel that that assumption was a mistake.
Herbert Blumer criticizes several aspects of the
analyses.

II

II

variables·

He says that too many researchers choose variables that do

not have real generic, values, outside of local areas of study.3
Further, he says empirical methodology often assumes that the observed
change in the dependent variable (all other variables apparently held
constant) is an automatic result of the action, by the independent
variable.

However, such cause-effect relationship does not take into

account what has happened in between the two variables.

It does not

account for the changing interpretative processes which go on by people
and institutions in defining and attaching meaning to intervening social
activities, relationships, situations, etc.

Such intervening

~ctivi

ties bring about the changes .in the definitions (meanings) of social
objects, and thereby playa central part in the changes of social prac
tices--the way people act.

To ignore the intervening interpretative
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process is to fail to take into account the more essentia1 reasons why
the change took place between the independent and dependent variables.
Blumer's cY'iticism was apropos to the

\'1ay

I had labeled the

independent variable in mY expectations--by mY over··emphasizing the
possible "influence of a conservative constituency in the

GPC~

and

deemphasizing the possibility of a powerful 1iberal group being able to
control the power and authority of the organization.

There is no doubt

that early in the research I had an expectation that the GPCC's fnvolve
ment in controversial social actions would set off conservative reaction
within the organization.

What I did not allow for was the GPCC's inter

venin9 organizational ability to control the interpretative process of
its own members, and thereby change their reaction toward a threaterring
sltuation.

The interviews, the records and observation at meetings

convinced me that I had developed a wrong assumption.

After much intro

spection and analysis of the research procedure, I finally realized that
1 had unconsciously changed the hypothesis to a one-sided, cause-effect

assumption.

Such terminology and reasoning were not only bordering

upon doctrinaire dialectic, but aiso had become an
,apart from a specific set of events.

My

~

priori judgment,

assumption was wrong.

I finally

had to let go of ft, and restate the hypothesis in terms more affirmative
to the dialectic process between both the conservative and liberal forces
within the GPCC.
The second methodological error I had'"been making was, simply" that
I was not obtaining a representative interview sample of the"whole
organization.

When I rea'lized that, even though I doubled the

intervi~\v

sample, the data continued to support the non-reactionary attitude
within the GPCC toward their involvement in controversial social actions"
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I was forced into ansWe}"'in9 the question "Why?" After wrestling at
length with the problem--at both the levels of sociological theory and
methodo1ogy--I discovered that I had also excluded the one group other
recent researchers have found to be generally conservative- in the main
1i ne Pt"otes tant churches:

the 1a i ty.

A1though I had made a s.peci fi c

(and s'uccessful) effort to obta"in in the sample a proportionate number
of laymen, as against clergymen, that sample still failed to be repre
sentative-of the general church laymen. "Why was this so?
In hindsight, I found that my difficulty with an unrepresentative
sample arose from my failure to observe the sociological differentiation
between the informal and formal structure of an organization.

I had not

adequately defined my unit of study and the population in it.

As soon

described, much of this study was forced to turn to investigating the
G~CCIS

organizational structure and its practical source of power and

authority.

This latter part of the investigation demonstrated that

"those people who came to be "elected to the Board of Directors, and
ll

i~portant

Commissions and Committees were largely hand-picked

Executive staff.

by

the

In reality, the uninitiated delegates to the annual

meetings had nothing to say about nominations, and consequently, no true
choice in their voting for officers.

Because of this control by the

Executive over who would serve in the top leadership, the "elected ll
officers were largely of one mind:

liberal.

Since the Executive

Director was personally committed to the church1s social involvement,
most of

tp~se

people whom he ratified for nomination to those bodies of

leadership in the GPCC had a fairly liberal attitude toward social
I

involvement.

The GPCC·s leadership, although elected from the member

churches, was not representative of the genera1 laity of the total member
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congregations.

As mentioned previously, recent research has shown that

the majority of mainli'ne Protestant laymen are conservative and much
more conservative than their clergymen.

Because the conservative lay

men tr/ere generally excluded from the lIinside" groups of leaders, so
were thefr conservative opinions eliminated from my intervievl sample.
The validity of this study heavily depends upon what is defined as
the organizational boundary of the GPCC.
acc~rding.to

If the organization is defined

its formal constitutional statements, this study has viewed

only the upper power structure of the GPCC.

However, if the GPec is

defined sociologically in terms of its informal structure, then this,
study's sampling of interviews and the accompanying organizational study
are adequate

w~thodological

tools for the investigation.

Because I

""'

believe the informal structure of the GPCC is, in fact (or pragmatically),
the sum and substance of this organization, I am convinced that the GPee's
meetings, decisions and programs exist relatively apart from its member
c~urches.

The organization itself is connected to the congregations only

by those persons who have sufficient individual motivation

t~

volunteer

for the activities of the GPCC, or by an activist pastor who takes a
.personal interest in the GPCC's type of social involvement. '
This study, therefore, does not pretend to represent the opinion of
all the GPCC's member churches and their individual members, but the
study does show what the informal organization of tightly-knit volunteers
actually did during 1960-70 in order to protect itself and carry out its
liberal policies.

Consequently, to correct my second methodological

m; stake, I am defi ning my' uni t of study as the GPCC' s ; nforma1, organi za
tional structure of power, authority and program implementors, as
distinct from the nominal, uninvolved member churches and their general

l2

lay membership. stnce this more specific definition of the organization
is limited to the active participants in the GPCC--its leaders and volun
teer program participants--I no

l~nger

consider the interview sample as

being unrepresentative of the total group.

The study does not examine

the GPeC as defined by its own formal statements, but as that social
entity of people who make the policy decisions and those who actively
implement their programs and decisions.
Definition of Terms
The independent variable for this study's hypothesis is:

lithe

relationship between the GPCC's change to· liberal action in.volvements
and its attempts to neutralize lay members' conservative reactions."
In order to prevent any false cause-effect assumptions from developing
~

between the two ends of the liberal-conservative continuum, which makes
up this one variable, it is extremely important to clarify the defini
tions of Illiberal II and IIconservative. 1I As discussed above, early in
this research I had falled to recognize the independent variable as a
single whole, the possibility of a liberal reaction, as well as a con
servative reaction.

It is imperative to define what kind of church

member reaction is conservative and what is liberal.
Depending on the context in which the terms are used, they may
denote

soci~l,

categories.

psychological, economic, political, as well as religious,

Represented in the GPCC. is a wide variety of religiuus

denominations, each carrying its,own social views, along with its own
~eligious

doctrines.

potential life.

The problem is similar to generalizing about

Knowing that some·Democratic congressnren consistently

vote more conservatively than some Republican congressmen, it would be
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impossible to place all Republicans and Democrats in Congress
respective

cons~rvative-liberal

i~to

their

cubicles.

Due to the \Last religious p'luralism in

t~e

United States, there

are several possible standards by which to determine the religious con
servativ~s .. William G. McLoughlin suggests five definitions. 4 The
first is really theological.

This measurement continuum places the

liberals with the scholarly, or intellectual method of dealing with
religious.doctrine.

Conservatives are biblically literalistic, unsophis

ticated, and emphasize, usually, a set of "fundamentals" for membership
conformity.

The critical criteria for measurement is, however, the

literalistic interpretation of Scriptures.

In actual analysis, this

method is not too clear cut, because certain doctrines (millenialism,
pe~rfectionism, etc.) are equated with the conservative view.

At the

same time, some sophisticated theologians sometimes become very dogmatic
about their doctrines (Virgin Birth, Trinity, Infallibility, etc.).
A second measurement of conservativism is the psychological aspects
of religious experience and worship.

The liberal attitude is defined on

a continuum that begins with the individual asserting only a bare
intellectual assent to belief and experiences almost no emotional con
tact with the deity whom he worships.

At the conservative end of the

continuum is the ecstatic, highly emotional worship of the pentecostal
J

or holiness groups in which

individu~S

experience direct, personal

encounters with the Deity so that worshippers lose themselves and express
themselves physically

i~

the power of the Holy Spirit.

This form of

measurement has much unclear overlapping with such practices
wustics.

~s

those of

For instance, the Thoreauvian transcendentalist's mystical

experience of the Over-Soul alone in the woods is a case of emotional
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spiritual possession, yet much

mOt"e

;'ntellectualized than pentecostalists.

So is the highly liturgical worship practices of some churches, which,
although completely ritualized, emphasize the sensuous with robes,
candles, incense, images, etc.
The third measurement attempts a kind of sociological standard.

On

the one side of the continuum is the upper-class, in-group allegiance to
the establishment church, and on the other side is the lower-class, out
group allegiance to the IIsectll group of alienated people.

The criteria

here is ;n socio-economic terms primarily, ,along with stratification
terms:

status, prestige, wealth, power-security, etc.

;s similar to Troeltsch's sect-church dist'inction.

This formulation

In America, however,

the sect-church designation is not clear, because status and socio
eConomic measurements vary in denominations and more extreme groups, or
"sects, ". vary from one geographi ca1 a rea to another.

Compare, for

example, the status of Mormons and Congregationalists in New England
with the Far Western states.
A fourth form of meas ureIDen tis stated in terms of church pol i ty
and

~

parallel social outlook.

The criterion here has hierarchical

church polity (bishops., archbishops and supreme head) as favoring a
monarchy or autocracy in socio-political life.

On the other end of this

continuum are the churches with a congregational polity operating from
the concept of the priesthood of all believers, which are more apt to be
supportive of a democratic social system.

If 'this criterion is applied,

then the Catholic Church typifies the conservatives; the Baptists repre
sent the liberals; and the. Calvinist churches (Reformed, Presbyterian,
etc.) with a presbyterian poiity fall in the middle as bei'ng supportive
of a republican form of government.

In actual practice, obviously, all
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tflree of these forms of churches have contradicted the above stereotypes
for socio-political affiliations'.
McLoughlfn gives a fifth measurement, which he thinks is more
realistically applicable to the United States' past and present.
defines ;,t within an historical framework:
ous Awakenings.

He

America's four Great Religi

In each hew Awakening there were those who espoused the

new, spirited evangelicalism, and after a generation of institutionaliza
tion, the new
consensus.

~vangelicals

They became

~he

reformulated the old orthodoxy into a new
new orthodoxY in religion, and accommodated

their Christian doctrine to conservatively "fit U the new problems ()f a
changing order.

Based on this historical analysis, the Liberals are on

the other end of the historical continuum.

The Liberals today are pro

ducts of the historical events of the early 1900 ' s when the great expo
nents of, the Social Gospel began that great movement within Protestantism.
The Social Gospelers wanted the churches to talk less about dO'ing good
deeds and actually to participate in alleviating the great social ills
of that time, of the industrial revolution--unjust working conditions,
malnutr;tion~

poverty, political injustices, etc.

The Fundamentalist

movement within the largest, traditional Protestant denominations during
this time was a direct reaction to the Social Gospel movement.
Liberals are updated Social Gospelers.

Today's

Theologically, they are more

orthodox', but the-ir over-riding consensus is socia-political involvement.
As each

pi~eti sti c

traditional cnurches

movement swept through the churches, ,many' in the

we~e attr~cted

to the movement, and joined in

criticising the older den"ominations.

The last Great Awakening took "lJlace

during the late 1800's and e"arlY 1900 s, partly as a reaction against the
1

Social Gospel

moven~nt

and partly' as a reaction against the intellectuals'
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"form criticism" of the Bible that undermined the literalistic i-flfalli
bility of Scripture.

McLoughlin describes the current Awakening as

beginning in the 1950 l s and continuing through the Sixttes.

It was a

reaction agai·nst the great uncertai-nty of liberal theology and the
times following World War II.

Out of this situation came Billy Graham's
.

'

revival crusades and the neo-fundamentalist federation, tne Natioflal
Association of Evangelicals.
Far· exceeding the limits of neo-fundamentalists, however, America's
present

conservative~

Protestants and Jews.

are a·new combination of pietistic Catholics,
Their most common characteristic today, according

to McLoughlin, is that they are either politically reactionary, or com
p~etely

apolitical.

The ultra-conservatives--the dissident fringe

groups--are the "apoliticals. 1I They are against all forms of political
invol vement.
The preceding definitions of terms, especially that of conservative,
'have an inherent problem.

On the one hand, I have reemphasized the

importance of the hypothesis' openness to both sides of the contradictory
currents--both conservative and liberal--flowing through the Amer'ican
churches today.

As the study progressed, I made a renewed effort to

remain open to any data which would indicate the conservative retrench
ment of the older values of individualism, laissez-faire economy, hard
work, thrift, piety, sobriety, all those qualities described in Weber's
Protestant ethic, as well as data indicating the liberalization of the
pietistic values

outwar~

to more socio-political involvements.

On the

other hand, because the above definition of "conservative" is keyed to
the term, "pO 1; t i cally reacti ona ry

,II

it may be that such a defi ni tion

forces the data presented here to conform to categories which themselves

~

1
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assume a cause-effect relationship.

That is, do the definitions of the

hypothesis' two key terms become determinants of a theoretical assump
tion? Does the concept of "reaction" in McLoughliR ' s definition of
"conservativell smack at doctrinaire dialectical materialism when used as
a basis for analysis of my research data? As used herein, is the defini
tion of conservative an

~

priori judgment that has theoretically forced

mY recording of in-depth interview data into pre-determined kinds of

conclusions? Were' the analytic conclusions predefined by the concept of
conservative reac tio,n?U
Il

My answer is "No" on all accounts.

My best refutation of this

possible methodological trap is the actual results of the interview data
and the actual analysis of them.

Instead of

t~is

definition coercing

the data to'show IIreactionary" opinions among the interviewees, I
recorded their responses and found them conclusively,to refute that the
GPCC was predominantly conservative, contrary to my expectations.
Abraham Kaplan points out that hypotheses, principles, rules,
a~ioms,

laws, etc., become tautological because vagueness allows them to

be always true no matter what is the case in their application to the
world of facts.

In other words, the hypothesis' practical meaning ;s

not sufficiently specific--that is, applicable to explicit situations-
so as to subject it to some sort of empirical control.

Kaplan adds,

though, that few laws, even in the physical sciences, are stated so

expli~itly that their meanings, functio~allY, always exclude ambiguity.5
The sociological methodologist finds it even easier to state his
hypothesis in a manner removed from everyday, empirical problems, recon
structing it to be so "analytically" logical that i,t is very difficult
for others to retest it.

It merely argues repetitiously in a circle-

lS

tautologica1ly.

Kaplan's point is important for this research.

He says

that when the methodologist's theory takes over artd imposes its own
logic--cause and effect--upon the data, then the theory does not allow
the raw data. the historical events being studied, to determine their
own relationship.

They are then being theoretically coerced!

While trying objectively

t~

reinspect mY methodolegy," I have not

found my mere use of the term "reaction" in the definition automatically
to have jr,lp-uted into the definition an

~.E.riori

assumption of any

theory, neither of historical materialism, nor of any lireconstructed
logic." Cel"taiflly such an assumption was not "defined into" the col
lected data.

Rather than my assuming anything in the \'1ord "reaction,"

-

I was trying to form a degree of precision for describing the attitudes
that may have fit the definition.

Ultimately, the word was used

~~

concept that would more accuratell measure the hypothesis· dependent
variables' indicators.

In retrospect, I think that any assumption of a

cause-effect relationship would have to be between the variables, and
consequently, within the total hypothesis itself.
l~m

That is where the prob

really lies, and I have diligently retraced my steps over the

earlier procedures in the study to strip" away my assumption that there
was a strong conservative reaction present within the GPCC.

I feel that

this was accomplished, since the evidence and analysis disconfirmed any
such

~ssumed

conservativism.

At the beginning Qf this research, I did not follow sufficiently
what Marx called the principle of historical specificity.

In applying

this principle, C. Wright Mills has said:
There is~ I believe, no "law" stated by any social scientist that
is trans-historicai, that must not be understood as having to do
with "the specific structure of some period. Other IIl aws " turn
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out to be empty abstractions or quite ~onfused tautologies. The
only meaniFlg of "social laws" or even of "soc ial regularities"
is such "principia'media" (Karl Mannheim's application of the
mechanis{11s of change within ~~arx's principle of historical
specificity) as we may discover, or if you wish, construct, for

social structure within an historically specific era. We do not

knew any universal principles of historical change; -the mechan
isms of change we do know vary with the social structure we are
examining. 6 (Parenthetical insert mine.)

After thorough ly a llowi ng the data. to di scanfi rm my own _unconsci ous ly
he.ld prejudice trrat Du.rkheim's theory (that religion integrates and con
serves society·s established order) was· substantially applicable to all
of the GPce's li-beral activities in its local community, I realized I
had not been

the very social change to be recorded and
analyzed which my hypothesis called for. 7 As C. W. Mills says above,
permi~ting

each cultural setting has its own specific kind of change.

The social

~

change which the GPCC had organizationally 'promoted through its special
ized use of social insulation must be understood within the historical
context of its community and the peculiarities of this local ecumenical
~roup.

I have tried to view openly the GPCC·s own time, place and social

forces of change; therefore, I am not here tryi ng to genera 1i ze the
GPec's own form of change (through social insulation) to any other social
worlds.

As an aside, however, some form of social insulation appears to

me often to have been operative \A/hen non-parish clergymen and religious

groups participated in the civil rights activities during the Sixties
throughout the cQuntry--Selma, Cleveland, Chicago, Delano (California) .. ,
and many other places.
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Conservative Reaction in

~he

Local Churches

Historically, U. S. churches have been prodtlcts of strong pietistic
traditions, evident in our- four great Pietistic Awakenings, viz., Chapter
Documentation of-the great revivals reveals that pietism usually

2.

went hand in hand with conservat-ive politics. S. t4. Lipset states in a
study that the conservative pietist tl'''adition in the United States has
demonstrated a strong correlation w'tth the new conservative politics of
former, low-status liberalism of U. S. Catholics, as they have become
established, middle-class conservatives'o8 Lipset concludes that a
politically conservative attitude has run through the whole of our
religious history.
'-,

Several other studies reflect'the more recent conservative attitude

toward churches' involvement in socio-political problems.

Jeffrey Hadden

reports the data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center1s
Amalgam Survey, constituting a representative national sample of 1504
.

respondents.
public

9

agre~d

As an abstract statement, 82 per cent of the American
with the statement:

"Clergymen have a responsibility to

speak out as the moral conscience of this nation.
have restricted ideas as to what this means.

1I

However, those polled

Forty-nine per cent said

that clergy should not speak out on social, economic, and political
matters.

Seventy-two per cent agreed with the statement:

IIC1ergymen

who participate in demonstrations and picketing do more harm than good
for the cause they support.
ur~arti n ~uther

II

Another statement in this series read,

Ki ng, Jr., is an outstandi n9 examp1e of maki ng Chri s ti ani ty

relevant and meaningful for our day.
agreed with this statement.

II

Only 29 per cent of the samp1e

The response adds to the evidence that the
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American public will applaud the ideal of equality for black people,
while rejecting any real effort to change the actual conditions which
place the black man in a disadvantaged position.

Church attenders, as

well as the general public, do not view the church as an institution for
social change.

Twenty-seven per cent of the Protestants agreed with

Martin Luther King; 39 per cent of the Catholics agreed; and 59 per cent
of the Jews agreed wi th Ki ng.

In other words, the proporti on of the Jev/s

who felt that King's efforts were a relevant and meaningful expression of
Christianity was twice that of the Christians.

The survey shows that

approximately 70 per cent of our church population reject the different
ways in which cler§y have been involved in civil rights activities.
The same attitudes are corroborated by a similar survey published
in September, 1969, by the National Opinion Research Center for the
National Council of Churches.

It was also a representative, religious
cross-section (1,481) of United States' adult population. 10 The
.important fi ndi ng of the survey for our purposes was that a majori ty,
58.5 per cent of the sample, disapproved of church involvement, and only
36.7 per cent favored such action by the churches.

In an apparent con

tradiction, 54.9 per cent approved of the NCC's work, while 22 per cent
disapproved and 22.8 per cent had no opinion.

Also, 60.3"per cent said

they had heard of the NCC, which is composed of 33 Protestant and
Orthodox Churches.

In both surveys, the public said, i.e., clergymen

and churches should not "interfere" \"/ith the political and social prob
lems of the real world.
During the 1959 desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas,
Campbell and Pettigrew reported that out of 15 ministers who signed a
public statement protesting Gov. Faubus' calling out troops to preV€nt
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compliance with the Supreme Court order, at least nine clergymen had left
thei r churches Has a reasonably di }"ect resul t of the i ntegreti on con
flict. ull In January, 1963,' following James ~1eredith"s stormy entry into
the University of Missi,ssippi" 28 native-born, Mississippi Methodist
clergymen signed a statement publicly declaring their Christian belief
against race discrilnination.

Only two of the' 28 remained in the same

congregation as they had at the time they signed the statement, and only
n'ine remained in the state of Mississippi by 1965. 12 In 1~64 at
Cleveland, 46 pe"r cent of the white clergy (221, Protestant and 10 Jewish
rabbis) joined an ad hoc
- group which supported the desegregation of
black children through busing, and some ministers began to participate
in pickets. 13 J. K. Hadden's study of the ministers' participation in
the·C1eve1and desegregation

incident~

has showri that of the most active

ministers, at least 12 soon were forced to leave their" congregations,
and six left the ministry altogether.
In 1965 a new role pattern began to develop within the groups of
p~rticipating

clergy activists, who turned up at civil rights protests.

Most were non-parish clergy.

An examination of the Selma Freedom March

in 1965 showed that out of several hundred clergymen' who flew South to
Selma (estimated at 650), a large majority were:

staff members of

national church bodies, campus ministers and ministers to specialized
areas (depressed areas) not dependent upon a congregation for support. 14
During 1966 in Delano, California, J. ·K. Hadden observed the National
Council of Churches' Migrant Ministry·s participation in the grape
workers· strike against the DiGiorgio

Fru~t

Corporation and others.

He

said the data he collected indicated IIthat the large majority were not
parish pastors.

They came from the National Council of Churches, state

i
II

;
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and natiQnal denominational staffs, colleges and seminaries ll (emphasis
mine).15
The above national surveys and local s,tudies give broad support to
the . contenti on that the 1ay churchmen I s prevai 1i M9 atti tude has been and
continues to be decidedly conservative toward their churches' socio
political involvements.

The studies also'point to the· conservative reac

tion of most. lay church members as being focused upon the local parish
pastor.

Non-pari·sh ministers·have recently assumed the role of being

the church's activists in controversial social issues.
the strong cOrlservative reaction

demons~rated

In the light of

by laymen against their

activist pastors in other areas, why was there an apparent mild reaction
against the GPec's direct involvement ;n several controversial issues?

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
From both the newspapers and word of mouth, I had heard about the
Greater Portland Council of Churches' new venture 'into starting a full
time staffed community action program within the city's area of black
-residences, the Albina

a~ea.

Later I ,also read about the Council 'of '

Churches' downtown community action "Youth Ministry" program being
accused

by

the city police of aiding the youth drug traffic and the young

runaways, in the downtown ,area.

Wi th a few prel imi nary i ntervi ews ; nto

I
I

~

!

the organization intself, I found that the GPeC had, indeed, made a sig
nificant change in its practical goal's--from relative uninvo'lvement over
'to highly direct involvement in social action activities.

Some active

members af the organ; za ti on agreed that a percepti b1e soci,a 1 change had
i:

oGcurred in the organization during the first part of the Sixties.

During

this preliminary inquiry, most of those with whom I discussed the topic
agreed heartily with the idea of the GPCe's new effort, but a surprising
number also said they knew there was already a growing reaction in the
churches against the GPeCfs community action involvement.

This evidence

of the churches' reaction convinced me that a study of the GPec's organi
zati ona1 change woul d serve as a worthwh; 1e reseat"ch project.

I·

From thi s

cursory examination, I felt that change in organizational goals could be
well documented and reasonably verified by the events and reaction deveTop
ing in the GPCC.
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When I drew up my research proposal, I decided that the purpose of
the research \#Jould be prjmarily exploratory, rather than verifying an
hypothesis.
Data Gathering Methods
My plans for gathering information included three basic strategies:

<

I

(1) records--current and historical, (2) observation, and (3) personal

I

interviews.

II

Executive Director developed early, almost complete access was granted to

First, the

~ords.

Since good rapport with the GPCCls

••

!

the official files in the GPCC's main office.

They included the minutes

of many committees and planning commissions, together with the very
important records of the GPCC's Board of Directors' meetings.

The files

also contained all the. annual and semi-annual reports, which are mimeo
graphed and presented to each delegate to the annual and semi-annual
!:

General Assembly meetings.

The annual report is extensive, including

reports from all major commissions and committees, and thereby comprises
the organization's official accountability report to its member congrega
ttons.

In practi ce, however, only those congrega ti ons whi ch are vi ta lly

interested in the GPCC make the effort to attend these meetings and obtain
their reports.

The same goes for the semi-annual meeting in September.

The Executive Committee usually met each month, just a few days before
the Board of Directors' meeting.

This group of GPCC officers and execu

tive staff is relatively small, powerful and exclusive.
expected, I was not able to attend any of its

meet~ngs,

As might be
although its

minutes were usually made available to the Board members.

Often the

Executive Committee's report to the Board included a strong recommendation
to the Board for the adoption of a new policy or program..
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Although the directors of the three CApis granted me the privilege
of

e~amining

their own brief records, I found little need to do so.

Except for the verification of some data about two or three meetings of
Albina's C-CAP and the downtown Hub-CAP, I found much more productive
information about the CAP's several crises from re-interviewing key
-lnformants or seeking out nevi informants who were personally involved.
The second strategy was observation.

I asked

perm;ssio~

from the

director of each Church-CAP, along with the GPCCls Executive Director,
to attend board meetings and observe their programs in action.

I

observed (a) the three CAp1s--their leadership and staff, their programs
and the'ir meetings; and (b) the GPCC itself--staff and officers, their
meetings and their methods of relating to the member congregations and
to the CAP's.

With the permission of the Executive Director, I regularly

attended the monthly meetings of the GPCCls Board of Directors and the
meetings of the General Assembly--for two and a half years.

I also

attended some of the Church-CAP's annual meetings and a few of their
specially called crises meetings.
The third but primary source of data was in-depth interviewing.
conducted several preliminary, but lengthy interviews.

I

Most of these

were with the GPCC's executive staff and CAP directors, and also a few
member laymen and clergymen.
For the forma 1- ; ntervi e\AJS, I deci ded to use twenty respondents from
the active, or formerly active, members of the GPCC, who gave a balanced
representation of both conservatives and liberals.
meet these requi rements :

I wanted the list to

(a) at 1east as many 1aymen -as clergymen;

(b) a few delegates to the General Assembly, who are not on the Board of
Directors; (c) some former members of the Board of Directors from the

,i

I
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i
\

e(}V'ly 1960·s, as well as present Board members; (d) a representative

i

number of

a~tive members~or

officers from each of the three Church-CAP's

studi€d; (e) an equal number of liberals and conservativ€s--sl:tpporters

and critics of the GPCC's recent social actions.

I obtained the sug

gestiofls for names from the Executive Director and the organi zer of the

three Church-CAP's (then on leave of absence).

I made up my list from

their suggesti'ons, and then consulted with the most experienced
tary in the GPCC's main office.

secre~

I found that she had a broader know

ledge of the membership of the GPCC and was possibly more objective
about· tile members than anyone else that knew the people in the GPec.
With her suggestion, I made one change in the list of twenty_
Experience soon showed me that bein9 objective as an interviewer
was a job of constant vigilance against my own
things into the respondents·
clear to me.

s~atements,

inclinati~ns

to read

especially if they were not

It is difficult to clarify all sides of the respondents'

view on controversial issues in one sitting.
cqnscious effort to draw

mY

More and more, I made a

respondents out, but at the

sa~e

time, not

to lead them into making conclusions, pro or con, about the GPCets
crucial activities.

Knowing my own prejudices, I tried to "bend over

backwards" to let any conservative opinions emerge.
When I began my formal interviewing of the original list of tV/enty

I
I

II
I

1

respondents, I nad aOl ready done severa'l pre 1i mi na ry i ntervi ews of GPCC
staff members, and

therefo~e,

became quite well aware of the organiza

tion's lI officia1 11 line on its policies and current problems.

I had drawn

up what I thought were the major controversial issues that had faced the
three inner-city Church CApls:

(1) the initial oPPosition witnin the

GPCC against sponsor'ing the first CAP in i.\lbifl&; (2) the react-ion again.st
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the S.W. dowfltown Hub-CAP program, its Youth Ministry to runaways and
drug users through
the

O~tside

Chari~

coffee house and its medical drop-in center,

In; and {3} the reaction against the E-CApfs efforts to help

provide low-income housing through its Interfaith Housing Corpoy'-ation.
I built my first few interviews upon my knowledge of these three issues.
I t was not long before I found that the f'j rs t and ttl; rd were not rea 11y
issues.
mY

The research, or at least the interview'jng, was turned against

bas i c assumpti on about conservati ve reacti on exi s ti ng from the very

start.

This period became very confusing and difficult.

I had to go

back and do much more homework, by talking to some more of the staff
members out in the CAP's, etc.

Yet, I found that mY more unbiased

information, although less complete, was coming from those on the sample.
Consequently, I was also forced back to interviewing as well.
I began each interview with an opening statement that explained
i"n general terms what my study was about.

liAs you know, II I said, lithe

GPeC became directly involved in social action types of activities quite
a~ruPt1y

in 1964 when the Council hired Paul Schulze to start the first

Church CAP in Albina.

Also, as you knows the GPCCls Church CAP's have

proliferated into seven separate CAP's scattered throtighout the city.
As far as I can tell, before 1964 the GPCCls only direct invcrlvement in
soc; a1 a'cti on was he 1pi ng to support the chap1ai ncy program to the ci ty
and county jails, along with coordinating other band-aid types of help!l
such as Christmas baskets, etc.

It seems to me that taking on the

CAP's represents a very real social change within the organization of
the GPCC.
come about?

This social change is what I want to know about.

How did it

First, what were the elements that went into making the

change possible in the GPCC? Second, I want to know about the contro

I

I

I
I

I

I
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surrounding the decision by the GPCCls Board to sponsor 'the first

v~sy

CAP in Albina.

What pressures were exerted for or against this important

change of policy?1l .This opening statement usually gave a satisfactory
f.rame of reference to the interviewee of \tJhat -IT\Y study vias " rea l1 y u
about, and the two questions at the end of the general description helped
to focus the intervievleels first attempts to relate his own interpreta
tion of what happened in the first months of the new Church CAp·s begin
ning.
~epending

I

I
I
I
I

upon the answers I-received, the specificity with

~~ich

tne i ntervievlee described the process of the change" the number of
people he named and identified as being for or against the new program,
the degree to which he volunteered his own opinion about what had taken
place-~all

these things determined how I would follow up with further

ques~ions.Because

I was so interested, I always inquired sometime

I

during the intervie\\1 about the interviewee's own "attitude ll toward each

I

issue being discussed.

If necessary I would ask if he could remember

who on the Board, or in the GPCC·s power structure, had opposed an issue
about the new chan.ges to social
vi~wee

actio~l.

I would point out to the inter

that I needed all the information I could get on eacn issue, or

on any new controversial points which may have been stimulated by the new
social action policies or activities.
quest; on in one form or another:

To pursue this, I asked a broad

tlWere there any other' events or pro

grams that involved social action and that you noticed resulted in some
kind of negative reaction from within the GPCC? Out of this form of
question came most of'
analysis.

~~

other issues which are assessed in the content

As mY knowledge of issues broadened, so did my specific ques

tions increase dUY'ing the interviews.

In this way the interviews became
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less and less open-ended and more focused in style.

Ea~h

reference to a

controversy I had not known of before needed to be checked, then fit into
the total pattern of other social

invo'vements~

and compared with con

servative reactions from other controversies.
As a growing number of controversial issues came to light,

r tried

to check them out in the organizational files and minutes fQr their
seriotlsness in the context of a total conservative reaction.

I found

that the organization's written, records gave 4ittle important informa
tion about such controversies, as mentioned below.

Observation at some

'meetings about issues which were still current helped me substantiate
the fact that very controversial issues \.'.'ere either minimized or almost
unreported \'Ihen I read the minutes of the same meetings later.

I

I
I.

I
I
1

My

best

sources for rechecking leads to new issues was to go back to previous
resp'ondents whom i knew were especi ally knowledgeab 1e about a parti cul ar
~base

of the GPce·s work., When necessary, questions about the new issue

also became a part of future interviews.

In connection with

recheckin~

new informg.tion, I found that the GPee was becoming diversified into
enough different kinds of social action programs in different geographi
cal areas so that

v~ry

active volunteers working in one or more

progra~s

often had a limited knowledge of the GPeets total social action work.

I

also found that some Board members greatly minimized internal contro
versies, especially evidence of current serious disagreements within the
organi zati on.

I

J

f

I
I
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I

I

I

A Content Analysis
Soon after beginning the interviews in my orig'inal sample grou.p of
twenty, it became apparent to me that the three topics I had proposed to
use as the most important social act;-on issues for the GPCC then were
actually i naccura,te.

I had to discard two of those proposed topi cs as

issues and more accurately define the third.

In order to find out what

the most significant social action issues had

b~en,

I began to do a

brief cont€nt analysis upon the interview notes I had gathered from each
. formal interview.

In this manner, I was able to obtain a growing list

of the most important topics related to the GPCC's' change to so£ial
action goals as mY informants reported them.

At the same time,

rny

I

dent sociological

I

"obvious change to social action goals was jolted into con.fusion.

l
I
I

~nderstanding

confi

of what was happening inside the GPCC·s

ll

During this search for clarity, the application of a mini-content analy
sis ·to each interview became the instrument for pinning down what were
the real controversies at issue between conservatives and liberals.

In

the process, I discarded dead-wood topics, which had previously seemed
to be important issues to the GPCC's change.

The nine topics finally

settled upon as the key issues went through a constant metamorphosis of
redefining, till they were winnowed down to the definitions used in tAe
enclosed analysis.
In an attempt to evaluate the total interview sample, I have
applied a relatively simple form of a content analysis to the iflterviews
compiled together.

However, as an instrument for scientific evaluation

of "the whole sample, the content analysis used here is not without some

I

J

problems..

First is the problem of representativeness in the sample.

The

3£

original sample of twenty was not as representative a sample as I had
planned it to be.
~roblem

(Althoug~

in Chapter 1 I have discussed this same

more on a theoretical level in relation to the

hypoth~sls,

its

variables and their definit-ions, I pursue -it further here to explain the
specific difficulties of the sample1s representativeness.)

Sinte it was

not to be a random sample, but a stratified one, I wanted it to be a
rep~esentative

of as many strata of the GPeC as possible.

When I dis

covered the lack of conservative opinion within the sample, I soon
thought that I had fa1len. into,a great methodological hole by ,failing to
obtain a fair representation of the conservatives I was quite certain
were present. As discussed before, I doubled the interview sample to get
a better representatJveness, going out of my way to find several known
conservatives
1ncr~ased

wh~

had served on the GPCCts Board of Directors.

The

sample combined with the earlier one still showea a great dis

proportion of liberal opinions in the total sample.

I finally realized

that the kind of equality between conservative and liberal opinion I
h~d

wanted represented in the sample would not be an accurate sample,

simply because the actual population was not so divided.

My

sample was

from the leaders and active, volunteer participants of the GPCC, which
largely excluded those church laymen who are generally the conservatives
of the mainline denominations.
When I recogni'zed the study was focused on that group of people
who actively worked in the political structure of the organization,
together with those who ,voluntarily and professionally worked in

carryin~

out the social action programs, instead of on the formally defined total

.

I

roombership"t¥hich included all the lay members of the GPCets member
churches, then the results of my sample started to make sense.

As I

~

J

.-

I

,

~

J

·I·
I
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finally understood this reality, the large number of forty-one tn-depth

interviews became very adequate for their stratified representativeness.
I interviewed 25 present aRd former manbers of the Board of Directors.
As discussed in Chaptel" 9, 35 people held 38 of the GPCC·g elect"tve

posi"~

tions for 84· per cent of the time over the ten year period studied, and
30 others held the· rest of those offices one term or less during the teil
years.

The study's interview samp'le amounts to 38 per cent of the total

number of people who served on the Board at different intervals during
the ·ten years.

Further, the ',overall sample of 41 had ,a balance between

'clergy and laymen, as well a's a good representation of people who had
served on the Board 9t different intervals during the ten years, going
back before 1959. _The sample also contained a representative number
(nine) from the three Church-Community Action Programs studied, both pro
fessional staff and volunteer laymen.

I also intervie\\fed two lay

delegates to the General Assembly who were not in the lIinner circle n of
decisions (Board, Commissions or key committees) and not active volun
teers.

Seven women were in the total sample; four of them were elected

lay officers,. and three were professional staff people.
As far as trying to obtain a representative group for its conserva-,
tive opinion in

my

s.upplemental sample, I asked several staff members and

active officers for suggestions about some people who would be good
representatives of the conservative view in the GPCC.

Through this

-effort, I located five very staunch conservatives for the extra sa'mple,
making the total sample consist of ten confirmed conservative viewpoiRts.
I am now certain that this number with strong conservative

vi~ws

is

overly representative of that view out of the total population of activ,e
participants.

Yet, I now think that extra minority representation is

J

3'4

helpful to the study"s understanding of what actually went on between the
conservatives and liberals in the light of the extremely liberal nature
of the rest of the informants.
As can be seen from the content analysis, Table 1, the same por
ti'on discussed above did not include the GPeC's professional
people.

s'~aff

(At this point, I am only discussing the representativeness of

the -first 29 responcients indicated on the analysis table.)

It seems to

me that this sample is adequately stratified and representative.

With

·such a high proportion ·(38 pe.r.ce,nt) of the orgaryization's active parti-.
'cipants being in the sample,' it fits Coleman's (1959) definition of a
"dense" sample,. in which data are gathered from a large number of mem
bers of the

releva~

structure (informal organization).

Incltlded in the total, expanded sample were twelve staff members
from the GPCC's own

executiv~

offices, together with staff from the

Church-CAP's and other program divisions., Not count·jng secretaries, the
accountant and audio-visual librarian, all but two of all professional
staff rrembers were in this part of the sample.

(When all, or almost all,

members of the relevant social structure are surveyed, Coleman calls
the procedure a J'saturation" sample.)
The seccnd problem with the content analysis has to do with the
very purpose for which I used the analysis.

Early in the study as I

tried to interpret the interviewing data, I began to use the analytic
tool to
GPCC.

lip~"ovell

there was some conservative reaction present within the

I found I was in the process of placing an increasing importance

upon quantifying mY data (through the use of the content analysis) in
order to verify the casual relationship which I had been unintentionally
transpos·ing ilito the hypo_thesis..

It

n0W

appears that I was trying to

35

verify that causal relationship in order to justify my transformed
n,ypothesis, but the hypothesis really did not say that.
Of course, the original intent of the hypothe$is was not to verify
a theory, but to explore and "shed sociological light"

UpGA

what had

taken place in the GPCC·s organization when it abruptly broke into
socia1 action involvement.

The intended purpose of the content analy

sis 'was not to establish strict quantitative accuracy for verification,
but primarily to decipher. the major categories of controversial social
issldes--on the basis of ,the negative reaction each one

generat~d.

That

. is to say, accurate quantititiveness applied to the content analysis here
is not to be despised, but on the other hand, I need not have become as
preoccupied as I
ness.

dt~

with that analytic method's degree of quantitative

I was much too concerned wi th the standard of "sci enti f; cness II it

added to the study.
This unnecessary emphasis upon quantitative measurement is illus
trated in the

essenti~lly

non-directive style of interviewing used.

Because I· used this interviewing method as much as possible, there was a
great unevenness to the quality of information obtained.
varied;

Subject material

reliability and accuracy varied; language and style varied.

However, as my information grew

~ore

specific about the different issues

and their importance, so did the directness of my questions about those
issues.

It worked out, therefore, that the interviews slowly changed

from non-dir€ctive
\'Jere

to more focused interviews.

Yet, if analysis Table 1

to begi n to approach some sta ti sti ca1 ·accuracy, the data fed into

it from the start would have had to come out of a structured interview
questionnaire, universally

administered~

Many of the early

i~formants

were not given a chance to express their attitude about all of the nine

I
l

...~,.

....0

issues ultimately defined as the most substantive for the comparative
analysis.

Although I drid go back to several of those early ;·nterviewees

to obtain their opinions about previously undefined and unmentioned
issues, the overall analysis was not a's uniformly applied as a fully
scientific 'instrument should

On the contrary, however, the origina1

b~.

and, hopefully, recovered purpose of the study is not to verify a
theory, but explore the sociological reasons behind the GPee's

abr~pt

social change.
Another ,illustration of the difficulty with this method's less
scientific analysis is that each interviewee's response was
interpreted by the researcher in classifying the responses.

s~bjectively

It would

have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply some form of
objective criteria to measure on a sliding scale the degrees between
liberalness, and conservativeness.

In the exploratory interview, a wide

latitude of freedom must be allowed informants to communicate their own
experiences and subjective views, especially about deep-felt insecuri
ties stemming from politico-religious problems.

Although the data were

not gathered by a structured questionnaire, administered to achieve
, quantifiable statistics, the analysis also lacks a high degree of quanti
fication.
Content analyses have been used most frequently to analyze mass
media, or various kinds of recorded material:
specialized articles, radio-TV,

~istorical

newspapers, magazines,

journals and docUlnents, etc.

In so doing, specific indices can be adopted for coding the material,
such as:

the number of times a word appears; amount of prominence given

to a subject in headlines or prime viewing time; the style of the author-
phrases and wor~ing.l

By focusing on such specific references, a high
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level of systematic analyses have been confirmed in these studies.

In

this study, however, personal spontaneity had to take precedence over
limitation (quantification) of the' subject material.

Consequently, anal .v

sis of the material only allowed for the researcher's relatively subjec
tive interpretation of the interviewee's subjective V'jews into simple,
codified symbols.

In order to prevent over-subjective interpretations

at this point of analysis, two simple.categor'ies are used:

servative, and "LI! - liberal.

lie" - con

Two additional categorfes-- Il W' - neutral

(due to lack of 1nf9rmation or personal involvement in the issue) and

nU" - undecided--helped to eliminate much prejudicial speculation in
interpreting unclear answers.
The final problem is the list of issues itself.

The nine issues

may be considered as not necessarily exhaustive of all possible contro
versial social issues engaged in by the GPCC, as reflected by informants.
Since a thorough content analysis should 'classify and analyze as much
relevant material as possible, I made a special effort to include all
such significant issues faced by the GPeC in the ten year span.

For

instance, there were two issues I did not include in the analysis which
were on the border line.

The first one was the GPCC's vigorous leader

ship in the 1965 state legislative fight against capital

punishrr~nt.

GPCC leaders had actively lobbied for such a bill in the legislature and
then led a state-wide campaign to pass the public referendum to abolish
capital punishment.

Mostly because only four informants ·said that this

issue had raised a mild reaction within the GPCC, and two were not too
sure of that much reaction, I did not include it.
Another issue not included in the list but seriously considered wa
the GPeG-'s active participation in the peace movement against the war in
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Vietnam.

It was mentioned spontaneously by about six respondents.

Almost always, however, it was mentioned as a comparative issue in rela
In retrospect, though, I think this may have

tion to SQme other onec

been due to the fact that at the beginning of interviews, I emphasized I
was interested in the GPCC·s abrupt movement into social action through
the Church CAP's.

When.! pursued further questions about this issue

if it was mentioned, respondents most often answered that the GPCC did

finally take a stand against U.
but only in general terms.

S~

participation.in the Vietnam conflict,

It never d·id _call for United States withdrawal

of its arme9 forces, nor did it sanction participation in an anti-war
demonstration.

Two respondents (one clergyman) say they had partici

pated in such demonstrations in downtown Portland, and had incurred
negative reacti ons from church members for thei r personal act; vi t-j es.
They also said several other active GPCC members (about 10) took part in
some of their anti-war activities in Portland.

These same respondents

added that the GPCC's Board still had too many people who were lion the
fence"

~bout

the GPCC's "right," as a church organization, to take a

political stand about such a controversial issue.

Minutes of the Board

of Directors have indicated that the issue was debated several times, but
gave little more information; yet, there is no indication that the
GPCC forced the issue into the public eye.

No significant public contro

versy appeared to have arisen· about the issue against the GPCC.

Because

of the few respondents who spontaneously reported the issue and the lack
of conservative reaction to the issue, I did not include it in the con
tent analysis.
The question naturally arises--what were the specific criteria for
determining those issues that \'lere used in the analysis? The most

..

~

~

~"

~ t,.
,~
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important standard was that which has been discussed at length pre
viously--tRe degree of conservative reaction generated by the issue.
weighed the, amount of reaction by:

T

J.

(1) the number of people who spontane

ously mentioned a particular issue, (2) the importance or degree of con
troversialness which the respondents placed on each issue they described,
(3) . the amount of debate,
time and importance each issue appeared to be


given in the organizational records, and (4) how well the descriptions
of the issues' controversial ness fit with the information about the other
issues.
The technique I used in applying these four criteria goes back to
the method I used to analyze my interview notes.

Following each inter

view, I tried immediately to rewrite and fill in my brief notations.
Usua,lly it was duri ng the i ntervi ews themselves that I fi rs t detected
new properties, which hinted at newer, separate categories for contro
versial issues.
separated out and

In the post-interview writing, the new properties were
not~d.

First, I ,coded the new properties with abbreviations in the margin.
Second, I searched for simi 1ar ki nds of references , and compared the
newer properties for possible emerg'ing categories of controversial
issues.

Third, I made special notes of the number of similar refer

ences and their possible connections with new issues.
was essentially a process of evaluating and

combi~ing

The third step
the new properties

into new, relevant categories, which applied the four- criteria above by
measuring the members· degree of conservative reaction, generated by the
GPCC's involvement in the new issue.

This is mY own version of what

B.. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss have called lithe constant comparative
method of qualitative analysis. 112

• - ' j;,'

"~,'

· ~r
Of COllrse, the pragmatic applicat-jon of this three step procedure
of constant comparison 'was not a1ways smooth.

An example of the diffi

culties in ,assembling enough valid properties to construct an imP9rtant
category is illustrated in the events leading to my discovery of the
spec's dispute over House Bill 1307 (1965, to equalize educational
opportunities through busing), and the following re?lction, led by Robert
Pampiin (viz. Chapter 6).

I had heard two or three slight references

to·this controversy during· the first seven or eight interviews.

Each of

the early references to, the dispute were so vague that I did not grasp
.that the r'eferences were to the same issue until much later.

When I

interviewed the most active Roman Catholic priest in the GPCC, Father
Griffin, he said that he did not know the details of the fight, since
it was well before his time, but he had discovered mOf'e latent strong

feelings about the "Pamplin affair" than any other event in the GPCC's
past.

Griffin knew only the bare outline of the issue--that it had to

do with the GPCC's activity in lobbying the legislature over an issue
and that it developed into a larger dispute about the GPec's rightness
iR taking sides on political issues.

He said he had heard that ,Pamplin

had quit the GPCC's Board over the disagreement with the Board.

Conse~

quently, that one interview from a relatively new participant in the
GPeC led me to pursue the issu.e in further interviews, and forced me to

do much back-tracki'ng by rei ntervi ewi ng previ ous respondents and re
exam; ni ng further records.' I found through . thi 5 effort that the earl i er
controversy was the real cri sis po; nt ; n the GPec' s
to social action involvement.

of changi ng

I had come close to missing this major

turning-point controversy.

.~

pl~ocess

;

oil
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Since classification into categories of the content to be analyzed
must have clear definitions in order to compare, analyze and test them
in the future, a brief definition of each of the nine issues used in our
content analysis now follows.

The'first issue on the content analysis

in Table 1 is the GPCC's original decision to sponsor the first Church
CAP in the Albina area.

As the table indicates, there was less negative

reaction against this social action move than against all other nine
issues.
The second issue was the dispute over House Bill 1307 (1965), which
called for busing of disadvantaged school children, mostly black, to
qualified schools where classes in music, art, theater and other cultural
s~bjects

were offered.

One of the Board of Directors, R. Pamplin,

vigoroLJsly opposed the GPCC taking an active part in lobbying the legis
lature for this bill.

When it was passed, Pamplin became even more

adament about the GPCC·s own organizational means of deciding to become
involved in a controversy over a "political" matter • .He accused the
Executive and Social Concerns Committees of by-passing the Board of
Directors.
The third issue was the GPCC's undefined and loose organizational
authority over the CAP's.
the CAP's:

Ultimately, who was to have authority over

the CAP's own local Boards and .staff, or the GPCC?

It was

never really resolved until the financial squeeze of the Seventies
dictated practical answers;
The fourth

issu~

was East-CAP and its aid to the S.E. Portland poor,'

especially its low-cost housing programs.

Of the three Church CAP's, it

carried on, by far, the least controversial social action program.

1
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The fifth issue \\'as the local Grape Boycott, which was a IIsecond
ary" boycott, supporting the Uni ted Farm Workers' stri ke, led by Cesar
Chavez.

The GPCCls Board never voted to support-the Boycott directly,

but did vote to affirm, publicly, the farm workers' right to organize,
bargain collectively and strike.

This liberal vote caused great dissen

sion within the Board.
The -sixth issue was the downtown nYouth Ministry," centered 'in a
cof.fee house, The Charix, and a 24-hour drop-in medical center, the
Outside-In.

1

The program sympathetically assisted runaways and other

youth in all kinds of trouble.

Because the city police accused the Youth

Ministry program of harboring runaways and allowing drugs to be exchanged
at the coffee house, the "youth ministry" made front page headlines and
motivated immediate public reaction.
The seventn issue was C-CAP's (Albina area, 1968) special summer
program of varied social actions for the black people to meet the "black
crisis" following Martin Luther King's assassination.

A young, contro

versial black leader, Colden Brown, who was accused in the press of being
a revolutionary, was hired to oversee the program.
The eighth issue was the internal reaction, led by a new Treasurer
of the GPCC, against the over-use of funds in the 1968 Summer Crisis
programs, chiefly in Albina's C-CAP.

This led to further conflicts

between C-CAP and the Executive Director .
. The ninth issue was the relative fa'i1ure of a financial funding
campaign in 1969.

The GPCC badly needed income to meet the large deficit

still hanging from the

SUfllmer

Crisis programs.

A professional financial

campaign company was hired to lead it, but less than one-sixth of the
total $250,000 was achieved.

It led to a lawsuit with the campaign
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company and the feeling of some members that it was a reaction against
the GPce's recent over~involvement in social actions.
To what

EYrE9~e

does the content analysis serve the investigation?

Although it has difficulties of exactness, the analysis permits an over
view of the conservative-liberal spectrum within the GPCCls internal

organization.

It lays out with fair objectivity the pattern of atti.

tudes which the· org.anization's core group had toward commuflity action
involvement.

The analysis serves to give some concrete, empirical evi

dence that, unlike the general membership of most mainline Protestant
cnurches, the GPGC,

~

an organization, was consistently supportive and

directly involved with ·socio-political issues.
The purpose of the overall content analysis is to determine the
relative amount of conservative reaction each of the nine controversia1
issues developed.

The proportion of the conservative attitude toward

each issue is compared to the relative degree of liberal support each
issue r'eceived.

By comparing the results of each issue, I \'Ias originally

attempting to find some sociological pattern in the different conserva
tive reactions.

However, it is easily seen that no issue came close to

generating a significantly large conservative opinion.

Looking at the

column for conservative opinions' percentages, all but two issues are
similar in size.

The first issue, the GPCC1.s decision to begin the first

Church CAP, ;s significant in its extremely low degree (2 per cent) of
conservative reaction.

The fourth issue, East-CApls activities, is also

relatively low at 10 per cent, compared to the others at 15 to 20 per cent.
The real variations are seen ;n the other two percentage columns,
the liberal opinion and the undecided-no opinion columns.

Most of the
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issues' high percentages of liberal support may be more instructive than
the conservative percentages.

It is noteworthy that the eighth issue,

the downtown youth ministry to the drug scene, runaways, etc., received
the highest proportion (71 per cent) of liberal support.

It coincides

with the largest amount of coverage given any issue by the press and
with the opinion of many respondents that this issue generated the most
public reaction.

Three more issues had a high (66) percentage of liberal

support: . the fi rst, thi rd and seventh issues.

In connecti on wi th the

first issue, the sixth issue, the ]968 Black Summer, Crisis program in
Albina, reached its apex at the same time as the downtown Youth Ministry,
and received some press coverage along with it.
'public reaction, because of such publicity.

It also stirred extra

The strong liberal support

for the third issue, the organizational difficulties between the CApls
and the GPCC's main office, probably ref1ects the internal tension that
L

was still unresolved at the time of the interviews.
.;:;-

~ ...~~.e ~

The last imp(}rtant point to note on the analysis table is the 51
per cent recorded for the second issue's undecided--no opinion.

The

second issue'was the 1965 controversy over HB 1307, which led to whether
the GPCC properly should be involved in socio-pol'itica1 matters at ail.
Over half of the interviewees either did not have first hand knowledge
about the issue, or had forgotten the bi tterness of the fi ght a'nd its
import,ance.

It seems that the di stance of time and the turn-over of

personnel had made the diffe'rence in this issue's significance.
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A New Strate9l.
What follows is a brief description of the where and how a basic

alteration in mY research procedure took place--from straight data
gathering about variables over

t~

deciphering the

interveni~g

ences -_.
between independent and dependent variables.

influ-,

As noted before, I

,

found mY expectations for conservative reactions from interviews taken in
the GPCels higher structure were largely iefuted.

I

thou~ht

that there

would have been a good dispute among the GPCCls Board members over their
starting

(f

€ommunity (action program in the city·s black residential area.

In preparing the study's proposal) I had interviewed the Rev. Pau1 Schulze
two times.

He was the GPCC's first organizer and administrator of the

first three Church-CAP's.
question, "Why?"

Now later in the research I was plagued by the

Why no di spute? Why didn t the Board at least have a
I

\...

vigorous debate about such a radical decision to become directly involved
in social action work? So I went back to Schulze and asked him.
very concise statement, Schulze answered:
First was an ad hoc

com~ittee

IIThree things were involved.

of mostly white churchmen, calling them

selves the Albina 'Community Concerns Council. I
organiz~

some kind,of local social action.

They were trying to

Second was the United Metho

dist Church Women of Oregon, interested in social causes and
$10,000 to spend.

In a

wi~h

about

Third was the Greater Portland Council of Churches.

William Cate (Executive Secretary of the GPCC) got all three together and
performed a three-way marriage.

II

Schu'lze ' s analysis became the key for mY understanding the multiple,
interacting,elements that went into making that originally
but ultimately radical, change of goals for the GPCC.

uncontested~

Schulze gave me
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naw~s

of others who could fill in more details about,the Board's first

decision to go into Albina--people from the United Methodist Church Women
and the former Albina Community Concerns Council.

With these extra

interviews, I concluded there were five distinct organizational elements
that prevented any serious criticisms by conservatives on the Board.
(l.

The United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference--their progressive

effort and 1arge sums of money; 2.
Albina; 3.

The Commun i ty Concerns Counci 1 of

The GPCC's Social' Concerns Comm'ittee;

- Executive Director of the

GP·C~;

4.

William Cate,

'and 5. ,The pervading "secularized" atti-,

tude of the majority active member churches of the GPCC.
Out of these five organizational elements

c~me

See Chapter 9.)

the properties which later

became the sociological categories that are the theoretical keys to the
whole research, viz., Chapter 11.

The first and most important category

to emerge and unlock the other categories waslorganizational oligarchy.
It became the key, because it opened up the way to mY seeing the other
categories and seeing ·them in a sociological whole--together.

More and

more bits of information added to mY' conclusion that the GPCC leaders
usurped and continued to use more and more authority than was formally
constituted in their offices.

In the process they increasingly avoided

challenges from within the organization to change its goals.

The insight

led to an origin'ci'lly unproposed investigation of the GPCC's organizational
structure-process~

As I continued my planned research, I found a minimum of negative
reaction within the GPCC against those issues derived from the GPCCls
three Church CApes activities.

Although I found a

la~ger

proportionate

reaction was stimulated by the CAP's controversial activities than by the

"

I
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Boardls initial,

December~

toward the CAP's

~ere

1963, decision, the later negative reactions

still much less than 1 expected.

Of course, it

was during this time my investigation intensified on answering the why
for this low degree of reaction against the CAP's social action programs.
vJhy were my data continuing to shovl a minimal rea.ction?

Not real izing

it at the time, I was then attempting to interpret what was going on

between the variables.

Retrospectively, I see mY sear'ching them to make

sense out of the clues which pointed to some kind of interruption of
those normal reactions by conservatives within the overall' organization.
: Si nee- the same muted reacti on by conservati ves followed each succeedi ng
controversial issue examined, an increasing number of the same accompany
ing social patterns--relevant categories--became more uniform in my
analysis of the growing data.
Before sta rti ng thi s paper, I had r'ead (some of Gl aser and Strauss I
book, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY, but at that time I did not have
enough practical research "hooks" on which to hang new charts for later
methodological storms.

During much of the work on this study, therefore,

I did not make the association of mY own problem back to Glaser and
Strauss· "grounded theory" method.

Because of the indefiniteness of

nondirective interviewing, I was more plagued by the real accuracy of my
own data ," ra ther than genera ti ng some new theory .. Gl aser and Straus s
maintain that instead of verifying someone else's theGries, more socio
logical research should be aimed at generating theory.

Obviously, in

order to yerify theory, emphasis must be on accurate quantitative data.
Because the generation of theory forces the researcher to evaluate what
goes on between the variables, qualitative data becomes much more
important.

Yet, Glaser and Strauss say:
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Our position in this book is as follows: there is no fundamental
cla,sh between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and
quanti tati v-e, methods or data. -What cl ash there is concerrlS the
primacy of emphasis on verification or generation of theory--to
which heated discussion on qualitative versus quantitative data
have been linked

hi~torically.

We believe that each form of

data is:useful for both verification and generat1Oi10fthe'OrY,
whatever the primacy of emphasis. Primacy depends only on the
circumstances of research, on the interests and training of the 3
researcher~ and on the kinds of material he needs for his theory.
Gl aser and' -Strauss" employ a form of campara ti ve ana lys is a s the
foundation of their method for generating theory. ' They recommend the" con
stant comparing, of information taken from many contrasting soc"ial groups,
, data and conclus'ions from parallel and contrasting studies--all to gain
the patterns of their sirrlilarities and differences.

In this way, more

and more abstract categories and their properties emerge from the data.
Essentially, hypotheses are generated in the same manner, moving from the
tentative, substantive
the differences
relationships

to

more formal, abstract hypotheses.

By comparing

(

and~similarities

bet\~een

between emerging categories, the general

the categorie.s soon appear.

Multiple relationships,

and therefore, multiple, suggested hypotheses are often pursued simul
taneously.

The researcher must

cons~antly

analyze his new field data by

comparing them with his previously gathered data and with material from
studies by other sociologists.

Glaser and Strauss emphasize the need to

be open to seeing while in the 'act of field work the

II

real life" rela

tionships of social Uthings," occurrences, people, data, etc.
In the beginnings one1s hypotheses may seem unrelated, but as
categories anq properties emerge, develop in abstraction, and
, become related, their accumulating interrelations form an inte
grated central theoretical framework--the core of the emerging
theory. The core becomes a theoretical guide to the further col
lection and anarysis of data. 4
Applied to my own effort to answer the evaluative question, "Why no reac
tion to the GPCCls rea'l controversial activities?", I look back and see I
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was comparing and putting together many lists of properties and cate
gories to try to'come up with a plausible social pattern for an answer.
My organizational analysis of the GPCC was the beginning of my own. '·"com

parative analysis" 'of reasons I found for' the lack of conservative reac
ti on..

When I reread G1 aser and Strauss' .book, I rea 1i zed .thei r method

·was a systematic treatment of what I was fumbling to do in mY search
a

~thod~-in

fo~

my attempt to evaluate or interpret .the data I was getting.

By comparing the several major controversial issues immersing the GPCC
dur'ing .the 1960's, I. found·that the properties.,

c~tegories.

and concepts

. emerged slowly into a whole, which served as an "answer," or a tentative
theory for this particular group, for this particular time and place.
I have mentioned before that the organizational analysis I was
"forced" into resulted

i~

ITlY conclusion about the oligarchic nature of

the GPCC's governing process.

When I compared its particular form of

oligarchy w'ith Paul Harrison's study of the Southern Baptist Convention, I
found that constitutionally the organizations were very similar and led
to the same legal powerlessness in the leadership of both organizations.
This condition in both groups, combined with membership apathy, Wil1aim
Cate's special qualities and ex-officio membership on all committees
(viz . , Chapter 9), allowed Cate and executives of the Southern Baptists
both' to ta'ke strong practi ca1 control of thei r respective organi zations.
Through this comparison, it was apparent that the GPCC's oligarchy
simulated Harrison's description of IIgrasped,II'or rational-pragmatic
authority.

This added set of properties, illuminated by Harrison's

grasped authority, further defined my first category of a deve1of)ing
theory, and opened the way for mY seeing most of the other six major cate
gories of the social insulation theory.
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In fact, at the conc1usion of my organizational analysis, I thought
I had found the fundamental answer to

my

over'a11 qual i tati ve questi on.

I

felt then that the special form of the GPeC's rat'ional-pragmatic oligarchy
was the basic sociological reason for the GPee's ability to control its
own reactionary critics.

Although it was a IIl og jcal" independent variable

,by itself, it was not, a historically sufficient
some of the later GPCe controversies.

on~

\'Jhen I looked ,into

Instead of becoming the answer in

itself, oligarchy became one of the major categories of the paper's inclu
sive theoretical answer--social insulation.
The discussion about the GPCC's organizational processes (Chapter
9) largely describes the emergence of othe"r major categories.
apathy became so visible and important

~o

Membership

make the organization funct:ion

as an insulator that I listed it as the .first form, or category, of the
GPce's insulation.

Another category which appeared at the same time

during the working out of the analysis was the necessity of an adequate
source of money to implement the new social action programs.

The data

showed the basic power of conservative reactionaries against liberal
religious organizations is the withholding of finances.

This becomes more

evident when compared with all highly voluntary organizations.
Together with oligarchy, the above two categories first appeared to
me as indicators of a dependent Variable, which I was visualizing as
"causing" the low-level reaction.

Another category that a1so emerged

during this same, time of analysis wa·s II structural insulation. II

However·

as I compared the concept of the "structural" quality of insulation with
the other categories, I realized that insulation was much more than a
static set of

ot~ganizational

forms," but a dynamic process.

I found that

the process of managed communication between insider-leader-activitists
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and the rest of the organization was the constitutive category of insula
-tion.

From there the other categories began to fit together into a part

of the larger process of social insulation.
category.

Insulation was more than a

It embraced' ·all -of the ..other·-.categories.- It was a dialectic

process in which the leaders' (notably, Cate and Schulze) used their
. peculiar grasp of organizational authority to

foc~s

a' major movement

\'Jithin Western. rel igion--secularizati-on--into ..local social activism.

i

.,

I

j
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CHAPTER III
A COMPARISON OF SOME CLASSICAL THEORIES
OF RELIGION" $ ROLE IN SOCI ETY:
A PARADOXICAL IMPACT
I

In developing a working hypothesis for this study, two separate
'points of

vie~

are considered.

The first views religion as,befhg pre-'

dominantly a conservative influence upon society.

The second also views

religion as being conservative in some instances, but at the same time,
an important prodder and stimulator'toward social change--a liberalizing
,influence.

Fo~

the first view, several outstanding writers in the

sociology of religion have said that religion contributes more to the
conservation of the social status

~

than it encourages social change.

Some of the best known people who have expressed this point of view are
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx and more recently, Kingsley Davis
and Will Herberg.

Obviously, all these people have not stated this point

simply and categorically in the same manner, but each one has concluded
with some form of this view, accompanied with their evidence supporting
religion's conservative influence.
Emile'Durkheim's sociology of knowledge greatly determined his view
of religion.

He was convinced that knowledge is mediated most funda

mentally by S()cial categories.

All

II

coll ective representations" are

appropriated by men through their common social relationships and social
I

II

structures.

Social consciousness or conformity is developed within moral

I

l

and logical categories through the social representations.

Durkheim,

,j
i
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consequently, went back to the "primitive" religion of the '&.ustralian
!'

aborigines 'to find out 'how their collective life. style helped form the

I'

collective representations 9f, rel;gion~

~

Because of his

s~rong disagr~ement

with the socialistic theory of

the inevitability of class conflict; Durkheim continued to base even his
.' view of religion. upon "organic solidarity."

Durkheim',fear,ed the politi

cal and social conflicts of his ,time as a general moral breakdown
related to the breakdown of religion.

Religi9n's

purpos~,

,it, was to solidify and conserve the order of its soc"iety.

as he viewed
He concluded

that ,all societies since the primitives have ha,d religions and divided
their society into distinct "sacred and profane rea1ms.
ll

Religion and

the sacred are absolutely necessary to the profane part of society to
give it unity, or·solidarity.

Religion, then, plays a very important

role in conserving each society's own social order by binding the members
of society together in a collective interaction that is qualitatively
different from that of daily life.

Religion becomes a necessary and

permanent part of society, because it performs this necessary conserva
tive function for society--the solidifying, or integrating, of society.
Max Weber wrote a long essay, which in substance agreed very much
with Durkheim'& view of the conservative role of religion. 2 Weber's
thesis was that religion in-general, but especially Christianity,
placates those people who are frustrated and disappointed by their
plight in this world.

The same concept of religion's social function is

the basis of Karl Marx's conclusion that religion helps to stymY "class
consciousness and social revolution by being an opiate of the people.
ll

Davis' views on religion also closely parallel Weber's essay on
the conservative function of religion. 3
Kingsl~y

;.'
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Without denying his analysis of religion1s overall conservative
role, Weber, however, took an oPPos,ing view in his THE PROTESTANT ETHIC
AND THE SPIRIT OF, CAPITALISM. ,In

,thi~

work, he tried to show that the

Calvinist, Church of th'e eighteenth century (not Ca]vin's own teachings)
",promoted the idea that econdmi c success, hard work ,and frugal i ty were
, , proof of" di'vine election, i.e., pt"edestined salvation. 4 Directly due to
, this motivation, Weber argued, Protestant
ma,k; ng as a moral duty. ," As

~eber I

asceticism,sanctio~ed

profit

s defenders have since poi nted out, he

was not trying to depict, the Protestant Reformation to have been the
"cause" of modern capital ism. ' 'Rather" Weber was demonstrating the strong
correlation between Calvinism's new ethical norms ,and the psychological
requirements of the new economic system.

In other words, Weber saw

that Calvinism was not providing the lower 'classes with any comfort to
assuage their problems, but complimenting the successful.
In two separate works, Weber presented arguments on both sides of
the question, whether religion has a conservative or liberal influence
upon society.

In his PROTESTANT ETHIC, however, it seems that Weber is

presenting Calvinism as an exception to a more general rule for world
religions.

Weber, indirectly then, suggests the insight that religions

play an ambivalent role in society.

To supplement this idea, S. N.

Eisenstadt in a recent. essay defends Weber's Protestant Ethic theory and
amplifies it by showing Protestantism's more conservative influences upon
society.

Eisenstadt shows how the new Protestantism had various kinds of

effects in different cultures and countries.

Depending upon their

style of government 'and cultural background, his findings illustrate
the ambi va 1ent i nfl uence Protestanti sm 'has had upon its varyi ng soc; 0
economic environment. 5 , In some cases, its religious influence has been
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towa rd changi n9 the old order into new patte rns, whi ch corrob.orates
Weber's 'idea that the P~otestant Ethic stimulated the new capitalist
economi.cs. . I n other cases, Ei sens tadt. holds, contrary to Weber, tha t
Protestantism has had a

~onservative

influence to maintain the social

status 9..!!Q. in certain areas ..
On the progress; ve side, Ei sen$.tctdt says Protestanti sm has had a
_.Utransformative c;apacity to legitimize, in religi9us or ideological
terms,. the development of

ne~

motivations, activities and new institu

tions which' were not encm)1passed by their original impuJses and views." 6
Eisenstadt defines "transformative capacities" in terms of three aspects
of Protestantism:

(1) a combination of "this-worldliness" and trans

cendentalism; (2) emphasis on individual activism and responsibility;
. a.nd (3) direct re1ationship of the individual to .the sacred, minimizing
!

the institutions.

When these three characteristics interacted with those

conducive socio-political conditions which freed the transforming
capacities of

Protest~ntism,

significant social changes resulted.

Eisenstadt says the key condition was autonomy in cultural, political
and economic institutions, which was present more in some Western Europe
countries than others, e.g., Spain and France.

Protestantism1s trans

forming powers varied in degree and quality from country to country,
dependi ng' 'upon the di fferent area' s abi 1i ty to absorb ·the· re 1i gi ous
transformative ideology.
Eisenstadt admits Weber did.not.pay. too much attention to Protest
antism's transformative effect upon the political sphere, but says it
was one of the most impor'tant, because it substi tuted the idea of
covenant and contract as a new view of "natural law. 7 It freed natural
ll

law from magical c()ncepts and capl"iciaus gods.

"

.

It made nature and rnen1s

m!!!""!

L
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own interrelationships subject to rational order.

In contrast to

countries which remaine'd· predominantly Roman Cathol ic, Protestant rulers
had to find new sources of legitimation other than the. church.

This

caused their developing new,· independent symbols for national identity
and the restructuring of central. legal institutions.

Consequently, when

there already existed a .potentia] openne.ss or flexibility in the p61iti
Gal and cultural

ceDt~rs

religious innovations of

of a.country, their'interactions
~he.

wi~h

the

new Protestant groups. allowed various

.degrees of institutionalizing of the, new

socio-e~onornic

forms.

Protestantism's transformative capacities were smallest where
Protestant groups attai ned full. powers--hence, restri cti ve, 1ega1is ti c
atti tudes were acti va ted, e. g., the Geneva experi rnent--and paradox; ca1ly,
also where Protestants became the "downtroddenminorities of a.country.
ll

In between the extremes of this socio-economic continuum, in some
countries Protestants came to occupy in sufficient numbers the social
category of "secondary elites" (close to but not identified with the
central elites), so that they had the greatest ability to influence the
social movement toward new social changes . .Similarly, Protestant groups
were also successful insofar as they were integrated into wiQer national
communities that had an autonomy, which had developed out of prior
estates. -These young autonomous groups,. saturated by Protestant '
secondary elites, developed without attaining full political powers.8
As Eisenstadt describes it, Protestantism's influence upon Western.
society was an ambivalent one.
it out upon a simple continuum.

It may be made more graphic by mapping
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PROTESTANTISM'S TRANSFORMATIVE CAPACITIES
Smallest

Greatest

Smallest

(Where and \'Jhen
Controllers L
of Power ~

;S'

--=::JIIII"'"

Protes·t~nts

became):
' ~ ,Do,:,ntr~d~en

Sec?ndary <'
Elltes ~

7'

Mlnorltles

Protestantism had the greatest influence to bring about social changes
where it became close to, but not identified with, the central elites of
.

"

its society.

This influence diminished where the Protestants climbed,

or declined too far on the socio-politico-economic ladder.
.

-

Eisenstadt gives several illustrations of the paradoxically similar,
along with contradictory, results that carre put of Protestanti,sm's inter
action with whatever socio-political structures which existed in each
area.

South Africa is an example \vhere the Calvinist influence became

extremely powerful, and at the same time, extremely inhibiting to the
socio-poli~ical

life of

~he

country.

Protestant transformative capaci

ties have been minimal in this country.

Lutheranism, for another

example, has also had different effects on different countries.

In those

German principalities where the rulers were autocratic and became
Lutheran, religious practlces were more conservative'and more restrictive
on the growth of socio-economic institutions.

In Scandinavia, Eisenstadt

says, there was greater prior autonomy in the Estates, and Lutheranism
was integrated into these wider national communities.

Sweden's political

development was subsequently in a more pluralistic direction than other
European states. 9 political, economic and social freedom developed faster
and earlier in those moderately strong Protestant European states.
Eisenstadt's analysis deals specifically with Weber's Protestant
Ethic thesis.

As mentioned above, Weber later wrote an essay, IIReligious

iii'
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Rejections of the

~lorld

and their Directions," pointing out the socially

conservative nature of world religions in general.

Eisenstadt has

tried to show hO"1 Protestantism itself has 'been' a conservative agent in
certain societies, as 'well as.a .liberalizing force, demonstrated by
Waber;

Eisenstadt's research is greatly broadened and up-dated by the

inclusion of examinations into newer emerging states in'varying
geographical areas throughout the globe.
However, it must be remembered that Max Weber a,lso later did a
great amount of

sociol~gical

India, and ancient Israel.

research into the religions of

China~

In these writings, Weber t'eported both- sides'

of these religion's social influences--both their conservativism and
liberating influence for change.

Particularly in his study of

Judaism1s ancient prophets, Weber found in their charis'matic leadership
the ingredients which were so important to bringing about the socio
political changes that made Judaism such a distinctive religion.
Weber classified world religions into two groups:

(l) the reli

gions of ritual, or legal pursuits, and (2) the religions,of conviction,
which are actively oriented toward salvation.

The first kind places

great emphasis on traditional, conventional order and laws.
"sacred" and must be obeyed in its greatest details.

It is often

characteri zed by a bu'reaucrati c form of moral i ty, as ; t
loses its concept of transcendence.

The la\'J is

progi'~ess i ve ly

The religions of salvation, accord

ing to Weber, are controlled by sacred conviction--or faith--instead of
sacred law.

Inner tension develops in the believer due to the dissatis

faction with worldly manners of life and his intensive search for a
transcendent meaning to this world.

Out of,this radical 'separation

between religion·s transcendent,standards, as against worldly standards,
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came the charismatic prophets, who came into direct conflict with
economic and political 'life.
Weber described the charismatic leader as one

se.izes leader··

\'./110

ship by reason of his own conviction that he is an agent of a higher
moral authority than, that ,of the present order.
break, with the established normative order.

He always' leads in ,a

The break is legitimated

and given rational support by appealing to a higher mora] order.
The greatest contri buti on ·of the prophets, ac;:cording to Weber, was
thei r ra ti ona.l i'za ti on of all ·.areas of 1i fe, due ,to thei r effol"ts to
bring about the IIdisenchantment of the world. II Because of the
prophets' unending war against magical and orgiastic practices, they
emptied the Israelites' natural world of magic, demons and mYthological
powers.

They said God is the God of all of life, and therefore he is

completely dependable.

This made life rationally sensible.

The

prophets over and over pointed to what God had accomplished for them as
a people, taking them out of bondage from Egypt, giving them their land
and consistently giving them victory over their enemies.

God's actions

were rationalizing, because they called for a rational response to serve
and worship their God of action.

The prophets' rationalizatiml was a

direct attack upon others' efforts to coerce and please a fickle god
, or pantheon bu; 1t around vague promi ses.

Thei r 'God had already acted.

He had already delivered them out of bondage, and time and again given
them victory over thei'r enemies!

This rational l"elationsh'ip created an

ethical obligation that bound the whole Jewish people as a IIsecular"
society to their God.
The purpose of this chapter ,is to expose the strong theoretical
support for both sides of the dilemma in which

L~estern

religion has
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played its dual l"oles.

During the greater amount of time, the religious

instituti-ons have lent "their support ,to upholding th'e social status guo,
but at other ,times in' some societies, these,same religious groups have
been critical and creative in forcing changes in their own social
worlds.' In the first paragraphs of.'thts chapter', Durkheim's fear for
the fragility of his society·'s moral standards is described as being
based.Dn his great perception that social order ,and interrelationships
are determined by each society's own representation collective.

He

di scovered' that the standards and, patterns 'of each soci ety have thei r
,sources in the human group, and because of'this, he was aware of the
tentativeness of all moral standards.

As noted before, he was fearful

of the breakup of Western morality, along with Western

re1igion~

which

upheld that morality. 'For this reason, religion was to him most neces
sary to conserve the 'soci also1i dari ty.

Although Durkhei m di d not see

the role of religion to be the critic of established

social and moral

practices, he identified the source of all social order as being con
structed by human beings, co11ectiveiy.
This is at base'what Weber wrote was the effect of the ancient
prophetic effort to IIdisenchant" nature and the world of humanly con
structed myths and mag'ic, in order' to let God be completely God over
all aspects of society; By applying its transcendent law, the prophe
tic tradition became i.conoc1astic of each of Israel's new ru1erships
which tried to deify itself.

Weber showed that this kind of rationalism

in Western religion periodically re1ativized its humanly constructed
soc; a1 norms

\~then

it has held up the propheti c, transcendent val ues

against current social practices.

s.

Using Weber's Protestant ethic thesis,

N. Eisenstadt has amplified it to show that Protestantism has worked

'"
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both ways in different social contexts.

As descl"ibed above, Protestant

ism in some cases did i~iticize and transform'its own social order (when
"Prote~tants

became, the secondary ..e 1i tes), and in other cases,', it accom

modated itself to the socia-political status

~

(when Protestants

became either'the dominant contr_ollers' of power" or the downtrodden
minorities) ..

.,

In the last analysis, this paper also intends to demonstrate that
,within the context of tne,GPCC and its
has, s.imul taneous ly, played both roles.

cOJll.m~nity,

this re1,igious group

The GPCC has paradoxi ca 11y

given support to traditional practices of the city government and the
local business community, while at the same time, it turned to becnme a
leader in 'severely contradicting the norms and values of these power
structures with its own social action"programs.

-'

CHAPTER IV
MOTIVES

~OR

SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT

Because a fundamental change in the GPee's organizational direction
and structure occurred within a relatively brief period, the question

Il
1
i

,immediately 'presents itself: ' What social conditions were present to
prod the unusual initi-al change from relative uninvolvement to a full
time" di rect socla 1 acti on- program? What we're the i ni ti a1 moti vati ng
factors that overcame the traditionally conservative posture of a recog
nized religious group? This chapter attempts to answer that question.
Before the Greater Portland Council of Churches made 'its big jump
to a community action program, it

VJas

carrying on some limited social

service type of work such as helping to fund the chaplins at the citycounty jails, juvenile detention homes and specialized hospital
chaplaincy.

Founded in 1919, the history of the GPec's pre-1960's was

Written in conventional

~ooperative

church work such as the widely known

(1,200 attendance) joint, annual two-week school to prepare SWlday school
teachers, as well as the cooperative, released-time church education
program with the Portland grade 'schools.

A typical help-the-congrega

tions type of program-was the GPCe's broadly supported, city-wide church
membership census in 1960.

However, the GPeC had remained uninvolved

from the conti"oversial social problems of local poverty, racial inequities,
and other social injustices.

It was -in this context that the' GPCC departed

from all its previous policies and voted to hire a fu'l1-time man to begin

6'4

in 1964 a "community action program" within the black residential area
of Albina .
. What brought about this momentous decision, which, was later to
change the direction of the GPCC's main stream?
appears' that the deci sian whi ch. the GPCC

I

S

In actual

fact~

it

Board of Di rectors made was

not fought out by two sides .of.strong or angry opposition .

No conserva

. tive group, .indeed, no individual, rai.s.ed any real opposition to. the.
pt~posa1

of.this social action project \'1ithin the city's b1a.ck community .

. Thi s researcher anti cipated that the. beginning efforts of the GPC'C· to
move in this totally new direction should have been marked by conserva
tive resistance within the GPCCls membership against such a liberal move .

None of the interviewees could recall anyone who had openly opposed the
decision .

According ,to three

re~pondents,

many Portland people outside

of the GPCC gave vocal support to the decision:

"Finally our churches

are going to do something constl"uctive in our community .... II Another
respondent mentioned that the GPCC's first year in Albina with a fu11
time, salaried worker was given strong popular support by member churches
of the GPCC, as well as by many parts of the city..

Why?

The reasons behind this smooth transition have their foundation in
the overall change which had its roots in the Social Gospel movement in
the America of the 1800's, and.before 'that in the European theological
liberalism of the iate 1700's, exemplified by Friedrich Sch1eiermacher .
Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch gave fervent expression to
the Social Gospel in the United States, which strongly influenced the
socia 1 thinki n9 of the Federal Coullei 1 of Churches in its famous
creed of the churches 1/ of 1908.

"SOC; a1

Fo11 owi ng Wor·l d Wa r I, the neo-orthodox

movement overshadowed the Social Gospel,' but also incoi"'porated much of

.'
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it.

The present National Council of Churches is a reformulation of the

old Federal Council,

and

·most of the mainline Protestant Churches which·

belonged to the fi rst are· now· members of the Nat; ona 1 Counei 1, as ''Ie 11
as of the GPCC.

These· are the same church bodi es, mostly, who have had

a strong theo 1ogi ca 1. :heri tage. of the 1; bera 1 movement and the· S.oci.a 1

Gospel.

These local congregations of the GPCC, especially parts of the

.Congregational, Methodist and Presbyterian bodies, were expressing. a
.bas i.c assumpti on pf the Soc; a1 Gospe.l-..;that the church shoul d be
111 nvo 1ved II in "Socj a1 ,. economi c . and pol;. ti ca 1 sectors of the. li wor l d. II

conservative tendencies of these churches to maintain the status

~

The
were

·there, but were diminishing beside a growing concern for the secular
problems of their city.

Ironically; the clergy led in this secular coo

cern.
The GPCC's December, 1963, decision to take on social action full
time was not, then, a cataclysmic event, but a kind of "natural
make.

The change was almost uneventful.

ll

turn to

Apparently, the GPCC membership

did not foresee the long-range difference it would make in their own
goals, philosophy and practice as an organization.
other important factors which preceded the
(1) The United Methodist

l~omen,

There were several

December~

1963, decision:

Oregon Conference, (2) The "Community

Concerns Council" of Albina, ("3) The GPCC's Social Concerns Committee,
(4) William Cate, Executive Director of the GPCC, and (5) the above
mentioned pervading attitude of the majority member churches of the GPec.
Chronologically, the United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference,
became seriously interested in performing some kind of social action in
the A·lbina area· about the same time that the local

gl"OUP

of Albina

churches. organized into the Community Concerns Council, the Fall of 1961.
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HO\'Jever, well before that time, the United

f~ethodist

Women had ser-iously

discussed their desire ·to use their own funds on·a social action project
s'Omewhe're in Oregon .. They were looking for- a worthy place to spend
their money in this

f~shion,

action on .thei rhome grou'nd

because
\Alas.

~hey

were convinced, that social

the. proper work of the church.

Mr-s.

Elizabeth Watson, who lives on .the .edge.of the Albina area, was president
of the United Method.ist Women, Oregon Conference.

Early in 1962, the·

Rev. Courtl.and,·a black pastor of Cambrick Methodist Church· in Albina,
called Mrs.

E.·~~atson,

and asked her.i-f the United .Methodist Women

consider sponsoring a "community center" in Albina.
the series of events following.

\~ould

Mrs ..Watson related

She brought this proposal before the

govern i n'g board of her state-wi de group.

A commi ttee of four; wi th Mrs.

Watson as chairman, was formed'to study Albina's socio~economic problems
and the feasibility of utilizing the Methodist Women's assets to meet
these problems.

The Women's study committee thoroughly analyzed the

great changes which had taken place in Albina, economically and socially,
over the preceding fifteen years.

The committee concluded that the need

for socio-economic aid was so great that it was too big for trreir group
·to administer.

Yet, they wanted the administration of their financial

.aid·to be done by a religiously based group.

During this time, her

acquaintance 'with the GPee's Executive S'ecretary, William Cate, a fellow
Methodist, led Mrs. Watson to discuss her committee's findings and con
clusion with Cate.

Cate told' her how much he wanted the GPCC to' become

involved in social action work within a local area with just such great
needs.

Through this contact, the committee decided to ask the GPCC to

administer a community action type of project in Albina, using the
Methodi st

~~omen

I

s funds of ten to fi fteen thousand doll ars, over a three
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year period.·
From their investigation, the committee concluded that, as a black
cormnunity, Albina had no voice, no center of . power or authority, that._
could speak to the white groups of

city and be taken

th~

s~riously-"by

the wh i te po"wey- structures ·of Po.-rtl and.. Al b.i na I' S prosperous Union .Aven ue
business area- had been destroyed fi.fteen years . be·fore when the Interstate
5. Freeway was constructe.d through one side of A1bi na, .together .wi th the
construction .of the.Lloydls Shopping Center and the Portland Civic
Center.

These major construction sites had involved the permanent·

removal of hundreds of homes and business buildings.

Albinals Union

Avenue business area was disetted into p.ieces and separated.
tee saw that there were already several
type of programs goi n'g on inA 1bi na.

ch~rch

sponsored, social-help

However, none of these church

action programs was aimed at the real problem.
were all small:

The commit

These church programs

Menonite playground program, a Roman Catholic nursery

for welfare mothers and a small fundamentalist church1s day-nursery.

The

Portland Urbah League set up an office in Albina for three or four months,
but pulled out to place it somewhere else.

Even the Oregon Welfare

Department did not have an office within Albina.

None of these little

IIhel p" programs, chut"ch or secul ar sponsored, was geared to the more basic
need of

th~_black ~eople.

Both Mrs. Watson ahd Sthulze

em~hasized.that

no

group was physically situated inside the community to help the black
. people organize themselves into an on-going, self-help organization that
would have-a representative'lIvoice,1I respected and heard by the power
structures of the larger city.

Probably because. fu·ndamentalist churches

are exclusive by the nature of their strict legalistic morality and highpitched 'emotional wo}"ship practices, the fundamentalist, black clergymen

.1
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in Albina were so str'ongly individualistic that they at that time \a/ere
'mutually exclusive socially.:l
economic and political

probl~ms

Usually, fundamentalists consider s'ocial,
outside of reJigton's prerogative.

This

religiously conservati've view" automatically conserves and legitimates
-those established "outside" structures.

Therefore, the' black fundamenta
, I

list churches in Albina did not serve as 'a rallying po-'int to organize
into

~n

effective organization.' The Methodist Women's committee decided

its social action job in Albina would be organizationally too big for
their resources.' The GPCC ,appeared to be ,an excellent vehicle to 'develop
Albina's needed voice.
The second factor which led up to the'GPCC's decision to sponsor
the action program in Albina was the Albina "Community Concerns Council 11
(CCC).

In 1961 the Rev. Jack Engermalls, a white Baptist pastor in

Albina, invited all the Albina churches to form an informal group to dis
cuss and plan some kind of

com~unity

action work in Albina.

Engermalls

had just returned from a Baptist conference about church social action
programs and their practical methods in local communities.

He was con

vinced that the black and white 'congt"egations in Albina could and should
organize an independent group of pastors and laymen to plan and begin
some form Qf community action effort which would deal with AlbinaJs own
problems. 2 According to common testimony, the "cecil met almost monthly
for over two years, but never moved beyond the talking stage.

The group

was never able to consummate any ~lans 'for specific actions.'
According to those interviewed who attended the Albina "Community
Concerns Council ," the purpose of their group was eventually to develop a
program to alleviate Albina's racial and poverty pr·oblems.

~1r .

Robert
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Nelson, who participated in this Council from the start, said that about
.- 25 1oca1 congregat-j ons wer'e i nvi ted to send thei r interested 1ayJre.n .afld
pastors to meet with the group_

~ince

Engermalls and- the other leaders

of the ad hC)c "CCCU group were aiming·at non-relig"ious goals for the
grriup,' the groupls
-black

chu~che s

~ecular_p~rpo~es

had a negative effect an the five

whi ch responded· to th.e i nvi ta ti on.

Because -of thei r .

.

~

fundamentalist background, the five participating black churches soon
dwindled to

t\-JO.

It can be seen from this beginning of the local

churches to be directly involved in social action within Albina, the
black churches generally would not ally themselves with social action
purposes.

This fact becomes more and more important in the evolvement of

the 'GPCC I s CAP IS, as we shall soon wi tnes-s.
A.th i rd factor was the sma 11 group of peop1e \v; thi n the GPCC' s
own policy-making structure.
Commission.

It was the GPCC's elite Social

Conc~rns

Members of the Commission were elected at the annyal meet

;ngs by -congregations! delegates, but it became an el ite group because
it developed so much independent powel" under its aggressive chairman, the
Rev. Dr. Robert Bonthius.

He was the pastor of one of the large urban

Presbyterian Churches, and strongly dedicated to the whole church's
involvement in social action.

Bonthius encouraged and led his sub

committees under his Commission into investigating the social implications
of many bills before the state legislature and proposals before the City
Council.

Consistently, this group of people introduced social action

plans and statements' on socio-economic pol icies to the Executive Commit
tee alone, or to the Board of Directors, to"be approved.

Most often'

these statements would be approved, and then presented to the public as
the "pos'ition" of the GPec.

A very few times the Social Concerns Commis

.

.,
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sion's recommended statements drew some real reaction from the Board of
Directors, resulting in vigorous debate and counter moves.

(The major

reaction of this kind will be taken up in a separate chapter, Chapter 6.)
, , Immediately foliowing the 'approval of sever'al of the- "position statetnents

ll

by the Bonthius Commissi'on in the early 1960 I s" members of the Commission
went down to the State Legislature, and lobbied in the GPec's name for
and against specific 'legislative bills., During- that time, for instance,
the Commission rallied the whole 'GPGC to put great'pressure on the 1e9is'
1ators to eliminate the death penalty.

Shortly after, the Commission

met much internal reaction to its support of a bill to finance busing
of economically disadvantaged children to suburban schools.
Thi s researche r has never met Bonthi us, s i nc€ -he 1eft Port1 and for
another parish before this research began.

Several respondents charac

terized Bonthius as a successful, appealing pastor; however, three of mY
conservative respondents considered his activities and words in the
interest of social action for the GPCe as too aggressive, even abrasive.
There was a broad consensus among respondents that Bonthius had spoken
forcefully at some meetings .for his Commissionls suggested social actions.
Some thought that

Bonthius~had

done a disservice by alienating some

moderates on the GPCC Board. 'Yet, 'one Episcopalian member of the GPeC
Board (an Oxonian Ph.D.) attested that at one meeting concerning,the race
and school busing issue, Bonthius and himself sat near each other, joking
and kidding each other that they were soon 'to make strong opposing pre
,

,

sentations to the meeting.

This respondent said that he knew that some
GPeC people were offehded by Bonthius l strong liberal views, 'but the
respondent thought it \A/as not Bonthi U,S I abras; ve manner as much as the
threat Bonthius represented to their conservative inability to understand

.J
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his liberal proposals.' Apparently, then, for Bonthius, and others, the
\

new Social Concerns Commission, which· was created in the GPCC·s 1961
reorga~ization

and consolidation ,of a wide variety of committees into·

'.teJ:l "commissions',.", became an excellent vehicle to marshal the pr'estige
of,a larger church. organization behi'nd the.ir,.socio-economic,convictions •.
It allowed them as churchmen to

bri~g

a new sty1e·of.power to bear upon

the. leaders of city and ,.state,. , ,
Two other respondents who had served wi th Bonthi us on ,thj ~ commi s
sion arid

wer~

econom.lcally upper-midd1e,'class, stfll defended the public

stands their commission and· the GPCC had taken.

They were proud of their

public participation in recent struggles to win acceptance of several
controversial issues:

the state's death penalty was eliminated in 1961,

school busing' for' the disadvantaged was adopte'd in 1964,' GPCC members
participated in the peace march on city hall, the grape boycott had been
successful in 1968, etc.

Both respondents claimed to have supported

the liberal side of these issues on religious grounds.

One woman

respondent, who had held several offices of national importance in her
conservative Baptist denomination, said that she gave her support to
these GPCC liberal

efforts~

knowing that her church was not yet in accord

with them.
Accordi ng to the mi nutes of the 'GPee s Board meeti ngs, the Soci a1
I

Concerns ·Commission regularly submitted proposals for social issues to
be considered, leading to proposed

~ctions.

This Commission began to

play an ihcreasingly important role in ·the activities of the GPCC from
the time it was created in'1961.
of the business and

~ct;ons

In the late 1960·s, by far the majority

of the GPCC were proposed by this same

Commission to the Board of Directors. ,The Commission played a decisive

..J
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role in formLtlating -the GPCC's major concerns and streng activity in
social issues, manjl of which were politically controversial in the city
and state. _It is .s.ignificant. that this group of people within the
_structure of the GPCC was the source. of the ideas and motivation which
led to 'most of the -GPCGls inv.olv,ement. in its socio.-political activi'ties
during the sixttes. All of the members- of this-committee, both laymen
and clergy,
pos~ible

w~re

middle anq upper-mjddle class, economically •.

~Jith

toe

exception of Bonthius, of the three respondents who had served

on the Soci a1

Conc~rns

Commj ~.si on, none had prev; QUS ly taken any act; ve

.part in social or political· action types of programs--neither in other
organization~,

nor individually.

Some

oth~r

respondents thought that

one or two of the women on the Commission had been somewhat active in
the League of Women Voters.
Co~ission
vi~ts.

By and large, however, the members of the

were not normally activists, nor especially political acti

Yet, within the setting of the GPCC and the Social Concerns

Commission, it appears that these church oriented, non-activist people
have taken on new roles and new social action purposes.
The reason for the innovations in their roles and socio-political
activities seemed obvious to me.

The vast movement of secularization

de-~l i enates ~ or removes re 1i gi on-I"s symbols,· insti tuti ons and taboos from
·.·society, including their new roles.

Through the GPCC, the strength of

this liberal movement was being focused upon them as individuals. and
strengthened by the new group action· of the GPCC.

The question, however,

that was beginning to force itself out of th-ese innovations was why they
could do these
reactions.
I'

I

I

activiti~s

in their own locale without incurring negative

i
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What. part, then, did the GPce's Social Concerns Commission play in
brih'ging about the ·posftive deci·sion of the GPCC to sponsor the first
CAP ·in Albina? Bonthius was important at this poi·nt, because he ·-was
close

frie~ds

.

with several activists 'in . the Albina, ad -hoc Community

I

'I
t

Concerns Council during the two years of its eX'istence before·the.GPCC's
1963 decision to go into Alb-ina with its CAP.

Bonthi'us 'had visited..'the

Al bi na group IS. meeti ngs, and . he had. become interested in havi ng the ·.GPC.C
hGlp them get some kind of concrete social action program going.

He·

-furthered .this· c-ause· by inviting his own Social" Concerns. Commission ·to
visit the meetings of the

Albi~a

group.

With this kind of convincing

preparation, Bonthius and his Commission became a strong positive force
in· preparing the GPCC Board of Directors for their acceptance of the new
CAP venture in Albina.
The fourth. factor is the Executive Secretary of the GPCC, William
Cate.

He is an ordained Methodist minister and Ph.D. from Boston Univer

sity, School of Theology.

Over a period of several interviews and dis

cussions, Cate mentioned more than once that he deliberately stayed out
of the limelight of the GPCC's gro"wing new·programs.

He felt it important

that he work behind the scenes during the first few years of his office
since 1959 at the GPec.

His method, he said, was to work through the

GPCCls Commissions, the elected officers 'and Board ·af ·Directors,·and let
·them take the center stage ••• and the c~edit.

It was during this time

tha·t he' was trying to convey- hi sown pe·rsona1 concept 'of the gaa1s the
SPCC should be seeking.

Cate said'he had two main goals for the GPCC:

(1) To' get the ecurnenica.l concept into the life and actions of individual
congregations.

(2) To get the individual congregations out of their own

provincial IIboxes ll to become lIinvolved" with their wider community.

I

,!

74

Cate's proposed means ·to achieve these t,,,o goals was the application. of
social action, but the first goa.l would'still remain ecumen'ics.

Cate said

he dealt with these two questions in his Ph •.D. dissertation, IIPractical
and Theoret.ical Aspects of Ecumenical Communication. 1I
"church

soci~l

?lGtion

~ooking

for

a..

methodology.

II

In summary, it is

Cate. s~aid tha.t. the

different CAP's, developed and now. located in various geographical ·areas

of the cj ty by. the GPCC., be,came the IImethod whi ch turned out to. be the
II

"key that unlocked the door to his own .basic goal-questions.
ll

In Portland,

the CAP's became the method to bo.th ecumenics and local.involvement.
kept emphasizing the local congreg"ations.

Cate

He said, liThe CAP's gave the

means (method) to the congregations to help

thems~lve~

to help their own

communities together . • . 11
'William Cate's great

importanc~

was as a "mid-wife" in the giving

of birth to the new Church CAP's under the GPCC.

However, as mentioned

above, Cate's contribution was within the context of the interaction
between sympathetic leaders and activists in the various leadership posts
of the GPCC and church related groups, viz., Elizabeth Watson of the
United Methodist Women, etc.

Since he knew that he was dealing with an

essentially conservative element of society, Cate said that he "went slow"
and did not "push" these church people.

Rather, he tried to communicate

hi s vi ews and encouragement for servi c.e in 'the GPCC to a' re 1at; ve few
potenti·al leaders, especially laymen.

He found and cultivated those

churchmen who '\"ier'e interested in both ecumenical work and s·oc;'al action.
Then his method was to work with and through them, letting them become
the· center stage advocates in the' GPCC for. soc; a1 act; on.

Close assocl

ates of Cate agree that .he worked for social acti.on goals from the moment
he arrived to take over his job at the. GPCC.

However, Cate readily
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admitted that preceding the GPCC original decision to take on the first
. CAP in Albina, there were many ·other people, inside and out of the GPCC,
who laid the foundation and worked for the Church1s new Community·Action
Program.

Cate gave special credit to the United Methodist Women of

Oregon and the 'Albina

~ommunity

'Concerns Council,..as,'well as many particu

lar individuals .. Yet, it was Cate himself
,the power,of his

exec~tive

~ho u~ed

his influence and

position to guide,local individuals onto the

GPCC Board of Directors,and onto key "elected" GPCC offices.

(Please

refer to Chapter 9 on organization, apathy and oligarchy in the ,GPec ..>..

t

From the above account,· it is evident William Cate was liberal in
his own goals and practical application of the kind of work he wanted
the GPCC to be doing as a portion of the "Church." On the other hand,
three respondents--intimate but liberal friends of his--referred to
Catels very conservative background and that he demonstrated it in many.
ways through his administration of the GPCC.
defense of

t~e

Cate was insistent on his

institutional church and its structure, and he consistently

demanded that the GPce's social action be tied to the local traditional
congregations.

Cate himself made a point out of telling me that he was-

and practiced--a moderate-conservative' theology and view of the church.
He said that he was raised in a very conservative Methodist family in·a
, small, rural, southern Idaho town, and' he attended' a, church-supported
college,

~lillamette

University, Salem, Oregon.

Therefore, he, admits, his

emotional ties ar'e .to conservative economics and politics·.

However;

intellectually, he changed and is committed to the 'liberal application
of lithe Christian soc'ia-l ethic to 'dislodge the ingrained social injus
tices ..11 He emphasized that the pf10ple who are "casualtiesof society·
cannot speak for themselves

. because of their lack of power, and the

.1
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churches' social action must stand behind these people and give them a
new dimension of their own power."
The fifth. factor was a growing attitude, fostered by many of the
larger, mainline Protestant theological seminaries) among these churches
that they should be "involved .in the socio-economic problems of their
ll

local communities. "This idea had been slowly filtering down to the lay
men over the past two decades since World War II.

The pastors of the

more liperal denominations, therefore, have been more in the forefront
of leading their'congregations into social involvements.

Significantly,

the local congregations of these mainline, liberal denominations make up
the bulk of the

memb~r

congregations of the GPec .. The people from these

congregations are the most active in the GPCC, and hold the key commit
tee posts.

It is important to note in connection with this factor that

when the initial proposal was presented to the Board of Directors to
become directly involved in social action work, no one:of all those I
interviewed could remember anyone else seriously opposing the GPec's
becomi ng the sp'onsor of the A1bi na communi ty acti on program.
This chapter and those following through Chapter 8 are somewhat
historio-graphical in reviewing those actual events most crucial to the
birth and life of the GPCC's new commitment to social action.

However,

it is necessary to examine the "raw historical 'evidence before interpre
ll

ting it in terms of the hypothesis.

The evidence presented attempts to

expose the dialectic tension between the conservative and liberal forces
within the GPCC, and thereby throw more sociological light upon the
organization's radical transformation.

In the later chapters, I propose

that enough evidence focuses on II soc ial insu1ation" to interpret it as
the theoretical means by which the GPCC neutralized the conservatives'

1
j

l
I

I'
I

I
1

1I
II

II

CHAPTER V
STIFLED REACTION IN THE FIRST
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM
This chapter deals· directly with two major controversiei which
developed in the original C-CAP in Albina.

The first dispute was over

C-CAP's 1968 Black Summer Crisis program. 'The second was the conserva
tives· strong cri·ticism of the over-expenditure of funds' for. the Black
Summer Crisis and 'the failure of their big funding campaign

~hich

shortly followed, the IIGenesis Campaign." The chapter's purpose is to
document both sides of the conservative--liberal interaction, which was
I .

represented in the two controversies.

The question constantly asked

\

here is:

What was the quality and degree of the conservative reaction

that C-CAp·s activities stimulated, and how did the reaction affect their
Community Action Program?
After Paul Schulze moved his family into tfie Albina area, he began
to talk with as many black people as he was able to contact, especially
all kinds of organizational and community

lead~rs.

Of course, the black
...

""

. - 

-. churches, as'well as. the area's white congregations, were his primary
contacts, at first.

Schulze operated out of an Albina realtor's office,

and used his phone for the first six months.

Even though Schulze asked

the local churches' cooperation) generally the black .clergymen gave him
and his project a cool receptio·n·.. -They we're being. threatened by an "out
side" organization; a "white" organization, i.e., an organization the

II
f

.I
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~

;

blacks could not control.

Schulze arranged several meetings with local

church leaders to make contact and interest laymen.
told of how the black pastors responded

~o

Two of my respondents

Schulze's presence by working

harder than ever to develop their own kinds of evangelistic efforts to
reach out into their own black constituency.
As mentioned before, there was already something of a base of sup
port established in this community:

the Albina Community Concerns

.i

Council.

I

and the group never did succeed in enlisting a popular support of black

I,

attended somewhat regularly, but by this time the group had met for two

However; it was first organized by a white Baptist clergyman,

people, let alone ,black clergy.

There were two or three black people who

years without resulting in any kind of community actions.

The main,

I

black pastor, T. X. Graham, who had taken a leading part 1n the "Commis

I.

sian," had recently been transferred to another. town by his A.M.E. Church

;

body_

I

been in on the planning of the "N.E. Project" with the GPeC from'the

I

I

I

I

I

I
I

This ad hoc IlCommission" was dwindling;

yet~

the small group had

beginning. 'The new Project was achieving their 'goals anyway, so they
were loyal and helpful to' Schulze.

It was out of this group that Schulze

was able to obtain several people to begin a II steering committee ll for
their IIChurch-Community Action Program,

II

as Schul'ze then renamed it.

Schulze and others reiterated that the "how", of the new program
. was
left completely up ·to ·Schulze . . There .~I/as no. precedent or known program
to follow for a church-backed social action effort.
.and Schulze agreed upon some basic goals.

However, the GPee

First and most basically,

the black people of Albina had no access to a platform from which they

1
.

1
I

I
!

could speak and be taken seriously by the power structures of their own
immediate (Albina area) community, city or state.

C-CAP was to provide
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this platform.
program.

The program was ultimately to be the black people's own

Secondly and more practically, Schulze was to begin by identi

fying the more specific problems of the black community which could be
dealt with by their kind of social action effort.

Thirdly, Schulze was

to enlist black individuals and churches into their project and give them
a responsible part.

Finally, Schulze was to organize some specific social

action actions.
In dealing 'with the final goal, Schulze lost no time in recruiting
help from the black neighborhood.

I

,I

Many respondents commented on Schulze's

ability to identjfy with the black people, to understand them, to win
their confidence,·and most of all, to recruit able black people to work
in his program.

The first person Schulze recruited into the C-CAP work

was a black woman, who worked at a menial job at the nearby hospital, but
who soon proved to be a very capable teacher and able leader.

In the Fall

of 1964, with the help of the same woman, Mrs. Jessie Varner, Schulze
started a pre-school program, free of charge, ;n a black Episcopal church
basement.

Soon their program was expanded to f;'ll the education rooms of

two other local black churches, a Methodist and a Baptist church.
program continued for two years.

The

The second year, some federal authori

ties learned of their pre-school program, and asked Mrs. Varner to
demonstrate their methods to teachers and the school board members.

The
.1

federal education program wanted to begin a model Head Start Program in
Oregon, and saw th'j s C-CAP pre-schoo 1 .program as a ready-made effort.
Consequently, their pre-school program was then taken over by

~he

Head

Start program.
I

l

I
J

About this same time in 1966, Mrs. Varner and Schulze decided to
start a school for retarded children of low income families in the Albina
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area.

The C-CAP staff 'noted that many Albina low income families with

retarded children had no access to training for their children.

Mrs.

Varner said that three and four college age Vista Volunteers worked for

two full years with C-CAP's pre-school and school for the retarded.
The C-CAP Children's School (for retarded) still operates with some
trained teachers and a professional: director in the basement of the
Highes Memorial Methodist Church in Albina.
For the first six months of her time with C-CAP, Mrs. Varner
volunteered her time freely, but then Schulze hired her as the first
staff person on C-CAP beside

~imself.

Early

~n

1966, Schulze was able

to get the Portland Juvenile Court to assign one of its black counsel
orS to work full time with C-CAP in Albina, but his salary was paid by
the court.

The counselor, Mr. Frank Fair, was in his 20's and had a
- I

college degree.

Schulze convinced the court ,that this man should be on

the streets of Albina as a street worker.

Schulze wanted to meet and

counsel and develop a means of helping the black, "deviant ll youth before
they were apprehended and taken to court.

Mr. Fair worked for three

months at C-CAP under the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction.

C-CAP then

hired Fair as a full-time staff member to continue the "street ministry,"
which ne had begun:

This second C-CAP program, Operation Contact, had

Mr. Fair on the streets, contacting the black, hard-core, high school
drop-out youth.

Schulze and Fair also devised a constructive side to

their rehabilitation program with a small monetary profit to the youth.
The first project was to cut up 'Jogs donated by a local church member,
and sell this firewood to the local neighborhoods.

Later, C-CAP obtained

use of trucks, etc., for the youth to do local moving jobs and other odd
jobs.

From these jobs the first work-study courses emerged.

Three or
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four capable teachers were obtained, and courses were offered to the
dropouts each'half-day in basic high school studies:
history, etc.

English, math,

Although taught in 'the C-CAP's own store-front facili

ties, after a few months of operation, the work-study courses were tied
into the local high school.

Some PSU seniors helped teach, and later

two certified teachers from Jefferson High School were added to the
staff.

Full high school credit was given to the courses.

The Operation

Contact was renamed the Opportunity School, and still functions with
seven certified teachers, counselors, ind work administrators.

Portland'

School District No.1 now partially supports this specialized school at
$20,000 per year.

Most of their' courses, are now accredited high school

courses, and it is a regular occurrence for Opportunity School (dropout)
students to move back into one of the local high schools.

. !

In the Summer of 1965, C-CAP staff members' recalled that they had
been aware of a growing, outspoken dissatisfaction in Albina.

~

:

During

·this time, the black people were being especially affected by the lack
of jobs due to the mild economic recession.

With the summer came the

'extra free time without employment for black 'teenagers.

Large numbers

of these young people, as well as white teenagers, gathered in bunches
on the streets and around hamburger stands.
becoming increasingly uneasy.

What appeared to amplify the tension

was'the news of the' riots in other
Newark (1967).

The city police were also

la~ge

cities, Detroit (1967), and

The-Watts riots were in 1965.

Schulze's awareness of the blacks' economic situation motivated him
to speak with many black business men and leaders.

Schulze became the

prime organizer of the Albina Citizens' Committee, which appealed for
a federally funded Ti tl e Four IIWa r on Povertyll program for A1bi na.

I

~

I

J

The

I
I

I

,l

.j
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government made the grant to them, and out of this local Citizens' Commit
tee came the administrative leaders for.their own new agency.

Scbulze

and C-CAP had aided their Albina community's people to come up with

their own leaders and speak for themselves.
In the following Summer of 1966, the same economic and social ten
sion remained in Albtna.

In response to this situation, the C-CAP staff

planned and organized a series. of weekly summer dances on the I'black
top" of Irving Park.

The dances were free and accompanied by live,

black bands in a park which is central to the Albina area.

The dances

attracted large crowds, but were peaceful ,and considered successful in
providing a social and emotional outlet for the black youth.

Both black

and white observers.who were our respondents agreed that these dances
helped to defuse the situation that summer.
For C-CAP, however, there was a

nega~ive

reaction.

The black

churches were critical of C-CAP for sponsoring the Irving Park dances.
Because most of the local black churches are fundamentalistic and there
fore very conservative, the black pastors could not understand how a
church-supported organization such as C-CAP could sponsor public dances.
The Irving Park dances confirmed the alienation of the black churches
from C-:-CAP.
E~er sin~~ ~~~ulze h~d Dired Frank Fair to 'be

a permanent

staff '

member, the local black pastors were very critical of the fact that Mr.
Fair was not a church member.

They pointed out to Schulze that this

person's non-church status demonstrated the· further fact that C-CAP was
not really a church centered program.
II

ll

These conservative churchmen

said that Mr. Fair's work with the black youth would not be helpful to
the youth in ultimately bringing them back to the churches.

The C-CAPrs
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staff workers should be church oriented if any of their programs were to
be supported by the black churches.

The black churchmen felt that the

C-CAP goals were not the same as their II spiritual U church goals, but
purely social and economic goals.
To offset this criticism and to begin to restore some grass-roots
support of C-CAP, Schulze -looked for and found a man who was a strong
churchman, yet interested in working on the streets with youth and people
outside of the churches.

He hired Sam Johnson, who was in his 30 s and
l

the pastor of a small, black fundamentalist church.

Johnson was working

full time then as part of the Urban League staff in Albina, and he took
With his previous experi

care of his pastoral duties in his spare time.

ence in the Urban League work, Johnson was hired to assist Frank Fair in
the same programs in which Fair was involved:

"the street ministry,U

counseling, Opportunity School, job placement, etc.

The following spring,

Johnson went out to attend a session of the Urban Training School of
Chicago.

Wh~ri

he returned at the beginning of the summer, all of the

positions at the Opportunity School and C-CAP were filled.

He soon

found a job with the white Highland United Church of Christ, which hired
him to conduct a summer recreation program that would be especially
directed to reach the black youth in the area.

Since this congregation's
.'

white pastor had recently left, the congregation hired Mr. Johnson
temporarily to fill .the pulpit.

Johnson set up both a recreational and

educational program, geared to the lower income, unchurched children.
It attracted a large number of children, both black and white, throughout
the summer.

The congregation decided they would like to continue the

program through the rest of the year._ Johnson asked C-CAP and the GPCC
for financial help.

The GPeC a'llocated funds, ahd Johnson's continuing

......I
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program of education and recreation was renamed the Highland Center.
the Center then became part of the C-CAP program.

So

Shortly thereafter,

the congregation called Johnson to be their permanent pastor.
In the next couple of years, Johnson expanded the Highland Center's
program to'include adult education.

Out of the sewing classes has come

a small garment industry, now named "Highland Fashion Enterprises, Inc."
The nationally known, locally based Jantzen Co. has given several of
"

their large, reconditioned industrial sewing machines to the
company.

ne~

garment

Some of the city's large, downtown department stores market

the young company's garments; the company has
own building.

gro~n

enough to rent its

Another small company, Highland Center Industries, was

formed to sub-contract the packaging of specialized electronic equipment
for another large, local company, Tektronics, Inc.

The Highland Center

Industries employs seven men and women, and rents its own separate
building.

On a different level, the Highland Center has maintained a

large house with "foster parents" for boys under 18, who are delinquent
or wards of the court.

By 1972 eight youth had completed their proba

tion ("rehabilitation") through the Highland Boys' Home, and regularly
there are about six who are in residence.

In a parallel work under the

Center's administration, a second home for 18 to ?2 year olds now
operates on a completely self-sufficient basis.

It is called the Highland

Young Menls Home, and its residents are in job retraining or school.

The

Highland Center's widely varied program now provides some strongly
established social actions for the Albina black people.
In 1966 the Executive Secretary of the GPeC spent the summer tour
ing Europe and the Holy Land.

During this time, Schulze, in consultation

with Robert Menzel, a college instructor and clergyman, laid the plans
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for two II spin-off" CAP programs in different
city.

geogr~phical

parts of the

They were later organized and called East-CAP and Hub-CAP.

the GPCC ExecU,ti ve, Dr.

~Ji 11 i

When

am Cate, returned to the ci ty, he hea rti ly

approved of the plans for the new action programs under the GPeC, and
he promised to support the work to organize them through the GPCC.
Schulze helped the local churches in each of the two areas get

t~eir

steering committees working and helped organize the two new CAP's.
Following, in agreement with C-CAP, each of the two new CApis purchased
some of Schulze's time, and he split his time three ,ways, directing the
two new CAP's in their first months of programing.

In the next couple

of years, more church-CAP's were added, under the GPCC's guidance.

Now

there are seven CAP's in the larger city area, started under the GPCC.
On January 1,1968, the Portland City Council hired Paul Schulze
to be the first director of Portland's new, federally funded Model
Cities Program.

Since Schulze had been splitting his time with some

other CAP's, the black C-CAP staff members were given partial administra
tive responsibi1ities.

With Schulze's recommendation, the GPCC's Board

of Directors chose Mrs. Jessie Varner to be the new C-CAP director.
C-CAP had its first black leader.

(With the difficulties in America's

predominance of matriarchial black families, this decision portended
..
some later problems.) Then two months 1ater, the GPCCls Board hired
Mr. Robert Nelson to be Mrs. Varner1s assistant.

Mrs. Varner said she

soon found out that Mr. Nelson's salary was $300 a month more than hers,
even though Nelson was her Jl ass istant. 1I She said she never mentioned it
to Dr. Cate, nor to anyone at the GPeC, but she always understood the
implications.

I

A white person was needed to watch over the real problems

of C-CAP's administration.

After Mrs. Varner resigned a year later,

J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____

87

neither C-CAP nor the GPCC was able to recruit a male, black director for
C-CAP.

Mr., Ne 1son became the IIi nteri m di rector after Mrs. Varner
Jl

resigned in February, 1969, and he still holds that post.

Although Mr.

Nelson is white, he is strongly committed to the black people, to under
stand their culture, to work for them, but, as he
istic. 1I

say~,

"not be paternal

Ironically, Mr. Nelson was a real estate dealer in Albina, but

he was also one of the original members of the IIAlbina Community Concerns
Council

II

and the original C-CAP Board of Directors.

On April 4,. 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated.

This event

was the trigger to set in motion the GPCC and C-CAP to attempt a special
summer program for Albina's black people.
j

I

William Cate, head of the

GPCC, was strongly convinced that King's assassination would likely
precipitate some violent black reactions in Portland.

On the other

4
4

I

I

hand, Cate also saw the effect of King's violent death as the opportunity
to capitalize on building an energetic C-CAP summer program for Albina.
The GPCC leaders sensed there was a lot of white. guiltll in the wake of
II

King's assassinat;'on, and therein might be enough momentum to motivate
a large funding campaign for C-CAP's special summer work, if not for the
whole GPCC's budget.
'The proposed Albina summer program was tabbed the IIBlack Summer
Crisis!l program.

Cate and the C-CAP staff

decid~d

they should have a

special leader for the Crisis program, who would be able to communicate
with the more militant and revolutionary blacks.
I

I

Mr. Colden Brown,

originally from New York and then a student at Reed College, was known
to be a mild revolutionary.

Mr. Brown had given some lectures at the

C-CAP Opportunity School, and Schulze and Cate felt that Brown was an

1

I

unusually capable leader, but moderate enough to lead their

propo~ed

I

~
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program.

Brown consented to take the ,job, but Scholze and Cate had to

make more than one persuasive presentation on Brown's behalf before the
GPCC's Board approved Mr. Brown as the special director of the Black

Summer Crisis. Brown was hired that spring.
In the following months, an extensive campaign of speakers from
C-CAP and the GPCC, 1ed by Cate, Schul ze, and Brown, went to all the com '
munity organizations and churches which would listen to their pleas for
the "Summer Crisis

ll

funds.

One respondent described Brown as a master
1

at building fear and apprehension in his white audiences and then reassur
ing them he would be able ,to handle the "Black Crisis.1I On one day
during that campaign, Brown and some cohorts walked through the downtown
and college area park blocks with guns on their shoulders.

Brown

succeeded in making the white "establishment!! uneasy, and, in effect,
stimulated awareness of the "crisis and the need for a IIBlack Crisis"
ll

Brown was an excellent speaker, and his efforts,obtained cash

program.
gifts.

In the

n~xt

few months, about $48,000 poured into the GPCC·s

Black Summer Crisis fund from churches, individuals, businesses and
groups.

The national publicity of King's assassination and the sympathe

tic feelings, throughout the country had, in a way, "paid off."
That Summer of 1968, the IIprogram" which Colden Brown conducted
for the_ Black Summer Crisis was not well coordinated, but a loosely
related series of Glasses and black cultural demonstrations and enter
tainment.

One young black junior high school teacher, Paul Dixon, did

not like Colden Brown and what appeared to him as Brown's arrogance.
However, after working on the Crisis program with Brown, Dixon said, III
found out I was black."
heritage.

Dixon came to respect his own black cultural

Dixon was thus motivated to teach a summer-long course on

,i
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handicraft and its black cultural roots to. grade schoolers·in the Iris
Court housing development.

Also a recognized local black artist, Issac

(Allen) Nomo, taught some adult art classes.
courses were taught, which included b1ack
accomplishments in science.

Many other black'culture

hi~tory,

literature, art,and

Two day long "Black Festivals" during the

summer presented plays, art and dances, and attracted much of the Albina
community.

Mrs. Varner, then head of C-CAP, said that before then the

black people of Albina had not even talked about being black, nor wanted
to be black.

It was just not discussed, because the assumption was that

trying to be IIv/hite ll was better.

Mrs. Varner said, "Colden Brown at

least taught us to begin having some self-respect.

1I

As far as the GPCC was concerned, the result of the Black Summer
in Albina was a different story. Although he worked out of the C-CAP
office, Colden Brown soon found out that the purse strings to C-CAP and
the Black Summer Crisis were held by William Cate at the GPCCls office.
So whenever Brown wanted to add on another member to the Summer Crisis
staff, rent a'building, purchase more materials; etc., Brown would drive'
across the river. to the GPCC office a.nd obtain the money from Cate.
Mrs. Varner commented that Brown built the paid staff for the Black
Crisis program into fifteen people, besides the regular C-CAP staff.
.

"

Several other respondents confirmed this fact.

By the end of the summer,

most of the $48,000 given to the GPCC in earlier months had been expended
by the Summer Crisis program.

By that winter (January, 1969) most of .
\

the money in the overall joint CApls accounts was exhausted.

Conse

quently, the GPCC's Board of Directors became angry at C-CAP in Albina
for its wholesale use of, what many Board members considered, a nice
nest egg.

i
j

Several respondents, both inside and outside Albina, said that
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the GPCC was disturbed because they thought Colden Brown1s Summer Crisis.
and its lavish spending had not accomplished any significant goals.
stated purpose of the Crisis program, when sold to the
etc., was to avert "trouble and violence" in

Albina~

GPCC~

The

churches,

The Crisis program

was to keep the black community 'Icool. 'I The result was successful by
this standard.

There had not been the slightest black provocation of

incidents, nor ·violence.
gross misuse of

funds~

Yet, many church people felt that there was a

because they could not see anything accomplished

at the end of the summer.

Some (white) people in the GPCC Board openly

doubted if there really had been any threat of black militancy or
trouble.

Other respondents have said that

have succeeded IItoo well.

Col~en

Brown1s program may

1I

The further reaction in the GPCC's Board of Directors resulted in
its vigorous demands for a more concise and consistent accounting of the
joint CApis money each month--and how each CAP spends its ,money.

In

retaliation at the following GPCC Board meeting, Mr. Nelson, then interim
director of C-CAP, got up and asked if the GPCC was now going to Hrunll
C-CAP.

Following this experience, the GPCC's Board soon decided to

devise a whole new method of allocating and spending funds given and
designated for the different CAP's programs.
Certainly this was a documentable internal Ureactionll to the
C-CAP "Summer Crisis" effort for the people of Albina, and indirectly, for
the people of Portland.

However, this limited reaction to C-CAPls use of

finances was not-a conservative
- - - - negativism against the social actions
program, ~~. There is inconclusive evidence in five of the respond
ents' statements, who were, or still are, on the GPCC's Board, that they
have some real misgivings about the validity of C-CAP's social actions
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for the black people in Albina.

Out of 24 respondents who were actual

GPCC Board members, however, only two ,respondents outwardly stated such
misgivings.

Apparently the GPCC's real criticism was directed at

C-CAPts liperal use of funds, not at its over-zealous social action
efforts.

Many (eight) respondents of the GPCC Board mentioned this

concern about the glibness of the printed--and lack of printed-
financial reports for the CAP's fiscal accounting at the GPCe's regular
Board meetings.

Several respondents openly questioned Caters extremely

free use of the money allowed Summer Crisis programs at C-CAP and Hub
CAP.

Yet, they hastened to say, they did not question or imply Catets

own use, or misuse, of funds.
An Analysis of C-CAP Activities
In the foregoing pages, some of the major C-CAP activities in the
Alblna area are recounted.

There were some conservative reverberations

throughout the, ci ty in response to these Il church sponsored" acti on pro
grams, but the unexpected result of the more daring programs was a
mi ni rna 1 amo.unt of reacti on from the GPCC I S member churches thems,e1ves.
The efforts of Paul Schulze and his black staff members were IIliberal

ll

in that the C-CAP programs were not designed to' uphold white, middle
class, or Protestant ethic values.
An important

a~pect

.

of the C-CAP educational programs and job find

i ng servi ce was its effort to prov; de these servi ces "free 1I of cha rge to

the Albina people.

One pastor, who had been an officer of the GPCCls

Board, but had dropped out of the GPCC membership, complained about·
at the church-sponsored hospital, which lies within
Schulze's
appearance
.
.
~

,

~

the black Albina area.

Schulze had come to the 'hospital

IS

governing
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board meeting in 1967 to "demand

ll

that the hospital hire forty black

people as a fair representative proportion of their working force.

The

pastor referred to the former C-CAP leader as a urabble rouser" for
acting in this and other offensive manners.

The respondent did not

like a church-sponsored organization placing economic pressures upon.
any part of society, let alone a church-sponsored hospital.

I

The same

I

pastor also said that black people should be hired on their merits to
hold a job, "just like everyone else. 1I The pastor was,

ther~fore,

com...

plaining-about C-CAP fostering in its black constituency a II something for
nothing attitude.
ll

Another respondent, who is a business man and still a GPCC Board
member, criticized the C-CAP program on similar grounds.

He said that

the C-CAP treatment of the black people has often given them too much.
He sa i d., IIG-CAP and the other CAP t S are di rected toward poverty, and we
should help these people get jobs.
free.

But we shouldn't give,things to them

. Other cultures have family ties, but Negroes don't.

They

don't have self-pride." This respondent thought that the Black Summer
Crisis program and some of C-CAP's other t1give-awayll projects to the
blacks had caused a negative reaction -in- the GPCC.

He said, IIPaul

Schulze was and still is out of touch with the GPCC.

They (GPCC members)'

don't want the tired, welfare-style of over-involvement with poverty
problems.

We don't want to keep giving everything free 'to these people."

Both of the above GPCC respondents have reacted conservatively to
the C-CAP methods.

Their criticism is based on the familiar Protestant

ethic--laissez faire theme:

When everyone has a free and equal chance

to education and to buy, sell and,own

prop~r~y, .. as

.opposed

t~

,birth, i.nto

feudal slavery, then work and the individual industry of each person

.£..

$3
will lead to the good of all.

The.fr~e

enterprise system and honest work

lead to wonderful rewards, as concluded in Ben Franklin's words:
to bed and early to rise/Make a man healthy, wealthy and wise . .

"Early
II

Two other respondents expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the
C-CAP work, along with the above two criticisms.

Consequently, four out

of 33 respondents (interviewed up to this point) gave critical or con
servative reactions to C-CAP.
viewed sample is not

~

Approximately one-eighth of the inter- .

significant amount of conservativism within the

GPCC itself.
However, the GPCC did record a definite, specialized, internal
reaction to the executive leaders' 1I1 av ish use of the'special fund of
ll

about $48,000, collected specifically for the Summer Crisis programs in
1968.

(This reaction is discussed extensively in Chapters 7,and 9.)

But a few conservative GPCC BO.ard members carried their 'criticisms
further, saying that the 1968 Summer Crisis had not achieved any
visible goals at the end of the summer.

The leaders' stated goal of
.

.

the Crisis program was to keep the black community "cool ll (peaceful) in
the wake of Martin, Luther King's assassination.

Cate and other GPCC

leaders maintained that the Black Summer Crisis had successfully ful-.
fiiled tts goal of preventing any racially motivated riots with destruc
tive violence reminiscent of Watts, Detroit.- ,Because of the invisibility
of accomplishing this goal after the summer was over, the GPeC was not
able to appreciate in "hind-sight" what the large expenditures for the
Summer Crisis had purchased.
The man who had become treasurer of the GPCC during the 'Summer
Crisis reacted very negatively to the manner in which the GPCC Executive
Df rector had permi tted C-CAP and the Cri s; s pr'ogram to tap free ly the
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CAP I S funds.

Thi s respondent, the treasurer, is .an insurance executi ve,

which is reflected in his demand for a precise accounting.

He said

there was no realistic budget submitted by C-CAP, nor by the other
CApls.

But he placed the blame on the Executive Director, as much as .

on C-CAP, because, he said, the Director had used his complete authority
to delegate the ,monies without restraint.
the means," he said.

"The end was used to justify

Apparently many members of

th~ GP~CJs

Board were

uneasy about the vague financial reports given out at meetings during
thi s, ti me.

Several of the respondents menti on'ed thi s fact.

The GPCC

treasurer said that the Board members saw" finally, that C"'CAP had
greatly over-used its account .during and following the Summer Crisis'.
He, therefore, thought there was at that time a definite loss of respect
for C-CAP by many on the GPCC's Board and other groups which give regu
lar financial support.

However, I think'that'the reason the treasurer

included, monetary givers among those reacting against Summer Crisis

I

programs Was due to the fact that at the time I was interviewing the

I

then formey'treasurer, Mr. Lowell Steen, he was looking back at events

I

with the benefit of seeing the failure of the funding campaign, the

I

"Genesis Campaign," which had followed in

1969~

If the conclusion of the

I

majority of knowledgeable respondents is rig.ht" the Summer Crisis prog·rams
.
and associated events did not have a dominant effect on the failure of

I

that campaign.

I
I

l
j

It was due more to other factors.

(See Chapter 9 for

further discussion.)
From several other respondents who had served on the GPCC Board
during the Summer Crisis, they gave evidence of a growing dissatisfaction
,

,

specifically with the excessively free use of finances by C-CAP and
Colden Brown for the Black Summer Crisis projects.

Also, it must be
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admitted that although the GPCC hired a professional fund-raising
company to lead the Genesis Campaign, by the end of 1969, the Campaign
had gathered pledges and gifts totalling only $46,500 out of an expected
goal of $250,000.

However, since then, executive staff members have

maintained that the regular, committed supporters of the GPCC--churches,
denominations, groups, individuals,

busfDe~se~J

etc.--have continued

their monetary support, and some had increased their regular giving in
1969.

The former treasurer, Lowell Steen, based his judgment that there
was a definite reaction against the GPCC upon the failure of the Genesis
Campaign.

Yet, only three other respondents gave similar views about.

the meaning of the Genes; s Campai gn.

As the reseal""cher, I was personally

very anxious to find as IIhard" evidence as pos'sible to support reasons
on either side of the question--why the funding campaign had failed.

Was

its failure an authentic sign of strong negative reaction against the
GPCC·s program in the preceding Black Summer Crisis 'and its lIirresponsible
use of money?

lt

Eleven respondents, three of them very conservative, gave

specific, positive answers to my question about the meaning of the Genes'is
Campaign's failure.

They all agreed that its failure was not the result

of a significant reaction.

The, most common answer given was that the

professional funding company, Campaigns West, had told the leaders of
the GPCC that the great untapped resevoir of money in the city for the
GPCC was the large, big businesses, represented in downtown Portland.
When the results were in, no new large big businesses or compan1es pledged
any significant amount of money to the' campa1gn.

In other words, the

professional funders had directed the campaign at the wrong clientele,
and they were unacquainted with the realities of church giving, according

~----------------------~------------------_/
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to the same respondents.

(Immediately following this campaign, the fund

ing company collapsed, declaring bankruptcy.

At the same time, the

company accused the GPCC of refusing to reimburse it adequately for
services rendered, and sued the GPCC.

Later, a compromise settlement

for a small amount of money was made out of court.) Along with this
reason, the same respondents- described the professional funding company
as having done a very minimal job of organizing the campaign, "expecting
the printing of the one brochure of pr9paganda about the GPCC's good
social services to work magic among the business people" (prospective
givers).

Other reasons given for the non-reaction theory about lack of

contributions include:

the special funding, campaign (for same essential

purpose) of the previous summer had preceded too closely to the Genesis
Campaign, and the recent economic recession had cut the margin of
gratuities from downtown businesses.
In both the disputes about the Black Summer Crisis program itself
"and the financial criticisms associated wlth the over-spending for the
Crisis program together with failure of- the Genesis funding campaign,
the overall conservative reaction recorded from the interviewees was
very minimal.

Three points stand out:

(1, Although several respondents

were articulate in their strong criticisms of the C-CAP program, especi
ally the Black Summer Crisis, the majority (66 percent) were quite
complimentary of the C-CAP's total effort.

(2). There was a relatively

small proportion of respondents (20 percent) who reacted negatively to
C-CAP's excessive use of finances for the Crisis program.
tion arises more' sharply:

(3) The ques

Why is there a minimal conservative reaction

over these unusually controversial activites in the GPCC?·

i'

i
I

I

!
CHAPTER VI '
A ONE MAN REACTION
Early in 1965 'a lay member of the Board of Di rectors became very
unhappy with the GPCC's liberal policies' and how they were arrived, at.
Soon he made two proposals for serious changes, specifically directed"
at cancelling new policies and practices of the GPCe's leaders.

First,

he cha11 enged the very val i di ty of the; r soci ali nvo1vement pol i ci es.
Second, he challenged the organizational methods used to obtain contro
versial policy decisions.

As described below, this challenge was concen

trated in the vigor and influence of one man.

Considering the general

acceptance of the leaders' increasing liberal changes in the organization,
why was one mp,n able to lead such a significant conservative rebellion'
against

th~

ne\'( val ues and practices? More important, 'why was this

religious group rejecting traditional conservative values? On the first
point, the events reveal that the essential nature of the lI el ec ted"
Board of Directors and its' 'officers' was cast ·into a'-rlberal maJo'rfty by
1965.

The second part of the events demonstrates that the leaders used

an oligarchic method to by-pass notmal procedures for policy ,decision
making.

However, we find'the liberal leaders do overcome this aggressive

conservative challenge, initiated from within by members of the organi
'zation.

Because it firmly determined the

libe~al

course of the GPCC's

future, the successful defeat of the pri mary part of, ,the conservati ve
cha 11 enges was an- enormous, turn; ng poi nt for· the 'GPCC.'· The·1 i,bera 1 '.

' .....

H

,,'

leaders won the essential part of the overall battle.

J_______________________________________________________________________________________
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Paul Schul ze called it a none man tour de force. II The series of 
events which led to this "showdown" revolved around a -'powerful ~
Presbyterian layman, Mr. Robert Pamplin.

He is the executive president

and chairman of the board of the Georgia-Pacific Co., one of the largest
iumber and paper companies in the United States.
conservative leaning', but'-did not -re-attze hbW
servativism was.
the GPCC.

Gate knew of Pamplin's

·strorY~rh;s

religious can'"

Cate told how Pamplin was invited to become active in

Paul Wright, Pamplin's pastor at the prestigious, downtown

First Presbyterian Church, together with Cate went to see Pamplin in 1963
to ask him to head a financing campaign for the proposed
Center building.

Int~r-Church

Their plans for the building were not small.

It would

house offi ces for the GPCC, the Oregon Counci 1 of Ch·urches, rentable
office space to several other church groups, various sized meeting rooms,
visual aids rooms, etc.
campaign.

Pamplin consented to be chairman of the building

For his work, Cate heaped praises upon Pamplin.' Cate

said~

IIWe knew of his unusual executive ability, and he certainly exhibited it
during that campaign.

With typical efficie-ncy,

t~r.

Pamplin carried out

the job with great dispatch. 1I He also contributed a large sum of his
own money to the new building, and now the building's largest meeting room
carries"his name, The Pamplin Room.

The next year Pamplin was elected to

the-GPC-C's Board of-D;-rectbrs.--' - 
Early in, 1965 during_Oregan,s biennual legislative session, the
1egi s 1a ture was cons i der; ng a b.i 11 to remove cap; ta1 puni shmen t from the
state's penal code.

The GPeC's Social ,Concerns Commission prepared a

strong IIposition paper against the death penalty and in support of the
ll

bill.

Without sending it to the Board of Dir-ectors, it was adopted as

GPCC policy by the Executive Committee.

Stating this GPCC position,

99

letters were sent and Social Concerns Committee members actively lobbied
members of the legislature at the state house for passage of the bill.
When Pamplin found out how the posi.tion paper was established as policy
for the whole GPCC by action of the small Executive Committee, he became
very upset.
The legislature did pass the bill to repeal-capital

p~nishment

that year, and the GPCC received a good share of the credit for its
passage.

Robert Pamplin, however, was unalterably opposed to the GPCe

.having anything to do with the passage or defeat of this, or any, legis
lative bill.
Shortly thereafter, another bill was introduced in the legislature
that would increase the quality of education in those· public schools
situated in depressed and poverty areas.

Its purpose was to rectify

the racial, as well as economic, inequities steadilY multiplying in
Portland.

Portland's Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Barnes, had chaired

the committee which drew up the bill, recommending over one million
dollars

fO~

enactment of the "compensatory" education.

Although the

GPCe's Social Concerns Committee agreed that the bill, HB 1.307, was good
in its intent, it was much too soft on racial equality in cultural edu
cation--music, art,. drama, etc.

The bill plainly did not have any safe
.'

guard to provide "equal" educational opportunities for black children.
The bill did not go far enough.
ties to the black children.

It could easily circumv-ent the inequ;-·

The GPeC's group felt.that·HB 1307 did not

, live up to the guidelines set down in the previous year's extensive
study on equal education in Portland.
Multnomah School District No. 1

A special committee, appointed by

(Portland)~

and chaired by Judge Herbert

Schwab, specifically reported that Portland'.S black and white children

j
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living in the poorer areas were receiving the use of inferior educa
tional facilities and inferior education generally.

The "Schwab Report"

strongly recommended that children in the depressed areas have the'
quality of their education raised to be equal with that of the suburban
schools.

More specifically, the Report outlines some new, effective

desegregation policies to be implemented in Portland schools to insure
equal educational ,opportunities. ,When the Schwab Report was revealed
the year before"

the GPCe had hi ghly endorsed it.

The Social Concerns Committee again chose the same route to
obtain support for its recommendation that the GPCC be opposed to
HB 1307's insufficient "equal" education.

Instead of submitting their

recommendation to the Board of D-irectors to'oppose HB 1307, the Social
Concerns Committee gave it to the Executive Committee, which quickly
adopted it--on behalf of the GPCC.

The Executive Committee's adoption

also included that GPeC members would actively lobby the legislature
against the bill.
Pamplin told this researcher that he received a phone call from a
legislator at that time.

The legislator had received a letter from the

GPCC,- with Pamplin's name on the letterhead as a GPCC Board member.
legislator wanted to know if Pamplin'supported

th~

. the inequities in HB 1307 s compensatory education.
1

Board'had never made any policy decisi.ons
because he, himself, did not

~elie.ve

a~out

The

letter's criticism of
Since the GPCets

the-bill, and especially

the GPeC .should he involved with

trying to. influence· the passage of the bill one way or the other, he
became incensed about the issue.

Pamplin then began a campaign in ,the

GPeers Board of Directors against the Executive Committee's policy deci ...
sian about the bill, and he also attacked the very right of

th~

Executive
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Committee to speak for the
and vote on an issue.

GP~C

without the Board's own consideration ..

In this first round, Pamplin won.

On March

10~

1965, the Board voted to reverse the Executive Committee1s decision,

and not oppose HB 1307.
The center of this dispute over HB 1307 climaxed at a special
meeting of the Board of Directors, which Cate called at the requ'est of
Robert Bonthius, Social Concerns Commission chairman.

Pamplin said that

he received a phoned message in the morning, notifying him of the
special meeting to reconsider HB 1307 that same evening at the' African
Methodist Episcopal Church in Albina.

Pamplin said that he thought that

"something was Upll for this hastily called meeting, so he 'broke his
appointment for the evening to attend the special Board meeting.

He

also immediately phoned Dr. Melvin Barnes, Portland Superintendent of.
Schools, and Dr. Martha Shaull, a city school administrator,. to be
present at the meeting to defend the bill as written.

As he expected,

Pamplin conti"nued, the special meeting was packed with black "preachers ll
and others against the bill, whom Bonthius had invited.
According to Father Robert Greenfield, Oxonian Ph.D., several
clergy spoke very harshly against the arguments of Pamplin and others
supporting the bill as it stood.

However, he .said, the Rev. John Jackson,

.

.

a black, pastor, gave a rational and very -effective·speech against the

bill.

Greenfield added, liThe tension (at tt,1e meeting) became terrific.

Most of the oppositiqn tuned .out Pamplin and his guests." Similarly,
. Pamplin said that both the black and white clergy acted badly, and did
not want to listen to their arguments.

The main issue boiled down to

whether there should be funds for busing of students, both black and
\vhi te, to make for "equa 1 educa ti on II in th is Mode 1 School program.

The

d:J
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black pastors' position was that HB 1307 was only tokenism, and it was
better not to have the bill at all unless real steps were taken toward
desegregation in the schools.

Greenfield said that he was for the bill,

because the legislature was then anti-education anyway. He wanted to
get what they could as a beginning effort to help the disadvantaged
schools.

Greenfield felt it was Ita foot in the door" for more educa

tional benefits for the disadvantaged later on.
The vote by the Board members at the end of the meeting was close,
'but Bonthius and his Commission had swung enough votes to reverse again
the previous decision of the Board.

This time, however, they voted to,

work for the amendment of the bill, trying to keep the funding intact for
th~

disadvantaged area schools.

They voted to lobby ,for three kinds of

provisions for more equal education (instead of "compensatoryll education):
(1) busing of black children from schools where blacks outnumbered whites
by more than 50 percent to ,other scho01s, (2) the exchange of teachers,
especially for cultural typ'e of courses (music, art, etc.), \'Ihich were
not offered in the populated black schools, and (3) the changing of school
boundaries to reduce the black student concentrations.
Clay Myers was on the GPCC Board, and present at the meeting at the
AME Church in Albina that evening.

He told the writer that he and other

Board and staff members personally and quietly began to contact legis1a
tors, urging them to inc1ude in HB 1307 several provisions (suggested at
that heated Board meeting) which would insure

gr~ater

"

equality of public

education--busing of children for special courses at other schools,
exchange or adding on specialized instructors, and the changing of school

\,

boundaries.

When HB 1307 was passed in May, it included the fir'st two

provisions, along with implementing funds of $1,750,000 over the following

'/

l---~---------~------
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two years.
The action of the Board and the amendments of HB 1307 were a double
However, he soon was mounting a broad attack upon

defeat for Pamplin.

the' whole general policy of the GPCC's direct involvement with secular
society, politics and business.

Pamplin criticized the undemocratic

method of the Social Ooncerns Commission in its by-passing the Boar-d of
-

-

,

~

- ...

Directors to get quick "rubber stamp" decisions fram the exclusive
Executive Committee.

He said that no policy statements or position

papers should be issued in the name of the GPCC without the consideration
and vote of the full Board of Directors.

Policy statements should not

come out of hastily called, unrepresentative meetings.
The second prong to Pamplin's attack was the fundamental propriety
of the GPCC's involvement with the secular, socio-political world.
Pamplin's heritage was in the southern Presbyterian Church--in the, funda
mentalist tradition of the church's southern, conservative wing.

Pamplin

.told the writer that neither a clergyman nor anyone else who claims to
speak for a church organization has the right to take a position before
the public on political, or any secular issues, because those fields are
outside of the church's spiritual competency.

"Churches," he said,

"should c:mly speak to those issues which are clear1y spiritual or moral
problems.
tie~_of

Clergymen are not competent in the specialized responsibili

government.

II

When the GPCC was trying directly to influence the

legislature, it was, to Pamplin, a violation of the principle of separa
tion between church and state.

In a formal proposal to the Board of

Directors, Pamplin asked that:

(1) no policy statements be made in, the

name of the GPCC without a fully representative meeting of the Board of
Directors; (2) the GPCC remove itself from all social and political issues,
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I

except in clear religious and moral problems.

I

Because Pamplin is such a powerful person, his proposal represented

\

a major challenge to the social action goals toward which the new leader

I

ship was turning the GPCC. To make an independent study -of both points
in Pamplin's proposal, the Board of Directors appointed a special blue
ribbon committee, as Cate referred to it.

It consisted of about ten out-

standing local laymen and clergy, chaired by Clay Myers, presently
Oregon's Secretary of State.
Early in the legislative session that year, 1965, Pamplin and a few
other church laymen, whom I have been unable to identify,' had already
_begun vocally to criticize the GPCC's Social Concerns Committee's lobby
ing activities at the State Legislature concerning other current legisla
tion.

In defense, the Social Concerns Committee, -led by BODthius, mimeo-.

graphed a five page, carefully worded defense .of the principles upon
which the Church and GPCC carried on its activities toward the legisla
tive ·process.

The Study Committee was instructed to examine this state

ment, as well as all the political and social statements issued by the
Social Concerns Committee.

It was to look at the whole principle behind

the GPCC's relationships with social and political life, and then submit
its recommendations to the GPeC in answer to Pamplin's double proposal.
After deliberating through the Summer of 1965, the Study Committee
mailed its one page recommendation to the Board of Directors.

On

September 5, 1965, a public panel debate about the Pamplin proposal and
the Study Committee1s recommendations was held at the downtown First
Christian Church.

On the platform representing the two sides-of the

question were Pamplin and two colleagues, opposed by Bonthius and his
two colleagues.

I~_________....__

On September 8, at the Board of Directors' regular meet-'

----------------------------------------~~---------t..-----~----~----~----------------------------r----------------'~
~ "

I

I
I
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i ng, the Study Comm; ttee I s recommendati ons were adopted in tota 1., except

for changes of a few clarifying words.

ConsequentlY;t the Study Commit

tee and the Board disagreed with Pamplin on what the GPCC's ·leadership

knew was the crucial issue--whether the GPCC had a right ti to speak to
II

public social issues, or not.

The recommendation states that the GPCC

should "speak to our member churches and to the public about· the
Christian implications of contemporary social, economic and political
issues. 11 On Pamplin's second point, the Committee's statement agrees
that the GPCC's former procedures must be reformed, and lays out four
specific points of procedure.
Myers said he thoroughly agreed with Pamplin's second criticism.
The GPCC's procedure of by-passing the Board and having short notice
special meetings were methods that did not allow both sides of policy
questions a fair hearing.

It was unrepresentative and undemocratic.

MYers wanted this practice changed to insure future representative dis
cussion within the Board.

During the Corrmittee's hearings, as chairman,

Myers said that he made special effort, as· chairman, to have the Commit...
tee hear people representing both sides--from both within the GPeC and
from without.

Myers did not want the unrepresentative manner in which

the GPCC had previously developed policies to be repeated by the Study
.-

Corrunittee. .He said, 1180th the 'Pamplins' and the 'Bonthiuses' must be
heard and not alienated; it was an extremely sensitive thing to decide. u
After hearing everyone out, .Myers said he told the Committee:

liThe Church

is not going to be what you or I say it is going to be, but it is gqing to
continue

bein~

and acting relevantly to its society

The church has

always spoken to current social issues, and it will continue to speak out.
Myers emphasized that his Committee was II substantial1 y ll in favor of the

..

II
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policy recommendations they submitted to

th~

Board.

When asked about how the GPee responded to his requests for policy
changes, Pamplin answered, "We reached a compromise on those proposals I

made to the Board.

1I

Although the adopted Study Committee report was a

compromise, the crucial issue at stake--whether the GPee was to be
directly involved in its own society--was decided favorably on the side
of the progressives and -against Pamplin.

After the Board adopted the

report, Pamplin attended only one or two meetings, and submitted his
resignation prior to the annual meeting.

Through this series of chal

lenges, debates and decision, the GPeC affirmed its new, -liberal direction,
and 'at the same time, eliminated Pamplin's conservative influence from
within the Board of Directors.
Robert Pamplin's reaction against

th~

GPeC's efforts to influence

the legislative powers of government apparently is a classic example of
the conservative opinion held by the "silent majorityll in mainline
Protestant'churches.

Testifying to the majority attitude of present

church members against their churches' and their leaders' active involve
ment with socia-political issues are two national polls and several other
studies, quoted in Chapter 10. What is not typical of Pamplin's reaction
within. the GPCC is that he reacted overtly almost single handedly.

He

had a relatively small amount of support from within the GPee's Board, .
and ultimately the Board defeated his most important proposal--to return
the GPCC to conservative uninvolvement.
From the Pamplin episode, it appears that the opinion of the
GPCC's Board members did not coincide with the national majority of-lay
church members.

If this were true of the se1ected Board members here,

was it also true of the GPeC's member churches and their majority 'of lay
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members? From the way the Board of Directors finally handled the Pamplin
challenge"the evidence seems to indicate that the people on this Board
are untypical in relation to the organization's general membership.

If

this is also true, how to explain the liberal attitude expressed in the
vote by the Board of Directors?
1

Knowing the procedures used by the GPCCts leaders to push through

, !

quick policy decisions, the same leaders may have used oligarchic' methods
to predetermine somewhat the climate of opininn within the Board.

This

possibility will be further investigated in Chapter 9.
In the continuing conflict between conservative members and the
liberal leaders·, efforts to reform the GPec into a socio-political
activist organization, the liberals demonstrated the ability to overcome
strong opposition from conservative lay, members with high social status
and 'economi c power.

The 1i bera 1s cruci a1 vi c'tory (1965) di scussed
I

above was undoubtedly the turning point,' which allowed the leaders
ultimately to 'guide the GPCC into changing its formal statement of pur
pose ;n the new (1969) constitution to include social action.
With powerful leadership supplied them by Robert Pamplin, however,
why were 'the conservatives in the GPCC soundly defeated on this far
reaching issue?

It is more and more evident that the large percentage

of lay conservatives in the member churches have little influence or com
munication with the GPeC's policy makers.

,I

l·

I
CHAPTER VII
.\

HUB-CAP:

DOWNTOWN INVOLVEMENT

AND PUBLIC REACTION
Hub-CAP's Youth MinistrY-Charix Coffee House worked with runaways
and those in the drug culture in S.W. downtown Portland.
stimulated a greater amount of
action program.

~ublic

This activity,

reaction than any other single GPeC

Yet, there was a relatively.minor· reaction from

GPeC's own member churches.

th~

Since churches tend to .be one 'of the most.

conservative .groups in society, this 'evidence defies the general social
pattern.

Why.had the GPec's churches reacted so mildly in the face 'of

strong public reaction? This chapter explores the facts of the dis
'crepancy.
Hub-CAP, the second of the GPCC's community action programs to be
started, had it? real beginning in the initial actlon taken by the strong,
downtown First Presbyterian Church.

In the Spring of 1966, this congre

gation's Session (Board of Directors) decided they should finally take'
action to meet the pressing downtown social
cussed' duri ng many prev; ous meeti ngs.

prob~ems,

which they. had dis

The pastor of the church sai d they

were motivated by their growing awareness that their o1tJn church should
be lIinvolved in the mission to the wor'ld immediately around them." Their
Session called a special meeting of the congregation to consider what and
how much social action the congregation should take on.

They s·tarted the

meeting by listening to the presentations of several community author;

I

ties on the needs of the downtown area.

So large were the problems
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presented that the congregation decided,that they should begin the tasks,
but that the social actions needed were too great for one congregation to
undertake alone.

Shortly, the First Presbyterian invited seventeen down

town congregations, including a Roman Catholic Church, to participate in
an experimental community action program to the Southwest dowDtown section
of Portland.
Of the seventeen churches invited, six congregations joined
together to take the first steps toward real social action.

In order to

narrow down the important social problems of the inner city within the
purview of these congregations, and to discover which problems they could
adequately handle, the congregations started a laymen's volunteer listen
ing ministry.

It was to last six months, after which the cooperating

churches would decide whether to continue their work.
convinced

th~

Their "listening,1I

six churches that there were, indeed, some urgent needs for'

their social' action, 'as a 'group.

The pastor .of First Presbyterian 1isted

the "needs" they:discovered most demanding:

the IIhomeless tl men on skid

row; many elderly people living in the area, often in poverty; runaway
children and youth; inadequate child care; inadequate education and inade
quate recreation for all ages.
During this time of assessment and IIlistening,1I Paul Wright, the
First Presbyterian pastor, constantly consulted with Paul Schulze.

.

Wright

and Schulze had become close friends sihce the time Schulze'was hired to
initiate the GPGG's social action project in Albina.

Soon after G-CAP

began, Wright and Schulze began discussing the needs and possibilities of
a similar GAP in the Southwest downtown area (where Wright's church is).
Wright said that he had long been convinced of the

"soci~l

Gospel

ll

and

that the cnurches should apply it.' He had been a leader in the GPCC for
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many years,

~erving

as president of the GPCC during the 1950 l s and 1960's.

Wright was an early backer of the idea that the GPCC should begin a com
munity action program"in Albina, and was most instrumental in obtaining,
the, Presbyterians' first grant of $10,000 for C-CAP.
Although the GPce's Executive Secretary, William Cate, was on an
extended vacation in Europe during, the Summer of 1966, Schulze was writing
out plans for more church-CApls possible to operate in other problem areas
of the city.

The downtown churches' initiative for such a CAP in their

own area provided Schulze and those churches an excellent opportunity to
coordinate their plans.

Many of the respondents who spoke of Schulze con

curred on one of his many abi·lities as being a udreamer,1t an "originator,1J
of ideas about methods for churches' social involvement. ,According to
Schulze's close friend, Robert Menzel, he and Schulze worked out the final
details in writing (on Schulze's front room cof'fee table) of the organiza
tion for two new church-CApls during that summer.

One was to be the new

downtown CAP and the ntherwas to be in the old Southeast business dis
trict.

The downtown churches involved agreed that their own social action

project be under the administrative wing of the GPCC.
Hub-CAP.

It was soon called

Upon returning from Europe, William Cate fully supported

Schulzels plans for the two nevI CApis to be incorporated into the GPCets'
"sponsorshipll of community action work.

The GPCe's Board of Directors

soon adopted with little opposition the proposal for adding two new CAP's
to the GPCC.

In the Fall of 1966, Robert Menzel was appointed to be the

head of Hub-CAP, effective June', 1967.

At that time, Menzel was an instruc

tor in a small, private college and a Lutheran clergyman.
The new Hub-CAP began to develop as an organization with several
specific programs for its own area.

Although Menzel

wa~

still teaching,
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both he and Schulze, Pastor Wright and some interested laymen of.
churches gave much time to help organize the new project.

down~own_

From 1966

through 1969, Hub-CAP developed a variety of social action services to its,

own inner city environment: several programs for children, one for
ly, one for the'

lI~omel ess II

elder~

men. on ski d row,' a di vorce counsel ing program

and the best known of all Hub-CAP serv;'ces--the downtown Street ·Youth
Ministry and the Charix Coffee House for youth.
Two separate children's programs, called the "After School Program,"
served on two sides of the downtown.

Both were designed to reach

children from the first through the eighth grades.
run almost completely by volunteers from thei-r local
the directors have been paid professionals.

Both programs were
church~s.

Some of

Handicraft is provided for

the uoung, and photography, woodwork and cooking are taught to the older
children.

In' 1969 the After Scho01 Program handled 80 children in the

Terwilliger area and 45 in the Couch area.

·1

In 1968 'H~b-CAP set up a four-week summer program 'for the children
in the same two areas as the After School: Program.

It was called liThe

Best Days of the Week,it and operated each summer through 1972.

The same

low-income family children were being served in this summer program as
the school time program.

It was in 1968 that five Roman Catholic

parishes joined the GPCC, and so from the beginning of the Best Days of '
the Week, Roman Catholic nuns and seminarians have been the directors and
teachers, along with volunteers.

Cla~ses

were non-religiously oriented,

teaching arts and crafts, and'providing recreating and educational field
trips.
One of the main Hub-:-CAP concerns since its beginning are the IIhome
less" men in the Burnside, skid row ar·ea.

The "Homeless Menls Committee ll

.\
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has tried to provide a detoxification center, where men can get medical
assistance as an alternative to a stay in jail.
In 1969, Hub-CAP began a summer series of meetings for low-income,
elderly people to aid them in their particularly pressing proolems:,
recreation, leisure time (boredom), legal aid, medicare, nutrition and
housing.

Hub-CAP called the program "Summer Spokes."

Nuns, pastors and

volunteers planned and carried it out, and the meetings averaged 55 in
attendance the first year and 95 in 1970.

This effort is considered one

of the more "successfulll so far.
In past years, Hub-CAP has provided a community service project to
help people face divorce or separation.

It has sponsored an Education

Action Committee, devoted to the integration of city schools and its
early implementation. Hub-CAP also has a Housing Committee, which has
"

worked as a lobby to the City Council for low-income families and been
on the Interfaith Housing Commission.
Most of 'the separate programs under Hub-CAP have changed format
freqaently.

Some have

b~en

completely disbanded, some drastically

changed, some merely modified.

The reasons were reflected in the extreme

volunteer nature of these church-CApls:

(1) new and unusual problems-

experi menta1 programi n9 for the drug users; (2) loose orga ni za ti o~a 1
conimi tment by supporti n9 churches to such 1i bera 1ness of programi ng;
(3) uncertainty of financial support; (4) uncertainty of maintaining
qualified staff in volunteer programing; and (5) the other organizational
problems that also accompany more conservative volunteer groups.
In February, 1969, Robert

r~enzel,

the first full-time dir'ector,of

Hub-CAP, resigned to teach, at an out-of-state college.

Three months

later, Father Gil Lulay, pastor of the Roman Catholic Downtown Chapel,

'-iIIIiII
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was .hired on a

h~lf-time

"staff council II of

basis to coordinate

~astors

t~e

Hub-CAP activities.

A

from the Hub-CAP churches suppli-ed guidance

to the individual' Hub-CAP programs.

The Roman Catholics-bought

t~e

old

Burns; de Hotel, and in November, 1969,. opened it to provi de a 1onge r
term detoxification center, along with -food and medical help-.

Fathe'r

Gil Lulay directed the Hotel and overall program for the homeless men .
Volunteers from the Hub-CAP churches helped the Hotel's program, but-.
resident men of the Hotel supplied most of the cleaning, laundry work, .
maintenance and cooking.

Hub-CAP churches, individuals and community

agencies gave financial support to the Hotel's detoxification center.
In March, 1970, a large, one-room Drop-In Center was opened in. the
same block as the .Hotel.

Essentially, .it provided a place for inen

temporarily to get inside, off the street and have coffee or milk.

It

was open twenty-four hours a day, and staffed by' some of the more
I

I

.

permanent Burnside Hotel residents.
In recoun.ti ng the above events and programs whi ch have developed
in the history of Hub-CAP since 1966; the account has deliberately left
out the program which held Hub-CAP's center of attention from 1967
- through 1969.
colony.

This was the ministry to Portland's alienated youth

None of the Hub-CAP programs previously discussed here has
..

caused any significant change in the social structures of the community-
religiously, politically or culturally.
lished community.

None has threatened the estab

The one Hub-CAP program that did, however, was the

Youth Ministry.
When Hub-CAP began to organize 1n 1966, one of the downtown churches
which strongly supported the formation of the new CAP, First Congrega
. tional Church, was already involved in developing a youth style coffee

..
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house.

In 1966 a Congregational seminary student, John Randledt, was

employed by F;'rst Congregational Church.

The pastor of the congregation

said that Randledt was hired to develop a coffee house in the basement
of their church building lito update our congregation's youth ministry . II
'That first summer the coffee house was called the "Catacombs. II

It, was

considered successful for the first summer, but the Congregational base
ment was 'not suited to the purpose and Randledt had gone back to school.
The Congregational' youth committee asked other downtown churches to
take part ;n running the new coffee house.

A few other churches close

by, also involved in organizing the new Hub-CAP, accepted the invitationi

-- ;
I

The coffee house was moved to the more adequate facilities of the First
Un; tar; an Church near Portl and, State Universi ty" and renamed the ,lICharix
House."
About

~h;s

time, Hub-CAP was in its first months of organizational

life.

Robert Menzel was just coming on as the first director of Hub

CAP.

The relationship of the Charix Coffee House, as one part of the

several Hub-CAP "programs," was one of relative freedom given it by the
Board of Directors of Hub-CAP, which is made up of representatives
from Hub-CAP churches.

Although concerned about what was going on at

the Charix in its early stages, the_ GPGC's Youth Commission and Hub-CAP
Board'members apparently (according to respondents) saw the need for a
certai n amount of freedom of express i on in mus; c,. ski ts, presentations,
program; ng, etc.

Smok,; ng was allowed by youth (j uveni 1es under 18), even

though against Oregon State Law.
of the Charix and its programing.

Miss Margo Maris was hired as director
She was convinced ,that, a.certain

amount of "openness" to the kinds and conditions of youth who would
frequent the coffee house was needed, in order to reach those youth who

I

,I
I
j
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really needed such a place.

Menzel was not immediately responsible for

the Charix, and was then developing the administration of other Hub-CAP
projects.

However, Menzel kept a close eye on the Charix, and was in

sympathy with Miss Maris' approach to the Charix.
In February, 1967, the GPCG, through. its Youth Ministry Committee,
hired a young layman, Mr. Eugene Horn,. to carry 6n a street
II

I
I
I

to youth in the

,area, especially around

dowr~own

~inistry"

th~. Charix~

.Mr. Horn

was hired ~eparatel.y rro~ .. t~~ H.ub-CA.P'.? Charix,. and .paid separately by
the GPCG.

He was directly responsible to the GPCCts Youth Ministry Com-

mittee; however, Horn was instructed to work in conjunction with Hub-CAP

\

under Robert Menzel.

Horn was to coordinate his work with the Gharix,

I

and report regularly to Menzel and the Hub-CAP Board.
The GPCG's Youth Ministry Committee had become well aware of the
growing

numb~r

of runaway, or "alienated," teenagers hanging out ;n this

same part of downtown.

Horn was directed to make contact with as many

of the runaways and other youth "dropping out of society as. he was able
ll

to counsel ..and help.
the Charix.

Horn rented a street level room for an office near

It became a

widely in age.

drop~in

place for· runaway

varying

Many of the young people were seriously sick. from poor

food, exposure and-:o-sometimes--drugs.
deserves

juveniles~

~he ~redit

for

cont~cting

,the

Menzel, reported,that Horn
UnJv~r~fty

Medica1 School and

obtaining the free services of interns and other interested doctors to
the youth "drop-in center.1I The demand for the free medical aid increased
steadily, so that a separate set of rooms was rented for a medical drop-in
center;l named the IIOutside-In.1I A private medical doctor, Charles
M. D., voluntarily took the directorship of Outside-In.
.:

~

+

Spr~y,

The medical·
• ~ ••

•

•

drop-in center came to be open all week, with twenty-four hour emergency
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service.
On August 16, 1968, the Charix Coffee House and Horn's "street
worker mi ni stryll broke onto the newspapers' front pages.

At a regul ar

meeting of the Ci ty Counc; 1 the, ni ght before, the head of the ci ty
police's Women's Protective Division, Capt. Elizabeth Mumford, accused
the GPCC youth ministry and Gene Horn of "harboring" runaways (and
therefore delinquent) children.

Capt. Mumford's second charge was that

the Charix was the site of regular and heavy exchange of,drugs.

She

charged, ". . . youngsters fi nd easy access to narcoti.cs at the Char; x
Coffee House."

It turned out that "undercover" agents, working for the

Narcotics Division of the city's Police Bureau, posed as IIhippie type"
young people, and found out many of the places (parks) where drugs were'
exchanged in Portland.

One of the places where the agents claimed

easiest access to narcotics was at the Charix.
Newspaper articles in the following days carried the strong
. rebuttals to Capt. Mumford's accusations from William Cate and Robert
Menzel, as well as from the elected officers of the GPCC and Hub-CAP.
Ca te and Menzel both 1a uded the po 1ice and the Women r s Protecti ve' Di vi 
sian, and both told the press that the GPeC and'its Youth Ministry
tried to'work- in cooperation with the law at all times.

At the Charix,

they said, there were stringent rules against narcotics use

o~

possession,

and that staff members and vo 1unteers enforce rul es lid; 1i gently. II

How

ever, both Cate and Menzel, along with Horn and the president of the Hub
CAP Board, Robert C. Shoemaker (also an Attorney) agreed with, Mumford's.
accusations to a certain extent.

They conceded that there undoubtedly

was a certai'n amount of drugs passed at the coffee' house, but no more so
than any other public gathering place for youth, such as any Portland

L ______----~--------------------------~~--------------------,---------/
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high school.

They pointed out that drugs were available almost any place

where youth are free to gather.

Horn contended that if he spent too

much effort excluding possible pot smokers and other drug users from the
Charix, it would "eliminate most of the young people we .are trying to
reach. II William Cate, Robert Menzel and attorney Shoemaker defended·
Gene Horn and the Cha ri x s program of try; ng 'to reach the a1; enated youn 9
I

people.
On Capt. Mumford's first charge that the GPCC1s youth ministry pro
gram was opposing her Women's Protective D,ivision by IIharboring lJ runa
ways, Horn, Cate, Menzel and others connected with the GPCC program
specifically denied the charge.

Dr. Cate revealed that early in the

summer a new set of guidelines was worked out with the Multnomah County1s
Juvenile Court and the Multnomah County Welfare Department.

Due to an

oversight, the city pofice1s Women's Protective Division' was supposed to
be called in on the'earlier consultation, but was not.

The Court and

Welfare Department had approved the GPCC's alternate program for helplng
runaways.

Horn said the new program required that parents must give

their permission for a runaway to be placed in the program's care.

Horn

explained, "When a kid comes into mY office, he has to call his parents
and tell them he's all right.

Then I get on the phone and tell the
.~

parents who I am and what the program is all about.

If the parents

approve, we take respons; bi 1i ty and ·go on from there ~ II Horn sai d that
some of the runaways are referred to welfare caseworkers who counsel
with them and their parents.

Some others went to one of the fifteen

private volunteer homes, which had agreed to be part of the program and
,

had been approved by the GPCCls Youth Ministry Committee. ,If a young

Il.

person would refuse any of these alternatives, Horn was free to allow the

!

I
I
I

I
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youth to leave without being put into custody.
had happened.

In some cases, the latter

The Women1s Protective Division had come in contact with

a few of those youth who had left the Youth Ministry program as known
runaways. .Capt. Mumford had ci ted the case of one fi fteen year old gi rl

from

Wa~hington

State whom their Protective Division had found in a

local park .late at night, IIhigh on drugs and in the company ,of four older
males. 1I

Understandably, Capt. Mumford's accusations, illustrated by the

case of th~ fifteen year old girl, had aroused the immediate anger of
some City Council members.
In the months that followed the
in downtown Portland, an internal

Summer Crisis Program for youth

1968

str~ggle

began within Hup-CAP and the

GPCC's Board~-whether the Charix shoul~ be further supported financially,
and whether it should continue at all, at least with the
format.

~ame

program

Behind all the problems at the Charix; of cours'e, was the,

principal problem: 'narcotics., The question was how to maintain a
coffee house, which would reach the "alienated" youth, and yet provide a
climate which was free from the presence of drugs.

How as the Charix

going to continue with a program of freedom, without catering to the
"hard-corell drugs users?

In September, 1968, Robert Menzel said that he

informed the Charix staff that it would have to go off financial support
.'

from Hub-CAP, because the Charix was a·lready incurring a large debt.
Menzel said that· Hub-CAP did not have 'the income to maintain the Charix
at the expense of Hub-CApls other programs.
however, cut the Charix off immediately.

The Hub-CAP Board did' not,

It was not until April 3, 1969,

that the Hub-CAP Board authorized the formation of a separate Board of
Directors for Char;x with the full responsibility of supplying its own
financial resources.

During the six months between April and September,

J

I
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I

1969, the Charix continued on a more restri'cted schedule.

I

Board and the Charix staff experimented with different modifications of

I

the wide-open, loud music coffee house of the summer before.

The~

Hub-CAP

It is

obvious that the wide public reaction to the uexplos;vell publicity about
the drug scene at the Charix was having a tremendous negative impact on
the Hub-CAP Board and the Hub-CAP congregations whi ch ·supported the pro
gram and the GPCC's

Board~

In a'memorandum dated September 9, 1969, from Robert C. Shoemaker,
Jr., then chairman of the Hub-CAP Board, to Hall interested persons"
(widely distributed to Hub-CAP churches, GPCC Board members and CAP's,
Charix staff and young people, etc.), Mr. Shoemaker draws up a list of
"points of consensus" which developed out of a meeting of interested'
Charix people six days before.

The first point is that the Charix should

not continue as presently operating.

Shoemaker says, lilt has developed

into little ·more than an acid rock dance hall ·and has probably become
fairly ineffective in serving its original goals.11
entitled

IIGoal~,"

In the next section',

Mr. Shoemaker lists five revised goals under which a

new Charix should operate:

lI(a) . . . provide . . . relaxation in an

environment • . . with a minimum of harmful elements present.' (b)
outlet for creative expression . . . as a
offered by drugs.

subst~~ute

for the release now

(c) . . . a window to the community to the problems

of alienated youth--and what the youth are trying to say to the community.
(d) . . . a place where kids in trouble may seek help and where help may
seek kids in trouble.

(e) . . . a representation and assurance to young

people that all of society is not opposed to them and that many 'square'
elements of

soci~ty

care about their welfare.

II
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I
t

I

In the face of all the criticism about the Charix, Shoemaker's ver
sian of the suggested new goals still appears to be a strong statement of
faith in the possibi1ities--even necessities--of a continued coffee house
for alienated youth.
ll

lI

Despite the fact that Shoemaker was ca11in.9 for

the closure of the Charix, he also said that the established society of
this community can benefit from the "window it provides society to see
ll

"the problems of aJienated youth--and what the youth are trying to say
to the community.1I He said it was not only a place where society can see
and hear, but also a place where straight
II

ll

,

(conservative) society can

meet the alienated youth and actually help them.
In the following months, many great changes took place in the Hub
CAP staff, its Board of Directors, in the Chari,x and in the Youth Minis
try.

Under pressure from Cate' and GPCC officers, Gene Horn resigned

from the Youth Ministry directorship.

Two months

lat~r,

February, 1969,

Robert Menzel resigned as director of Hub-CAP to take a teaching posi
tion.

Nine members of the Hub-CAP Board resigned, three of them officers

of its Board, including Robert Shoemaker, during the following spring and
summer).
replaced.

Five a1t.ernates on the Hub-CAP Board also resigned and were
That number amounted to the major part of the Board.

On

June 15, 1969, Father Gil Lulay was hired as IIStaff Council Coordinator

ll

for Hub-CAP, which amounted to a half-time replacement for Menzel's job.
The big change formally took place for Charix on April 3, 1969.

A '

separate Board of Directors for Charix was set up at that time.

It con

sisted of over 50 people from the community a't large.

This Board became

responsi b1e for the supervi sian of Charix, as well as for' its fi nanc; a 1
support.

Later, however, Father Lulay said that

the legal entity responsib·'e for the Charix.

Hub-C~P

always remained

In July of 1969 the two

n
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Boards of Directors of the Youth Ministry of the GPCC and the Charix
were merged into one Board and into one program, the Chari x-Youth

~in

istry program. After Menzel resigned at Hub-CAP, Gene Horn was hired
as director of Charix.

Six months later in July, following the merger .

of the Charix and the Youth Ministry programs, both Gene Horn at Charix
and Margo Maris Horn (married the previous winter) resigned their
directorships, effective August' 1, 1969.
August through December, 1969, marked the last phase of the Charix
Youth t4inistry.

Since the programs had been consolidated organization

ally under its own governing Board of Directors, the program was then
completely on its own, financially._

From then on, the new Board was

unable to generate any consistent sources of new money income.

Soon

,
I

after the Horns left, the several pastors to Portland State University

j
t

students (PortJand Campus Christian Ministry) at the nearby Koinonia

I

House offered to take on the direction of the C-YM program for four
months--until ·the end of 1969.

It was agreed that a complete evaluation

of the program and finances' of the C-YM would be carried out during those
four months.

Hired for this task was Mr. Lewis Durham, consultant for

the Urban Young Adult Action, Incorporated, and the Glide Foundation of
San Francisco.

Following the evaluative study, the decision was reached

that there were insufficient resources and motivation in. the downtown
churches to provide an adequate service for such a fast changing youth
culture.

The Charix was closed in early 1970, and the Youth Ministry

also ceased to exist then.
Two of the former Hub-CAP Board members who resigned during 1969
were interviewed for this study.

Both are still very much committed to

the idea of the churches' CAP's--the necessity of the churches· actual

n
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involvement in social actions.

Both respondents defended the past work

and accomplishments of Hub-CAP.

They had each served on the Board for

over two years, through Hub-CAP's most tumultuous years, and they had
grown weary of the enormous amount of time and energy it took from them
to maintain the on-going administrative life of their Community Action
Program.

!lEach Board meeti ng ni ght, whi ch was almost every week, was a,

battle," one respondent said.

Significantly~

both men spoke spontane

ously at some point during their interviews about the possibilities of
accomplishing social change through the Hub-CAP. ,(Both interviews were
conducted separately and without the knowledge of the other taking part.
The'similarity of their views rray be due to their being good friends,
although one is an active Roman Catholic, and the other is an active
Presbyterian.)

Because the two men felt that the time had come in 1969

when the actual chances of accomplishing some sotia1 change through Hub
CAP had greatly declined, each realize'd he had becorre ineffective, and
so each decided to quit.
One of these two respondents, Mr. Withycombe, said that Hub-CAP
had the potential of becoming more than a Ilband-aid n operation on the
downtown social problems.

He felt that their CAP could have become a

catalyst to open the way for other social structures--business and
, government--to begin to take part in making positive changes. , The fact
was that Hub-CAP had lost its effectiveness in his view.

He said that

the Charix could have been an illuminating rtwindo\v to alienated youth,"
but due to mismanagement and over-permissiveness, Charix had become
bogged down in unnecessary problems.

It beg'an to take too much' time and

ene.rgy to make it go, he said.
The other former Hub-CAP Board member, Mr. Ni eberga 11, s'a i din
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effect that the churches and their individua1 members had lost their will
ingness to continue, to support such a radical program as the Charix and
Youth Ministry.

He said that he had found so many of his own church

people and those of other Hub-CAP churches who were deeply repelled by
the idea of their church getting down and participating in the actual
programs to help alienated youth.

Mr. Niebergall was very specific in

stating that the rejection of the "success ethic ll by this youth culture
itself causes strong reactions 'among middle-class, church people.

He

defended the Charix as presenting a,valid program much of the time, but,
he said, it was extremely difficult to keep out the presence of hard
drugs and still reach those who needed the Charix.

It

~eeded

stronger

management and surveillance, but that took more money and people, which
depended on the churches.

The churches were backing out, because they

were afraid to take the chance of repeating the Charix experience-
'leading to another explosive reaction from the community.

The middle

class churches' of Hub-CAP were afraid of the consequences of failing
agai n wi th such, an acti on program for IIdi fferent youth. II
What becomes apparent from the above two 'interviews is the subtle
effect of the reaction within the great ,number of members of the congre
gations which make up downtown churches and

sup~ort

the Hub-CAP programs.

It is important to note that one of the above two respondents said that
there was no noticeab1e drop in money
which make up the Hub-CAP membership.

contrib~ted

by those congregations

One congregation later did with

draw in protest to the Hub-CAP over-involvement" but its contribution was
small and offset by the addition of three more congregations into Hub
CAP. 'The concrete measurement of, negative reaction, therefore" by
financial giving, or congregational participation" would seem to say

.I

124

that there was little or no reaction from the churches involved to the
Hub-CAP program.

On the other hand, there was a

re~l

and significant

reaction, which was registered in the Hub-CAP Board and their unwill
ingness to continue to carryon some kind or progressive 'ministry to
"alienated youth.
ll

left as

Hub~CAP

Mr. Nie.bergall said that after Robert ,Menzel had

director and some of the key Hub-CAP Board members had

resigned, the philosophy of Hub-CAP's purpose even changed. A form of'
public pressure was exerted by the church members upon the Board mem
bers.

The conservative reaction by the

unh~ppy

church members resulted

in "battles" at the Board meetings, which resulted in inaction by' the
Board.

After the withdrawal of nine Board members, five alternative

members, the Executive Director and some members of the staff, the
"threatening ll youth program was ultimately dropped.

This evidence

·1

I

I

I

strongly suggests that the negative reactive of church members had a
negative relationship (if not negative effect) upon the Hub-CApls actions.
Mr. Withycombe thought that the purpose of the Hub-CAP and its kind
of program was to be a "forerunner" of the church in that the tAP would

. t

,
I

help the church to understand the social needs of the community.

Then

I
1

the church could also act.

But, he said,- the CAP would have to be free

of the i'nhibition of conservative church people's reaction.

In order to

accomplish this freedom, the CAP's would have to become lIad hoc commit
tees . . . so that they could take the necessary social and political
actions • . . without the stigma of church orierited and church organized
programs . . . " Nr. Niebergall had earlier said that Hub-CAP also tried
to perforlTI an educational function for the people in its own member
churches.

Hub-CAP had tried to inform them about the churches' rationale

for its particular social action approach to helping the youth in the

n
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downtown, along with explaining some of the problems within the new
"youth cu1ture.

1I

Mr. Nieberga11 said that not enough of their regular

church members understood the theological reasons behind their church
social actions through Hub-CAP'.
not started

ea~ly

But, he said, they (Hub-CAP Board) 'had

enough.

Robert Menzel emphasized that,Schulze strongly believed

~hat

he

could convince reluctant churches of the need and effectiveness of Com
munity'Action Program methods--if only he could be permitted to demon
strate them.

Schulze thought the best way was first to put a CAP into

action, ,and then the ,local churches would
ing.

~ee

and respond with their back

Four years before, Menzel related, Schulze' had done' exa'ctly this 'by

demonstrating the success of C-CAP in Albina, and the churches backed the
other church-CAP·s.

Menzel said that that tactic doesn't work anymore,

because the congregations have now been through this

th~ng, an~

they have

experienced the conservative reactions from some of their influential
people.

Menzel said his experience since (he now lives in another state)

has shown that conservative reaction to local social action has spread to
churches and communities where active social action programs have not yet
been tried.
Analysis of the Hub-CAP Program and Its Theoretical Meaning

,I

In analyzing all of the 41 respondents' statements from interviews,'
conducted specifically for this study, only 14 people did not spontane
ously mention something about the churches' conservative reaction to the
Charix-Youth Ministry program.

Eighteen respondents, 'who would definitely

be classified as IIliberals on the churches' social action involvement,
ll

gave fairly detailed accounts of how their own congregation, or some other

i

1
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congregations, had reacted negatively to Hub-CApls alienated youth pro
gram.

Out of the total number of respo'ndents, only seven expressed their

own disagreement with ,the youth program, or

displeasur~

with its purpose.

(Many interviewees working on separate GPeC programs or CAP's', especially

at different points in time during the 1960 s, did not know factual
1

information about other GPCC programs, because the social actions were so
disconnected.

Yet, in several non-directive interviews, I found several

who spoke spontaneously about GPCC soci a1 acti on issues or prog·rams other
than in their own expertise, revealing their ignorance of facts.

I am

sure some specific interviewees gave opinions about Hub-CAP based on
hearsay, without personal experience.
included in this data.)

'1

However, their opinions are

Without doubt, the evidence for the strongest

negative reaction to all the GPCC·s social action programs was recorded
here aga i ns~ the Chari x- Youth

~li ni stry prog~am.'

More congregati ons were

defi ned by respondents as havi ng a'n element of outspoken, cri ti ca 1 reac
tion to that action program than any other GPCC social action work.

On

the other hand, seven respondents out of the 41 interviewed is not a large
proportion (17 per cent) within the GPCC itself to be considered a signi
,

ficant negative
Althou~h

r~action

1
1

on such a sensitive social issue.

the conservative

~action

brought to bear upon the Hub-CAP
.~

Board by the individual church members of its constituent churches was
quiet and even difficult to pin.-point, it was

~

effectively negative that

the Charix and Youth Ministry program dwindled steadlli from lack of

~

port, until fifteen months later the Hub-CAP Board admitted the program
was dead.
-The evidence presented here about reaction against the GPeC I s work'
in the downtown Youth Ministry is not hard evidence, but very subtle.

'-"

n
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The Chari x-Youth Ministry survived the first great public outcry about
its involvement in drugs quite well, but as time went on, the GPCC and
the congregations most directly involved organizationally and geographi

cally did not want to take the future risk of being held responsible
before the public for managing such' a difficult program.

The GPCC

literally washed its hands of the .program, and threw it back into the
hands of the congregations sponsoring Hub-CAP.
struggle of

assess~ng

After a difficult

and again reassessing the program, the Hub-CAP

Board of Directors finally voted in 1970 not to continue either Charix
or the Youth· Ministry.
downtown youth work:

The Board gave as its reason for suspending the
not enough money to provide the kind of quality.

ministry needed to meet such a difficult job.

Father Gil Lulay, part

i
II
!
I

time director of Hub-CAP at that time, as well as two other Hub-CAP

I
I

Board members, admitted that their

memb~rs

were· afraid of not being able

to control the use of drugs by the kind of youth they were faced "/ith
helping, and that the public's sensitivity to this problem presented too·
great a probabi·l ity of conservative reaction backfiring.

Translated,

that meant for 'this researcher, the sponsoring church people had come to
realize now the great

bre~dth

of difficulties accompanying their assist

ance of the youth sub-cul tures into the drug scene, 'and they were now wi se
enough to foresee further bad publicity and public criticism.

They felt,

as congregations, they could not withstand the p.rice of the accompanying
negative reaction.
It is my estimation that William Cate and other GPCC leaders did
not want to pursue this aspect of, social action after the initial bad
drug publicity the Charix-Youth
1968.

r~inistry

received in the Summer' Crisis of

Cate advised the GPCC's Board of Directors to give the program

n
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solely to Hub-CAP, therby disassociating the GPeC .from it.

Cate was more

concerned about the GPCC's overall future for its social action program.
He did not want to endanger the GPCC's organizational change-over to
social action goals.

At that very time in 1.968, the GPCC·s committee to

rewrite a new constitution had reconstructed the organization
around three working

divisi~ns

~hiefly

with socia1 action purposes, and was get

ting ready to present the new constitution to their members.

Cate cer

tainly did not want to endanger the adoption of the new constitution
because of some high pitched public reaction·aimed at the GPCCls social
action programs.
Also, at this point in

my

research I was seriously asking the

I

further question, ,IIWhy?" Why had the downtown Youth Ministry program
incurred such a long lasting public reaction? .It appears to me that the
answer lies within the process of legitimation; which religion normally
performs for the socially constructed world.

was causing a serious threat to their well-established social meanings,
their churches normally acted to legitimate.

Because of new

methods based on unusually applied values, such as disregarding punitive
trea tmen"t for these devi ant youth in exchange for sympa theti c therapy
and assistance, conservatives felt their church-legitimated values were
threatened.

When the press' headlines gave public notoriety to the local

law enforcement1s attack upon the Charix-Youth Ministry's program, then
the conservative church members of Hub-CAP had their fears and criticisms
confirmed.

In other words, institutional

r~ligion,

as represented by the

GPeC, had stepped outside of its tfaditional role of legitimating the
"

I
1
I

1
!

The conservative elements

in the member churches of Hub-CAP thought the downtown Youth Ministry

~hich

"I

"

,

local government and law and order.

n
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In the past, churches usually supported the police's crackdown on
juvenile delinquents.

In contrast, the GPCC's Youth'Ministry open1y'

.I

opposed the police's legalistic and depersonalized method of dealing
with such deviant youth.

The churches' program was challenging govern

mentis law enforcement with a completely different set of

values~

say

ing the police's treatment was dehumanizing.

·1I
I

I
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CHAPTER VIII
THE GRAPE BOYCOTT CHALLENGE,
Although neither the GPCC, nor any of its action groups, actually
participated in the 1968 national Grape Boycott, the GPee did publish
an official statement supporting both the United Farm Workers" right to
.'

strike and the consumers· boycott of local sales.

\

By giving its verbal

support to this Boycott, the content analysis shows the respondents gave

I

one of the highest disapproval rates (20 per cent) and t,heir second
1

lowest rate of approval (39 per cent) from among the loyal group of

\

activitists.
Why did this issue result in the high degree of increased tension
between the liberals and conservatives in proportion to the time and
effort the GPCC committed to the problem? Did the financial-economic
context of the issue have a deciding effect on the conservatives' reac
tion? This chapter faces these questions and the facts surrounding the
Grape Boycott situation.
,In 1968, the Rev. Robert Burtner took over as chairman of the
Soci a1 Concerns Commissi on,. fa 11 owi n9 Robert Bonth; us I move to another
ci ty.'- Under Burtner, the Soc; a1 Concerns group has conti nued to be
aggressive on state legislation and local politico-economic issues.
1968 was the time ot'the GPCC's IIbig summer,1I the Summer Crisis in the
youth drug scene in Southwest 'Portland and the Black Summer Crisis in
Albina.

Under Burtner that September the

Commiss~on

drafted a strong

statement condemning the United States' uninvolvement in the. Russian

1

11

;

!
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invasion of Checkoslovakia, which was returned· by the Board to the Com
mission for redrafting and toning down.

In August, 1968, the Social

Concerns Commission also had issued to the Board members a statement
defending the nation-wide Grape Boycott, organized by the United Farm
Work~rs,

AFL-CIO of Delano,

California~

At the Board meeting on

September 11, 1968, the Board members also referred the Boycott state
ment back to the Social Concerns Commission for rewriting.
Proceding and 'during this time, the Social Concerns Commission
asked the Board members to go hear Cesar Chavez, the union leader of the
Farm Workers; speak at Portland State.University_

The Commission also

set up special hearings of representatives from both sides, workers and
growers, for the Board.

A representative of the Farm Workers Union and

local organizer of the Boycott appeared at a special Board hearing, as
well as with the local secretary of the Independent Growers Association.
j'

I
I

Because the local boycott involved secondary picketing' at local super
markets, the Social Concerns Commission set 'up a meeting with the local,
grocers through the Grocers I Association representative.

Th~ m~eting

was at the Roman Catholic Chancery office building, but only one
Grocers· Association representative showed up to defend their position
against local picketing.

Burtner said that

fo~_

those. churchmen, lay and

clergy, who were at the meeting, lIit was a real flub for the grocers. 1I
,

,

Burtner said that the Grocers' Association representative was at a loss
to explain why no other supermarkets felt it necessary to attend the
meeting.
The Social Concerns Commission

~hen

called a special meeting of the

GPCCls Board for September 23, 1968, at 4:00 p.m., to reconsider a new

n
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GPCC statement on the grape boycott. All those present, including
Monsignor Tobin, representing the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, voted to
adopt a favorable· statement, defending the farm workers and their
strike--with the abstention of ,Lowell Steen, the Treasurer.

The GPCC's

Executive Director, William, Cate, said that the· statement they adopted
did not support

t~e

boycott itself, but defended the workers I. right to

organize and bargain collectively.

However,' the actual 'statement,which

follows, does support the boycott, at· least locally.
Whereas, the right to organize and bargain collectively long has
been recognized as an important part of American workers, the
farm workers of the U. S. A. have been denie~ this right under
the National Labor Relations Act. For nearly two years now, the
farm workers of California, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez,
have been engaged in a certified strike with Delano, Coachella
Valley and South Kern County grape growers. The issue is simply
whether or not farm workers can legally organize themselves into
a union, and bargain collectively with their employers •
. ,

We hereby record our support for the Delano grape strikers in
their consum~r boycott of California table grapes.
Cesar Chavez has specifically sought the support of the churches
to help them in their non-violent efforts, for justice among farm
workers. We heed his call, and urge others to refrain from the
purchase of all California table grapes in Portland stores.
William Cate said in an interview in 1970 that he considered the
GPCCls suppqrt of the grape boycott had caused the greatest reaction among
church people against the GPCC itself, second only to the reaction over
the Youth Ministry and Charix House treatment 'of runaways and drug users.
Cate said more people called or wrote to complain and threaten their
withdrawal of financial support to the GPCC for its I'unwarranted" sup
port of the boycott and the farm ltJOrkers, than any other soci a1 action by
the Council~ except the Youth Ninistry.
In one of the early interviews conducted for this research, the

1J

• I
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respondent, who is the pastor of a strong urban ,congregation, said that
he had formally resigned from his office as a GPCC B0ard member for
several reasons, but the main reason was the GPCCls support of the Grape
Boycott.

The respondent, the Rev. Johnston, said that he had been

personally connected with the GPCC--on its Board, or committees--for 14
years until his

r~cent

resignation. He said that, generally, the GPCC

had become much too unbalanced toward social action concerns.
Council should also maintain the other side, evangelism.
emphasized that the GPec should assist the congregations

The

Johnston also

in

their local

work, rather than the congregations' spending so much of their means to
assist the GPCC in programs which are so controversial that they detract
from the congregationts local neighborhood work.

He thought that his

own congregation and others in their own local area would accomplish 'more
if they set up their own youth, low-income hOUSing, senior citizens,

and similar programs. Following this interview, two other respondents referred to
Johnston's resignation from the Board as an indication of their own
strong feelings against what the Council had been doing recently.

Both

of these respondents are clergy, and having been on the GPeC Board in
past years, they knew Johnston very well.

Both criticized the same
;"

GPCC·s preoccupation with social actions as Johnston did.

The Grape

Boycott stand had caused reactions within their own congregations, they
said: One of these men also resigned from the GPeC, following Johnston,
but his chief'reason was his reaction to the Youth Ministry in Southwest
Portland.

His reaction is probably due to the fact that his congregation

is situated only a couple of blocks from where the Charix House was

II
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located.

The other pastor did not resign;

support the GPCC in his large

Presbyteri~n

however~

he does not personally

congregation, situation across

town. Yet, some of the lay supporters of the GPeC in his congreQation have
. I

continued successfully to pressure the congregation to give its-annual
$1,000 gift to the GPCC.

I

The Presbyterian pastor said that IItwo very

influential men," who regularly gave large contributions to the congre
.

-

gation, told him they wanted their congregation not to support the GPCC
any longer, due to the Council's support of the Grape Boycott.
In the interview, Johnston also expressed strong disagreement with
the GPCC's "condoning the use of drugs" in the Charix House.

He said the

Chief of Police had told him personally that the City Council would not
give the word to the Police Department to close down the Charix, because
IIthere were too many important, politically influential people supporting
the GPec's Charix and downtown Youth Ministry.
Johnston's second criticism of the GPeC was the CApls financial
irresponsibility to the GPce itself.

He said that he asked the Board in

September, 1968, if the CApis were responsible to report

thei~

use of

funds and if the GPCG had a veto power over the CAP's financial actions.
Th~

Board discussed it at length then, but could not decide.

Johnston felt that the financial drain by the CApis was the direct cause
of having to withdraw support for the
quency Home and for the jails.

ch~plains

to the Juvenile Delin

Johnston pointed.out that these chaplains

had partial support from the GPCG since the late fifties, but were now in
danger of being withdrawn from their posts because of lack of support.
Johnston admitted, however, that his decision to resign was affected
mostly by his dissatisfaction with the Board's support for the boycott of

I

I
I
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grapes.

He felt strongly that the Social Concerns Commission "forced"

the Board into this position, because the special Board meeting (Septem
ber 23, 1968), which favorably adopted the boycott stand had only ten
members of the Board present to vote.
contain Johnston's letter of

The old GPCC records happened to

resignation~

reasons for leaving the GPCC's Board.

to which he appended his

It is obvious <that Johnston's

most specific reaction is to the Grape Boycott approva1.

He also con

fided that several of his own church members had complained<about the
Council's action on this, but one local businessman said he wanted the
congregation also to stop contributing to the GPCC.
In his resignation letter, Johnston mentions that he had recently
made two trips to the California grape growing<area
California.

aroun~

Delano,

He told the researcher that before he had studied for the

ministry, he had been in business himself, running a plant nursery in
the San Joaguin Valley.

He said he knew the problems of the grape

growers, most of whom are small growers.

Johnston also said the Union

was "forcing" the workers into the Union against their will, in many
cases.

It is interesting to note that in the information published by

Chavez' United. Farm Workers, they give figures directly contradicting
Johnston:

IIIn California small family farms ar:e NOT the issue!

Six

percent of the landowners own 75 percent of the farmland--gigantic
agri busi ness corpora ti ons.

II.

The Grape Boycott issue was the one dispute

in

which the GPCC came

into direct conflict with the city's business community.

Some respond

ents used terms such as "meddling in business peoples' affairs
describe their criticisms of the GPCC.

ll

to

Other respondents critical of the

n
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GPCC's participation said that the "secondaryll boycott of local stores
was unfair and unjustified; the GPCC should not have "stuck its nose into
i

a problem they di d not know all the facts about . . ...
The
community.

GPee

was'challenging strong economic forces within its own

Inevitably, numerous local lay members of churches which

belonged to the GPCC had large invested interests in the supermarket be
ing' picketed and hurt ~y the Boycott.

Because the pragmatic intenSity of,

the issue directly affected their economic well-being, many of its own
members vi gorous ly questi oned the GPCC I S stand."

.'

. 1
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CHAPTER IX
AUTHORITY AND POWER IN THE GPCC
The GPCC·s forma1 organizational

stru~ture

;s patterned after the

Protestant, congregational centered structure of the national church
bodies.

Protestantism in the Unite·d States has traditionally placed primary

emphasis on the local congregation1s purpose of preaching the Word and
administering the Sacraments.' Constitutionally, in national church bodies"
the congregation has been the real locus of organizational power and
authority.

However, a broad tendency in Protestantism has been the rise

of informal control of the denominations by

~he

special

Formally) all the parts of

~gencies

within each denomination.

,different departments and

the· structure and efforts of the denomination continue to be instrumental
to .the local purpose of the congregations.

Informally, the power of the

organization is in the hands of a few leaders, and the congregations are
instrumental to the organization.
Max Weber's definition of author'ity, as against power, is necessary
at this point.
exercise power.
authority.l

Authority is the legitimate right (of the organization) to
Weber descrjbed three ways in which a leader may gain

The first type of legitimation of authority Weber called

"rational-legal" authority.

A specific office of leadership possesses it

because the group has established laws or rules which specify that the
office legally embraces certain specific authority.
belief in rationally established laws.

It is based on the

The second type is "traditIonal

authority." Certain rights and powers come to be associated with an

'--........

Ii
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I
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office after a period of time.
ship position.

I

I

A tradition builds up around the leader

The office holder takes on authority more 'and

more~

because traditionally the holder of that office has assumed authority
with respect'to specific tasks., The third type of authority is called
"charismatic.

II

Because an individual leader possesses traits which

inspire, confidence and willingness i,n his own group to follow his leader
ship, apart from any legal definitions or traditions, then that person
has Jlcharismatic authority.1I

In contrast to the other two definitions,
,

,

charisma applies to the individual and not to the office of authority.
However, a fourth type of authority, which especially applies to
the Protestant, congregational form of organization, is described by
Paul Harrison in his study of the American Baptist Convention.

He calls

it rational-pragmatic authority.2 Unlike Itrational-legal" authority, it
;s organizational power that is not legitimately authorized.

Harrison

'\

says, rather, that it is IIpower grasped,1I since there is an undefined
vacuum about key offices in relation to many other,parts of the organiza
tion.

Because of this IIvacuumll the office holder is able to exercise

power, although not legally authorized.

As Weber points out, these forms

-I

of authority are only "ideal-types," and not necess-arily mutually
exclusive.

They often overlap, or are only partly present in some

organizational positions.
The GPCC is a voluntary organization..

In. a sense it is a double

voluntary organization, since participation in the decision-making
Assembly, Board of Directors s or Commissions precludes the person's
membership in and appointment by la congregation.

Because of the inherent

nature of a voluntary organization, it tends not to develop a strong
rational-legal authority form of government.

J.

~

It tends not to have a

n
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highly elaborated system of 1egalistic specifications for performance and
standards of' production.

Paul Harrison describes the great difference
between the theory and practice of the American Baptist Convention. 3 .The

denomination's theory calls for the decision-making power to be in the
hands of ,the laymen and the local congregation.

In reality, the laity

and congregation participate in the decision-making process in only a
few perfunctory ways.

The same is large1y true for the GPCC.

Among the

American Baptists, the real power of the national body rests in the hands
of church executives, usually. clergy, who have little legal authority
but have enormous pragmatic influence.

Until the adoption of the new

constitution in 1969, the same could be said about the GPCC.

The GPCCls

new constitution is still unspecific about the real powers of employed
staff personnel, especially the Executive Secretary.

Although the new

constitution spells out in some general terms the working relationship
·1

of the three new major social action arms to the GPCC (Community Action
. Programs, Center for Urban Encounter and the Metropolitan Ministries;
viz., chart on last page of this chapter), almost nothing is said about
the specific powers and responsibilities of the employed staff heads of
these divisions, nor of the elected chairmen of the three Commissions.
OligarchY and Insulation
In analyzing the development of authority in the GPCC during the
sixties, the most important place of authority is the office of Executive
Secretary.

Ye~, the'a~thority

9f the Executi.ve Secretary cannot be

understood without considering it within the context of the GPCCls con
stitutional, or formal, sources of authority.

In the eleven years since

William Cate took over as the Executive Secretary (1959), the GPCCts goals

II.
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have changed radically.

From its beginning in 1919 till about 1960, the

GPCC primarily served to reinforce traditional goals of congregations.
It was a cooperative group of congregations, working to achieve common,
congregational goals, like evangelism, education, youth

progl~ams

(for

their own youth), etc. ,The GPee was centered· in the congregations.
Because the goals did begin to change shortly after Cate arri,ved at the
GPeC, and

~ontinued

to change throughout his tenure, the inevitable

question arises about the amount of influence Cate exerted on the GPCe
to make this change possible.

Does Paul Harrison1s description of a

large church organization and the executives' development of "rational
pragmatic Sl authority apply to the GPeC and its Executive Secretary?
Under

the~

old constitution (adopted 1959, revised 1960), the

Executive Secretary's responsibility was defined as the Ilsupervision of
the activities of the Council . .
the same broad definition.

The new 1969 cohstitution adopts

There is no real authority assigned to the

Executive ,office in those words.
anyone or any other offices.

II

It does not say he has authority over

It is more a statement of responsibility.

Authority here is undefined, but wide responsibilities imply wide author
ity.
power.

This consti-tutional 'statement is the first source of undefined
The Oi r,ector is thus gi ven -the vast po.wer to make everyday pol i ty
.

,

interpretations.

This power to interpret goals into practical decisions

a 1] ows ,the O'j rector 'actua'lly to

new policy--when he'is interested

;n reinterpreting organizational goa)s.
! ','

j

A'seco-nd source' of' undefi n~d authori ty ; s th~' ~ons ti tuti'ona 1 pro

, I

vision which allows the Board to Ilauthorize any officer or officers,
agent or 'agents' to enter fnta any"coritracf' . .
behalf of the Council (Art. XI, Sec. 1 & 3).

!

"I

~Ir,

'ana to wr'fte 'checks on

So the Executive Secretary

iT

tn

'I
I
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is able to control large sums of money from day to day as instruments of
his decisions.
The Executive's third level of inform<3:1 authority. is his ex-officio
membershi p--wi thout vote--; n lIa 11 bod i es of the Counci 111 (Art. X). '
Through his ever-present influence, the Executive permeates the total
power

structu~e

with his, interpretation of the organization1s

purpose~

In the case of William Caters interpretat~on rif goals for the GPCC, ~t is
known that he came to Portland with a very specifically defined philoso
phy of purpose for local church councils.
dealt with this very problem:
by 1oca1 counci 1s of churches.

Gate's Ph.D.

disser~ation

kinds of methodologies" for social action
II

Whi 1e in Portl and, ,Ca te wrote a short

book, published in 1965, on this same theme, uSing illustrations from the
GPCC. 4 Of the 41 respondents interviewed by 'this researcher,' 22, or over
harf, made some reference to Cate's positive ability to illuminate the
possibilities of the new social action proposals for the ,GPGC and' the
theological-moral necessity to be involved in social action.

In the

period of four lengthy interviews with Cate and several informal discus
sions with him, he repeated his de1iberate efforts to try to influence
both ,laymen and

.~

pastors--informally~

behind.the scenes--to support the

local churches' increased involvement in social action.
he worked slowly in his first five years at the GPeC to
train many key people in a wide number of

10c~1

personally involved in social acti9n work. II

Gate said that
and

I~onvert

congregations to become

He said, "People rally to

your side if you are able to get them involved--to act on the idea.

Many

of the people who are now supporting our (GPeC) community action in the
city have developed a commitment to it in the years before.

II

tn

.!
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Thi s thi rd i nforma1 , -undefi ned. source of authori ty f9r the Executi ve
Secretary (changed to Executive Director in 1968) through his ex-officio
presence on all committees, etc., has allowed him greatly to influence
IIkey people" and help encourage these and other people to allow their

names to be nominated for more politically important

co~mittees,

commis

sions or the Board of Directors.
It is a recognition of the DirectorJs use of undefined authority
by his very presence--his personal, charismatic dedication to social
action goals, and by the authority inherent in the status of his execu,,:,
tive office.

It is illustrated in Caters statement that he worked about

five years to IIconvert and train many key people • . . II to' become more
involved in GPCC social action projects.

In other words, by Cate1s con

stitutional presence on all bodies of the GPCC, he was constantly pre
senting his views before the people who were 'interpreting and deciding
the administrative goals of the GPec.

Cate's executive status, together

with his expertise and commitment to social action goals became a per
vasive influence upon the committee members; especially the laymen.
Working in such small groups and on a one-to-one basls before and after
such committee meetings, Cate's IIbehind the scenes ll efforts began to
accumu1ate in numbers on the Board and committees.
The fourth undefined source of the Executive Director's organiza

tional authority is due to the GPeC's process of electing members of the
Board of Directors ,and other

~fficers.

A slate of nominees is carefully

prepared by the Nominations ,Committee well in advance of the a'nnual meet
ing of the General Assembly.

Of course, the Executive Director is

present on the Nominating Committee, exerting the informal authority of
his office and person.

But even more significant in this process is the

"'_.

{
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lack of democratic procedure by the delegates from the member congrega
tions to the annual meeting.

Rarely, if ever, do delegates nominate

from the floor of the meeting any opposition candidates against the pre
nominated slate of officers.

Without opposition, the pre-determined

candidates are, in effect, hand picked successors to carryon the pre
vailing policies

appr6v~~

by those already in'office.

An illustration of this breach of democratic procedure within the
I

organization comes from an unusual participant observer, a Roman
Catholic priest, who had not before been a part of any extra-Catholic,
ecumenical group.

In 1966 he began to participate in Hub-CAP

I

,I
I

activi~

ties without, his parish becoming official member 'of that CAP program.
His interest and activity in the GPCC·s CAP was to become the precursor

of five Roman Catholic parishes officially joining the GPCC in 1968.
At that time he was elected a member of the GPCC's Board of Directors ..
In a formal interview and in other discussions with this respondent, he
said that while in Rome for special studies during the Vatican II,
Ecumenical Council, he had become very interested in the possibilitie·s
of new

~cumenical

relations at local, practical levels.

Many Catholics,

he said, were then extolling the democratic practices of the Protestant
churches.

However, when he first

witnesse~

the GPCC's elections at the

annual meetings and saw no opposition nominations, nor open discussion
of nominations from the Assembly floor, as a new, outside observe.r, he
was particularly struck by the absence of the democratic process there.
He emphasized his amazement at his first experience within an essentially
Protestant organization that there was no real contesting groups or
arguments presented against the .established group's nominations.

·1
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The General Assembly, according to both the 1954 and 1968 consti
tutions, is lithe supreme governing body of the Council ,II and the 1968
version further

\

stat~s

that the General Assembly nshall' have final

jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the Council" (Art. VI). The
Assembly is also the GPCC's fully representative body of delegates from

\

a

1" the member congregati ons, whi ch has thi s ul ti rna te auth'ori ty over

all GPCC matters .. Constitutionally, then, the congregations and their
delegates are intended to be in direct contact with the governing pro
cess of the GPCC.

Both the old and new constitutions have kept intact

the widely held Protestant principle that the individual person is the
locus of authority, because he is personally responsible to God through
his own faith.

Since the individual receives the Word and Sacraments in

the local congregation and renews his faith in God there, the congrega
tion is the center of the individual's religious life and faith.

The

i ndivi dua 1 and the congrega ti on are the source of ,author; ty and power, and
the GPCC's constitution recognizes this principle.

As the first paragraph·

of this chapter stated, the principle of congregational authority governs
the formal structure of the GPCC.

The appearance. that the delegates have

the decision-making process in their hands is given to the congregations
delegates assembled at the two AS'sembly meetings each

year~

. In reality,

however, tre General As'sembly IS annua1 and semi -annua 1 meeti ngs pl ay

little or no part in conducting the policy decisions for the GPec.
Through the GPec's informal

stru~ture)

the actual working authority for'

decision making resides, first, in the small (7 voting members, plus 4
ex-officio) Executive Committee and then in the.Board of Directors.
Throughout the 1960 s, the election of officers and new Board mem
1

bers \'las the sum total of the IIdecis'ion-making by delegates at the
H

I

t
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General Assembly's annual meetings, officers, entertainment ,and a special
program, or "outside" speaker.

For the past eleven years, the annual

meetings' printed agendas indicate that no provision was made for dis

cussi on, or deci sions about any spec; a1, or press i ng ,problems faci ng the
GPCC.

Given to 'the delegates at the beginning of the meetings is a

bulletin of mimeographed reports from most of the committees, commis
sions, the President, the Executive Oirector, together ,with a financial
report from the past year.

The General Assembly·s business meeting has

never included, according to the bulletins of reports of the past eleven
years, the approval of a proposed budget for the coming year.

Although

the constitution provides for it, no one in the GPCC could remember the
General Assembly ever being called into special session between regular
meetings during the year to rule upon some critical issue facing the GPCC.
Bec~use

the mechanics of arranging the agendas for the two semi

annual meetings fa'll into the hands of the Executive staff, subject to
approval of the,elected officers, the control of what the representative
de1egates stia11 be all owed formally to cons,; der and vote upon in thei r
Assembly meetings is largely determined by the Executive staff.

Asked

why there was no provision for a real business meeting on the agenda of

I

the Assembly's annual meeting, a staff member conjectured that it had
.~

I

probably become "traditional

ll

a long time ago, because the delegates do

not know enough about the issues to make' good decisions, and because the
~eetings

would get much too long.

The staff

re~pondent

said that he had

never heard anyone question the practice of having a brief business meet
ing at the annual Assembly anyway.
Although Robert Michels was dealing primarily with large voluntary
organizations, his political theory, which he cal1ed lithe iron law of

146
oligarchy," has wide applications to the GPCC.
.

Michels concluded that

,

the very nature of a large organization gives its leaders control over
the organization's machinery, which in turn gives them the necessary
resources to exercise monopolistic power 'within the organization., -lilt
is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over
the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates
over the delegators.

Who says organization say~ oligarchY.uS The'size

of the organizatio,n definitely has a great deal to do with its propensity
toward oligarchy.

Lipset, Trow and Coleman state that democratic pro

cedure is usually directly proportionate to the smallness in size of
the political association.
Increased size necessarily involves the delegation of political
power to professional rulers and the growth of bureaucratic
institutions. The translation of this proposition to the level
of private government is clear: The smaller the association or
uni t~ the greater membershi p control. There can be 1i ttl e doubt,
that this is true in the trade-union movement. 6 .
The GPCC would not be considered a large organization by the
standards of most international trade unions, professional and business
societies,

~ooperatives,

and other national voluntary organizations.

Yet,

the GPCC takes on the aspects of largeness when the total number of indi
vidual people: who are represented to the Council are counted.
there were 130 member congregations.

In 1969

The new 1968 constitution gets

around the limitations to GPCC mernbershi p for certain churches-
II

ll

without holding to statements of belief in the' GPCC preamble, such as
Jewish synagogues, etc.--by allowing "participation in the GPCC through'
ll

membership in a local church-community action program (CAP).

In this

way it is possible for a member of a synagogue to be a voting member of
the Board of Directors, if he is elected the chairman of one of the local
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CAP's board.

According to the new constitution, each, CAP must have a mini

mum of five C7ongregations as members, but none, of the congregations need
be members 'of the GPCC itself.

As members of a CAP, local congregations

are in a working relationship to the GPec. The GPCC coordinates the
CAP's programs so as not to compete, but assist each other in social ac
tion throughout the city.

The GPCC has also received into membership

one more Roman Catholic par"ish ,(addJng to" the first five Catholic
parishes received in 1968) and the Reformed Latter Day Saints denomina
tion, plus several of their local congregations. , The GPCC ha's signifi
cantly expanded in the last decade, and continues to expand its repre
sentation of new denominations and new congregations, adding many new
individual people.

I

Of more consequence than numbers and size in the GPCC is the
principle of IIdouble voluntarism. 1I A local church is a voluntary

\
~

1
l

organization to which a person ,must belong as a prerequisite to being
elected or appointed as a delegate to the GPCC.

The congregation itself

then volunteers to become a member of the GPCC 7 and appoints delegates,
together with the pastor, to represent it to the GPCC's General Assembly.
The congregation has higher loyalties to its own national denomination,
so the' GPCC is usually a secondat'y concern for most pastors' and laymen'.
(It appears that laymen develop prior loyalties to the GPCC easier than
pastors, probably because laymen have

n~t

had the seminary experience in

which to internalize primary lDyalties to a denomination.) But lt is at
the in-between level--between the congregations and the GPCC--that the
congregation's delegates to the General Assembly become a layer of
insulation, separating the church people from the inner circle of power
within the GPCC.

The GPCCls informal decision makers--Wil1iam Cate,
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Paul Schul ze' (who returned to the Center for Urban Encounter) 'and a few
elected officia1s--amount to about five people who really
mold policy. decisions.

c~eate

and

The formal power structure of the GPCC is still

made up of a relatively small number of people who represent over 130
congregations, or conservatively 35,000 to 45,000 people.

The formal

decision makers are 24 Board members, four officers,' plus chairmen of
three, committees and three commissions.

Taking into consideration that

35 people held 38 elective positions for 84 per cent of the time

~ ~

ten year period, 1959-1968, and 30 other people held same of the offices
one term or less during the ten years, the great majority of the congre
gations" delegates do not break into the core group, "which makes GPCC
policies. 7 These delegates and common church people never really learn
the inside vocabulary of the GPeCts,decision making about ecumenical and
social action work.

Again, the Nominating Committee chooses people whom

they feel will work for the goals they generally value--social involve
ment goals.

From an interview with one of the members of this Committee,

he agreed that the nominees are screened to obtain Board members who are
"somewhat sympathetic ll toward more liberal social involvement goals.
Wh~n

they are nominated, the nominees are also virtually assured'

of being elected, since Assembly delegates have.· never nominated from the
floor opposing candidates to the pre-nominated slate. ,Because delegates
from member churches seldom know the candidates and their views, and
because there is no opposion to the

official'slate~'there

discussion, nor information given, to enlighten
nominees' important views.

th~

is no floor

Assembly about the

The staff says it couldn't be done, because

it would be "po liticing," "awkwar'd," Hembarrassingl' . . •

In effect,

church delegates become pawns--through their own apathy--for installing.

. I

:
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hand-picked Board members.
,

\
I

The' Itinsulation," or barrier between the congregation and the
GPGG's. Board is with the delegates" because the General Assembly's

delegates are representatives to perfunctory meetings and perfunctory
responsibilities.

This particular process 'is a,

cl~ssical

example of one

factor whicn Michels described as a consistent threat to organizational
democracy:

apath~

in membership

Earticipation~

The double bureaucratic

autho'rity which effectively separates the congregation's delegates from
the GPCC's governing process has the same effect that largeness does in
national organizations. Michels demonstrated that largeness tends to
make for increased bureaucracy and, therefore, for increased

deleg~tion

of powers to a relatively few professional, technical experts. 8 In the
GPCC, the delegation of governing powers is also handed over to a small
group, and ultimately, to the professional staff--the Executive Director
and Directors of the Commissions for Urban Encounter and Church-Community
Action Programs.

Although the GPCC is smaller in size, compared to

political parties and labor unions, it is not small in its representation

I'

of total membership) about 35 to 45 thousand (before Roman Catholic and

\

Reformed Mormon parishes entered).

However, the GPCC's double voluntar

ism and double bureaucratic layers also remove its authority, ,and
heighten member apathy.
Of course, the delegates are not alone ,to blame for their·minimal
participation as responsible representatives.

The GPCe's bureaucratic

barrier works against democratic procedure in more ways

tha~

one. The

lack of informative communication to all members is another protective
obstacle.

Communication out from' the GPeC about the

~eneral

work of

CAP's and) recently, CUE (new Center for Urban Encounter) to de1egates and

I
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churches does exist in the form of an extensive monthly newsletter.

How

ever,. most of the information is promotional material, telling of the
GPCC's

p~ograms

and good works--along with their financial needs.

Information about GPCC activities' communicated to members strictly
avoids discussing the different church factions, whether conservative or
liberal, and the issues they- differ over.

When open conflicts began to

saturate the GPCC's Board meetings from 1964 onward, the real signifi
cance of the di sagreements was ju'st not communi cated to member churches.
An example are the minutes from the specially called Board meeting for
the evening of March 30, 1965, to reconsider the GPCCls stand on House
Bill 1307.

The meeting was held in the Bethel AME (African Methodist

Episcopal) Church.

According to common testimony, the discussion was

extremely tense and often times harsh;, yet, the mi-nutes are completely
devoid of the true verbal exchange and, therefore, the true degree of
conflict over the issue, HB 1307, IIcompensatory education,1t within the
GPCC.

In this case, as in others, members and congregations were not

being- told what was the state of the crucial issues currently being
"hammered" out in the GPCC.

The word of mouth communication by some

Board members to friends within a few cong.regations undoubtedly filtered
dciwn, e.g., the Board's intense discussions 01 the issues during the
1968 Summer Crisis programs in the downtown Youth Ministry and in Albina.
Relatively few congregations, however!lc have their own personal repre
sentative leaking

informa~ion

back to them.

I have noticed a willing

ness among the GPeC's professional staff members to discuss with me the
I

important internal conflicts which had taken place in the GPec's' past
years!lc but a strong reluctance, even complete mootness, about current
disagreements on issues touching real conservative-liberal conflict.

In
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such cases, the Executive Director and Board have consistently referred
to the GPCC's ecumenical purpose:

to be,a "meeting ground for friendly

dialogue and cooperation on common problems..

Il

Because excessive

conflict violates the lIecumenical spirit"U .MY open conflict becomes
embarrassing.

The GPCC avoids it.

In so doing, the. GPCC

ecumen~cal

functi on pragmati ca11y becomes a posture of not antagoni zi ng its s'urround
By fearing conflict and refusing to challenge
power
.

ing secular powers.

,

structures, the GPCC's passive attitude conserves society's status

~.

A Test of Authority
The relationship between the GPCC and its several Community Action
Programs has shifted progressively from year to year since the first,
CAP was begun in 1964.

When Paul Schulze began his work in Albina, the

CAP which he developed there was largely a product of his own conception.
As was pOinted out in the chapter on C-CAP, Schulze was almost given a
,carta blanca· in Albina, because there were no rea'l models available at
that time for church action programs to follow.
to C-CAP was

lar~ely

The character he gave

due to his own experimental efforts at several kinds

of "secular" projects.

Schulze intentionally directed the C-CAP program

toward the socia-economic needs of· the black people, especially the
youth, in'Albina.

As pointed out in the C-CAP chapter, from the start"

Schulze pointed the programs specifically at the "alienated ll black
disregarding their church background, or lack of it.

youth~

Na IIstringsli were

attached, such as church-joining, or attending as a condition to enjoying
the program's benefits.

It was the momentum of this "secularized" direc

tion in \l/hich Schulze launched the Albina program that made the 10ng
lasting difference in C-CAP and the following CApt s under" the GPCC.

I
.!
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Schulze1s overall style of CAP ministry was the same.

C-CAP

spo~sored'

dances in 'Irving Park, and Schulze hired a black, non-church member to
I'

be his "street worker"--to make contact with the drop-out, black youth.
This liberal approach to community action was an affront to the very
conservative, Albina black churches.

The result was that the. C-CAP

program was not grounded in the local churches--a fact that was to plague
C-CAP till the present.
What significance does C-CAPls style of ministryll have to do with
Jl

the,organizationa1 structure of the GPeC?

~ts sig~Jficance

directly

affects the relationship of C-CAP to the GPCC in the following way. 'In
progressive steps, C-CAP came more and more under control of non-church
oriented people, until late 1968 and early 1969, when the GPCC faced a
monetary crisis..

Uncharacteristically, the Board of Directors began to

hold the Executive Director, Cate, accountable for this state of fiscal
imbalance.

Cate determined that it was C-CAPls great over-use of funds

that was uncontrollably draining the GPCCls money.

When Cate tried to

take control of C-CAP by firing the interim director of C-CAP, he was
staunchly rebuffed by the C-CAP's own Board of Directors.
effect, a

sho~-down

It was, in

of organizational power--in the face of unconstituted

authority by the Executive Director over C-CAP..
maintained its Ilinterim director" until 1972.

The Albina C-CAP has
The GPCCls Executive

staff was forced to spend much effort in 1969 and 1970, finding effec
tive ways to bring the Albina·CAP back under control.

An effective

method of n con trol,1I however" was never found, but a way of- circumventing
C-CAP was finally worked out.
Structurally, what the above progression of events.illustrates is
the organizational dilemma which Paul Harrison identifies in the American
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I

.1

Bapti st Convent; on, and is endemi c to some degre'e inmost Protestant
denominations.

Formal authority is constitutionally vested in the con

gregations, and the rest of the denominations· organizational structure

is supposedly devoted to serving the needs of the individual congrega
tions.

There is little or no authority formally empowering the officers

and staff.

So it is with the GPec .. Cate's authority was a kind of

lIgrasped power" over the CApis in the absence of any constitutional
definition of authority.
trates,

therefore~

The test of authority over C-CAP also illus

the previously common practice of the GPCC·s execu

tives to operate with oligarchic power.
The organizational problem which the

present to the GPeC is

~APls

founded on the very premise of Protestant freedom and spontaneous
voluntarism.

Like Harrison1s description of the American Baptist's

organization, the local congregations are litera'lly laws unto themselves,
and constitutionally~ are not accountable to any denomlnational organiza
tion over' them'.

Until 1968, the church CApis were operated without any

constitutional provision to authorize' the structural addition.of the
CApls.

Schulze set up C-CAP's own Board of Directors in Albina, and

made that local CAP Board of Directors a pattern for the rest of those
seven CAP's which were to follow.

Each CAP Board of Directors was to
.'

have its own local IIresponsibiltty" for its own special kind of programs.
Both Cate and Schulze admitted that neither thought of the GPCCls
formal organizational structure during the first two years of C-CAPls
beginning, but they were primarily concerned with the practical effec
tiveness of its new style of ministry." When asked about the degree of
II

the CApis present autonomY from the GPCC, Schulze answered that each
CAP is IIjust about autonomous in practice right now. II He felt that the

I
I
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GPCCts role should not be to control or administer each CAP, but rather
to assist and help coordinate assistance to the CAP's.

Schulze' granted

that he had never foreseen the GPCC as more than a coordinating agency
for the CAP's, because he wanted the CAP's to be a kind of midwife to
an essential' change in the local congregations' "style of ministering to
thei r 1oca1 nei ghborhoods. II Both Schul ze a.nd Cate wanted those congre
gations to develop into a new style of congregation, blending their
separate efforts into a united ministry to their ,whole area.
coordination of community
wanted to

dev~lop

act~on

would come from the GPCC.

Special
Schulze

a new concept called IIparish clusters .. " Schulze wrote

an introduction to the new GPCC constitution, soon to be submitted at
,the annual 1968 meeting.

Schulze there described the "parish cluster ll

concept:
The Church-CAP programs are the early stage formulations of what
may eventually become smaller parish clusters working together
even more 'unitedly on a total ministry to a neighborhood. Here,
several parishes may well become one operational unit combining
many of their efforts, making more economical use of their facili
ties. While maintaining individual worship traditions~ they
could nevertheless do much together in education and community
service. Some of their building resources could well be released
for secular community use. (. . . )
It is essential that heavy emphasis continue on 10ca1 initia
tive, planning and support of geographical area project ministries.
Where additional funds are needed; they should be sought through
the over-all supervisory structure.
Although the church CAP programs must 'continue to maintain inia
tive and primary responsibility for ministry for their respective
areas, there is need for coordination through an effective and
creative Commission. Many. of the communittes ~ problems are
,_
similar to those in other areas; hence, general evaluation and co
ordination is importcm,t. in ,church-CAP, pl@ni.ng~ .The chur.ch-CAP
structure allow,s the churches to become the agent. of comm_uni ty
development in neighborhoods. 9.
,
'
It is interesting to note a comment by the chairman of the committe'e
whi ch' wrote' the new 196'8 consti tuti on, the priest who i ni ti ated the
Catholic Churches' participation in the GPCC.

He $aid:

IIA lot of, people
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carried out .. Mrs. Varner resigned in February, 1969, and Mr. Nelson was
assigned to be the "interim director ll of C-CAP.

In the following'

months,- Nelson hired another person to the C-CAP

st~ff,

without con

sulting William Cate over at the GPCC. '
It was in late 1968 that a new treasurer, Mr. Lowell Steen, took
over for the GPCC.

Mr. Steen was aghast at the great expenditures'

through the previous summer and fall for the Black Summer.Crisis in
relation to the income for 1968.

(Part of the Summer Crisis program

and expenditure was focused on the Youth Ministry and Charix Coffee
House for ualienated ll youth.

Note

on Hub-CAP.

c~apter

largest outlay was for the ,work in Albina.)

But by far the

In an interview with Steen,

he said that the GPCC's work in community action had had several bene
ficial effects, and he named three specifically:

demonstrated to the'

city that the GPCC was truly acting to benefit the cqmmunity;, demon
strated to the

churc~

people of Portland what needs to be yet done; and

it took some of the pressure off individual churches which could not
have handled'the action projects individually.

After paying these

compliments, Steen said: ,lf,The financial situation of the GPCC was in
a mess when' I was elected Treasurer.

The admi nistrati on of the Counci 1

was deplorable, starting with Bill Cate;

As far as the money of the

Council was concerned, Cate was irresponsible..

Cate didn1t know how

much money was in the Council-Js- account, but he authorized spending it
to the point of a great deficit. . .

Cate CQuld do this because Bill

Cate really -was the GPCC. (Cate had announced his resignation by the
time of this interview, and Steen ,remained treasurer only through 1969.)
,

The churches have a tendency to do thi s • . . to not put ministers .on
the spot and hold them financially responsible. 'I

Later on in the inter
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view, Mr. Steen said that, as the financial officer of the GPGG, it was
extremely difficult to deal wi,th the CAP's, because "we could never get
a realistic, itemized budget of their planned

expend~tures

for the

coming months, or year from most of the tAP's.1t Steen thought that a
part of the i rresponsi b1e use of the money \'/a·s due to the CAP saver-use
I

of that ·extra. amount that had poured
Crisis.

in~o

the GPCG for the Summer

Yet, Steen still maintained that Cate himself allowed the situa

tion to get out of hand.
When telling about the events during the Black Summer Crisis at
C-CAP, Mrs. Varner said that Co1den Brown, the special leader for the
Black Crisis program, found out early in his stay with C-CAP that Cate
held the purse-strings for anything connected with the Summer ,Crfses
programing.

Mrs. Varner said that Brown had convinced Cate that just

about everything he (Brown) would undertake was an immediate necessity.
She said that to everybody's amazement at C-CAP, Brown would come away
from Cate1s'office with a check for whatever he wanted.

Other respond

ents corroborated this story, saying that Brown scared every minister
who was connected with the Black Crisis events into believing that if
his programs.didn't go off

immediately~

as planned, the black community

would reach the feared exploding point, and there would be "real
trouble" (violence).

Robert Nelson said that Colden Brown had, step by

step, hired 15 black people as his special staff for the Black Crisis
programs.

Few expenditures were spared--if Brown advocated the need for

the expense, according to the respondents.
The speci.a 1 amount of money recei ved by' the GPCC for the Summer
Crisis program at C-CAP and Hub-CAP totaled

a~proximately

$48,000.

Most of this sum went to the Black Summer Crisis in Albina, and according

'. 1
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to Mr. Steen the books showed a large 1968 ·deficit of· about

$lO~OOO~

This defi-cit increased at a rate over $1,000 a month when Steen,was
first taking over as Treasurer.

Later on Cate said that the CAP's

deficit had reached $25,000 by the middle of 1969, when the GPCC was
starting its new funding effort, the "Genesis Campaign.

1I

In retrospect,

it is easy to understand the sudden pressure which. the new Treasurer
~xerted

upon the Executive Director and the GPCC's Board of Directors.

At the Board meetings, Mr. Steen relentlessly pursued the necessity
for economizing and balancing the budget--in the early months of 1969 •.
Cate advised all the CAP's about their' empty bank

accounts~

especially

C-CAP and its lIinterim director," Robert Nelson.
It was in this situation that Mr. Nelson hired an extra assistant
at C-CAP, without contacting Cate or his own C-CAP Board.

Apparently,

this new drain on the CAP's limited funds seemed to Cate a willful
defiance:of his own authority by Mr. Nelson.
the time Mrs.

V.~rner

This happened soon after

res i gned at the end of February, 1969, and' Mr.

Ne1son began to opera te in the capaci ty of "i nteri m di rector. II Accord-'
ing to Mrs. Varner, Cate phoned her, inviting her to meet with
GPec President, the

Rev~

him~

the

Royald Caldwell, and another GPCC officer, to

di scuss fi ndi ng a permanent C-CAP di rector. to.~ fo 11 ow Mrs. Varner.

The

meeting was set at a nearby, Albina, Roma.h Catholic settlement house,
and Mrs. Varner became suspicious of the meeting.ls purpose.

On her own

volition, she called Mr. Nelson, and invited him to go to the meeting
with her.

As she suspected, Dr. Cate was surprised to see Mr. Nelson

arrive at that meeting.

Cate's purpose was to discuss the possibility

of Mrs. Varner's taking the action of "dismissing" r4r. Nelson--·in her
official capacity.

If her guess was right, she wanted Cate himself to

i

I

.I
I
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say he wanted to fire Nelson.

Mrs. Varner

said~

"I figured that if they

(GPGG) wanted to get rid of Bob (Nelson), he must be getting in their
(white establishment IS) craw, and if so Bob is worth keeping at C-CAP

working for us.

II

She descri bed Cate as becomi n9 very angry; the only

'time she had' ever seen Cate "blow his cool. 1I She quoted Cate as telling
Mr. Nelson, "You have blocked everything I have tried to do through our
program for the Albina area • . . II

I

.1

Schulze and other respondents, including Nelson himself, described
Mr. Nelson as a strong churchman, and a good friend of Gate during the
early days 'of the GPCCts involvement in Albina.

The longer Mr. Nelson

became active in the C-CAP Board of Directors, and worked directly with
and for many black people along with Schulze, he progressively became
more militant for the black cause.
Soon after this meeting with

Mrs~

Varner 'and Mr. Nelson, Cate

asked the President 'of the GPCG, the Rev. Royald Caldwell, to write a
letter to

Mr.~,Nelson,

terminating his services with C-CAP, because of

the CAP's' fi nanci a 1 troubles.

Robert Nelson was determi ned to' fi ght Ca te

j

and the GPCC's authority over C-CAP to be the decision maker for dis

!I

missing and employing the CAPls staff members'.
sympathy of most of the black people on the

I
"

I

I
j

1
1
t

.

Nelson knew he had,the

C~CAPts

Board of

Directors~

so he informed the C-CAP Board that they no longer had to take a back
seat to the GPCC.
should be

fired~

Nelson asked the C-CAP Board tO,decide whether he
or whether they (C-CAP) could find a solution to their

financial problems themselves.

In an

intervie~

with Robert Nelson about

a month after the President of the GPec had written the letter to C-CAPls
Board chairman, demand'ing Nelson's dismissal as Hinterim director,"
Nelson gave to the writer the four mimeographed copies of the corres- ,

!
I

"60

pondence between the GPCC and C-CAP concerning Nelson's dismissal.

As

noted above, .however, Nelson remained lIinterim director" until 1972.
Mr. Nelson told the researcher that the C-CAP Board had discussed

in its recent meetings the possibility of leaving the jurisdiction.of the
GPCC.

The Board members, he said, felt they now had access to sources

\
t

of financial funds, both in and out of Albina, and that C-CAP could
make it on its own from then on.
parting from the

GPCC~

Nelson said he discouraged them from

because he thought it more important to remain in

contact with the rest of the churches in Portland.

The churches would

be of great help in developing their ideas of urban responsibility, as
well as receiving financial help from the churches in the long run.

How

ever, Nelson strongly stated that C-CAP was now taking the steps- necessary

I

The obvious problem which C-CAP has always had is the lack of
I

I
I.
,.

Those few black churches

which were members of C-CAP, together with individual black people taking
interest in the

progra~,

had little' money to contribute.

.C-CAP had little leverage to obtain national church funds
grants.

By itself,
or federal

C-CAP was largely financially dependent upon the GPCC.

This

hard fact was no deterrent, however, in C-CAP's willingness to challenge
the GPCC

I

S

author; ty over them.

From the t"ime

o~

Cate s aborted attempt
I

to fire Nelson, there was a different re1ationship between the GPCC-
especially the Executive Director, William Cate--and the C-CAP group.
Tension grew steadily.
militantly active.

I

I

to obtain their autonomy to become more politically active.

financial resources within its own constituency.

'. i

Robert Nelson and the C-CAP staff became more

For instance, on June 2,1969, a "rumble"'at an

Albina hamburger drive-in brought a great number of Portland City Police,
followed by a large number of arrests of the black people within the area.

I
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.1

At that time, the city1s Chief of Police was out of town at a conference.
Because of the lIexplosive situation ;n Albina,lI.tbe Deputy Chief of
Police, Pat Carr, decided to make a "show of force Jl by the police.
.

Following the event,' Robert Nelson and
at the indiscriminant mass

ar~ests

black on-lookers in the vicinity.

~;s

.

s.taff were extremely indignant

and police violence against so many
Ne1son l s staff decided to coordinate

a petition effort to recall the Deputy Police Chief, who made the
decision to "show force. \I This type of political .activity was not can":
sonant with Cate's concept of church-CAP business. ' Cate said that .
Robert Nelson has been' ~'abrasive" to churches in the GPCC, and that he
has "swiped our program" (from the GPCC) by moving C-CAP away from a
"church-centered" CAP.
I

I

I'i

When C-GAP's own Board of Directors acted as its' own organization
and rebuffed the authoritarian command from Cate through the GPeG's'
President, Caldwell, that Robert Nelson be fired from C-CAP, it
to C-CAP's dec1aration·of independence from the GPeG.

That act also

affected the other CApis intimate relationship to the GPCC.
a tenuous business relationship.

amount~d

It became

From then on, C-CAP's main connection

II

to the GPCC was reduced to finances.
Evaluation of Power and Authority
As the first pages of this chapter discussed, the GPCC follows most
Protestant denominations in America by placing its highest formal value
upon the autonomY of the local unit and the freedom of the individual.
Constitutionally, the GPCC's organization is anything but hierarchical.
Max Weber's categories of authority are primarily
tarian and hierarchical organizations.

~pplicable

to authori

Weberls models for studying

J
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organizations are, therefore, difficult to apply to much of America's
religious organizations, and to the GPCC. 'The pietistic movements from
Europe, particularly the Calvinistic groups, ostensibly feared old
world ecclesiastica1 authority and excessive civil power.

Largely out

of this cradle of religious struggle and thought has come the American
ideology for democratic government.

Because American religions have'

emphasized the suspicion of authority, these voluntary organizations-
in formal structure--are the epitome of participatory democracy.
However, as Paul Harrison has shawn, voluntary associations of all
kinds in America, as well as religious denominations, have developed
into complex organizations which have striking similarities to the
highly centralized

str~ctures

of government and corporations.

Contrary

to their formal statements, the churches and other voluntary associations,
have become corporate types in their centralized structures.

The national

officers and staff have obtained a significant degree of influence over
the activities and policies of the local units and congregations; How
ever, they have not obtained' power by constitutional authority.

Max

Weber's social organization theory emphasizes the necessity of legiti
macy for those offices of authority.

The people holding the offices are

given the authority to make decisions and act by the "legal, II or con
stitutional sanctions of that organized socia1 system.

Because a social

system cannot operate for long on the basis of the leader's own power
alone, the leaders must find a kind of sanction which will give them a '

I

legitimate right to exercise their power.

I

Harrison called this sanction rational-pragmatic authority in contrast

J

to Weber's rational-legal authority.

I
j

.!

i

As mentioned before, Paul

During his first two years, 1959-1962, the new Executive Secretary,

I
i
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William Cate, departed little from the traditional type of ecumenical
programs common to 1oca1 'counei 1s of churches.
years old.

The GPCC was then forty

Many established procedures maintained its accepted tradi-'

tiona1, annual programs.

"Institutionalization ll had turned the organi

zation away from developing new avenues of cooperative church projects.
However, evidence indicates
sive leadership in the GPCC.

th~

time was ripe for Cate's kind of progres

The process of secularization

~ad

helped

to bring several capable and vigorous liberal ministers to some of the
larger congregations in Portland.

The same pervasive, liberal influence

was also loosening the moderately conservative attitude of many other
clergymen in member congregations.

On the other hand, when several

ministers thought the GPCC's liberal actions had adversely affected
their congregation, they moved in the opposite direction during the
1960's.

Two ministers officially withdrew their congregations from the

GPGG in 1969,'and many more gradually reduced their financial support.

I
~

A ,former president of the GPCC and member of the search committee
when Gate was interviewed for the Executive's Job became very critical

I

of the lIover-emphasisll during the 1960's on social action by the GPCC.

I

He said that they were then looking for a man with new ideas for organi

I

zational management, but not too liberal.

I

interviewing Cate indicated that Cate held such moderate views of

I
I

I

I
1

I,

ecumenical church goals and

His

iJn~ression

from their

This well-known Portland

acti~ities.

minister said that he had no idea that Cate would turn out to be so
liberal as to go 'lover-board for political involvements, secular community actions . . . condoning actions
obstructed the ci ty' s po1ice work .

by

the Youth Ministry which
II

He added) "There i sn' tone

congregation in the GPCC that hasn't ,paid dearly for something the
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Council had done to disrupt the law and alienate a lot of people in the
city ••. ", In 1969 this respondent withdrew his congregation from GPCC
membership in protest to, the GPCC's actions.

,One of the most import.ant points this chapter makes is the wide
breadth of the authority, although undefined (rational-pragmatic), that
Cate had obtained.

The chapter points out how he methodically nurtured

individuals' support of social action goals.
attention.

He gave them his personal

Several respondents have spontaneously described the loyalty

Cate generated in this way.

To a degree it is charismatic.

This chapter has examined the oligarchic structure of power
developed within the GPGC and the strength of Caters' IIgrasped authority.1I
Primarily William Cate, Paul Schulze and other liberal GPCC leaders used
their rational-pragmatic authority to attain their ultimate dual goal:
social action in the' context of church cooperation, or ecumenism.
Pragmatically, the classic meaning of ecumenics is the people1s willing
. ness, or spirit for cooperative, democratic church actions.

Conse

quently, the GPCC's leaders' form of compelling their liberal interpre
tation of church programing into social actions stands in contrast to
the relatively reluctant, conservative lay church members in Portland's
churches~

Important also to note is that Cate used "coercive

ll

,

or o1igar'

chic means to install his style of ecumenical efforts involving a wider
range of "secularll life.

That is to, sai~ Gate developed the oligarchic

powers of a few leaders in the GPeG to accomplish more
involved, social action goals.

s~cularly

IICongregational authority," the formal

gov'ern'j ng pri nci p1e of the GPCC, was overcome

by

the i nforma1, practi ca1

way of getting things done through the existing ·organization.

It
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allowed the real decision making to fall into the hands of the Executfve
Director and a relatively few Executive staff members, together with an
e1ite group of the elected Board and officers.

informal ~ pragmatic power level, it

\I·1as

However, on the

the Executive Director who held

the ultimate direction of decision making.
Secondly, attached to the leaders· oligarchic control of the
organization was the layer of organizational insulation between the
effective leaders and the large number of lay church members.

The most

important ingredient to this layer of insulation was the apathy of the
congregations' delegates' to the GPCC's two Assembly meetings a year.
Apathy was also fostered by the clergymen of the member churches, because
they largely influenced the attitude and commitment to the GPCC.

This

chapter pointed out that the same relatively few delegates had held
most of the elected offices of the GPCC.during the 1960's.
Because clergymen's livelihood depends on the "success ll of their
own congregations, few local clergymen can afford to encourage their most
capable lay 'members to be lIecumenicallyll active in the GPCC at the
expense of their. own congregations.

Pastors of struggling congregations,

or congregations which feel threatened by the liberalness of the GPCC,
therefore, avoid the GPCC by not attending
delegates.
chal1en~

th~mselves

and not sending'

Those delegates who do attend the annual meetings do not
the GPCC's pre-prepared slate of officers, etc.

Also, the GPeC published information about its more liberal action
programs, harmonized and filtered of the details which would be too

I
t

offensive to the great number of apathetic member congregations.

The

news-letters minimized the controversial issues, and maximized unity and
cooperation--through social action.

Cate, Schulze, Bonthius, Wright,

. j
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Menzel and others made extra efforts, mentioned by several respondents,
to publish a dearth of IItheological study papers ll as the basis of new
"position

papers~ II

which were adopted ,by the Board of Directors.

The

congregations, however, were a1most always left out of the preparation
and ci rculation of these papers--un.ti 1 they were fi rmly adopted.
By the unchallenged pre-selection of Board members and the control
ling of information, a bureaucratic layer of insulation was built up by
the more permanent, hired staff leaders, and extended to encompass their

\

new structural

appendages~

the CAP's.

The leaders consistently stressed

the new action programs' religious orthodoxness and ecumenical IIneed."

\

I
I,
•

1

I

Apparently to a great degree they kept the image of ·the new programs
relatively conservative, until the Summer of 1968.
In Part III of this chapter, the power-authority relationship
between the CAP's, specifically the Albina

C~CAP,

is discussed in the

context of the 1968-1969 dispute over C-CAP's excessive use of the CApis
total funds.

At C-CAP the

spe~ial

director for ,the Black Summer Crisis

program, Colden Brown, had been able to convince William .Cate to allow

I

him, Brown, to spend greater and greater amounts on their Crisis pro

I

gram, till there was a large deficit.

However, that fall the new

Treasurer, L. Steen, placed heavy pressure upon Cate to reduce the over
spending following the Summer Crisis programs.

Soon after Steen had

bluntly made the accusation at a GPeC Board meeting, Cate took action
to fire Robert Nelson at C-CAP.

As-the chapter points out, Nelson

resisted with the aid of the C-CAP Board of Dire'ctors., of whom very few
were church members.

According to Cate, C-CAP had become so non-church

oriented and was continuing to spend money on new, non-church oriented
staff members, he felt urgent tactis were needed.

Several of -the C-CAP

!'B!l'!'PII'!
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Board, Mrs. Varner told the researcher, consisted of black activists, but
not of Black Panthers, as Cate charged.

When Cate could not get rid of

Nelson and his association with the black IIradicals,1I Cate moved
quickly to remove the GPeC as a major source of money for C-CAP.
William Cate's interaction with the few conservatives on his Board
of Directors over the use of funds for the 1968 Summer Crisis programs
reveals that Cate reacted with his own brand of conservativism.

How

ever, Cate's reaction, toward the crititism directed at himself was his
own effort to restore the confidence of his Board in the Community
Action Programs, as well as in his management of them.
Theoretically, the sharp criticism by the new Treasurer about
Cate's loose financial management represented a significant tear in the
canopy of ,insulation constructed around the CApls.

In order to repair

that hole, Gate had to restore the appearance of the CAP's religious
orthodoxY and, social conservativism.
conservatively.

Cate himself, therefore, reacted

Since Cate knew the GPGC's social action practices

had to maintairl 'a 'degr€;e of visible conservativism to appease their more
conservative members, he acted swiftly to rejuvenate that appearance.
Another very important factor contributed to Cate's stimulation to
restore the CAP's good image.

A committee to·'rewrite the GPCC constitu

tion was at that time sending out its final draft for the first adoption

I
I
I

reading in the April annual meeting. , This constitution completely
reorganized the GPGG's working organization around three main social
action divisions.

One of the new divisions is

CUE~

the Center for Urban

I

Encounter.' Its purpose is to offer a variety of means to educate the

j

1aymen of the member congrega ti ons about social act; on:
meaning, its goals and its practical applications.

its' thea 1ogi ca 1

Both Gate and Schulze
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have told me that they consider CUE the'most- important vehicle-by which
they would be able to convey social action goals into the GPCC's
future.

The adopt"i on of thi s cons ti tuti on, therefore, was extremely

important to Cate, Schulze and all the liberal leaders.
crucial time.

It was a

Cate did not want to jeopardize its adoption with a last

mi nute conservati ve reacti on, erupting out of the Boar.d and mushroomi ng
in a chain reaction throughout the general membership.

It would have

destroyed the liberal goals of the GPCC to which these men were so com
mitted.
In other words, Cate knew the GPCC had to maintain a paradoxical
posture:

a traditional, conservative appearance--an inherent part of the

liberals' protective insulation-'-while at the same time, more seriously
pursuing liberal social action ,goals.

.~
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CHAPTER X
, SOCIAL INSULATION
In many church bodies and in their various structural divisions,

\i

evidence (viz., Chapter 1) confirms that an increasing number of the
activist ministers involved in controversial issues have positions within
the churches· organizations which are
the lay members.

organizationall~

insulated from

Beginning with the "Selma Freedom March" in 1965, the

greater proportion of clergymen taking part in protests, civil rights
organizations, etc., has been non-parish pastors, such as campus pastors
and specialized divisions of the national body.

The many departments

of the National Council of Churches and the ecumenical councils of the

\

I

larger cities in the United States have also supplied more and more of

\

the clergymen to the social activist ranks.

These non-parish ministers

are protected, that is, they are insulated by the independent, special

\

ized departments within many of the ·larger church organizations through

\

out the country.

The local congregation is kept at a distance, organi

•

I

zationally, so that it does not have much restrictive leverage upon the

\

denominational groups without hierarchical polity--that is, without

f

I

I
\

I
I
\

activist

clergym~n

in higher structural levels.

This is also true in

formal authority .. As part of the larger organizat·ional structures, these
liberal clergymen do not need to fear the laymen1s displeasure against
their own social action involvements.
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have wrestled with the fact
that with';n the GPCC's membership there was

~arely

a perceptible reaction
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to the GPec's new social action policie$ and activities.

In the light of

the conservative reactions described from studies listed earlier in the
previous chapter, the question IIwhy" the relatively mild reaction to
the GPCC's actions and

le~ders

of its central question.

.now leads this stuqy to the conclusion

Theoretically, the sociological answer for

the unexpected m; 1d reacti on wi thi n the GPCC can be termed the' process
of insulation.

The emphasis on the social process, or interaction of

people and. groups is deliberate.

To be sure, .the GPCC's organization

provides much of the GPCe's leaders and activist staff members'with
structural insulation, but the

II

structure ll of the GPCC between the leaders

and cOAgregational laymen is primarily informal organization.

The Execu

tive Director has led in the insulation process by maneuvering the
constitutionally powerless Board of Directors through his own dynamic
informal authority.

.

,

This change of organizational impotence into a "

formidable ·social force within the community was also dependent on the
conditions predetermined by the dialectic process of secularization.
The study has found seven separate forms, or aspects, of social insula
tion surrounding the GPCC's social action programs.
apathy of the large

numb~r

They are:

(l) the

of GPCC members; (2) the oligarchic take-over

of the GPCC's governtng process; (3) the lack of communication .with the
uninvolved member congregations; (4) the financial independence of the
GPCC's action programs; (5) the church-CAP's semi-autonomous relationship
to the GPCG, which made laymen's criticisms of GAP social action diffi
cult to focus on the GpCC as the responsible agent; (6) the seculariza
tion of an increasing number of parish pastors within

m~mber

congrega

tions; (7) the GPCG1s ambivalent posture before laymen and the public,
holding to conservative policies '~/hile acting very liberally.
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The first form of insulation is member apathy.

As Michels has

informed us, the problem of membership apathy plagues almost every volun
teer organization.

However, in this loose religious organization, there

is what we have previously termed, double volunteerism.
chur~h

The active lay

member is asked to give loyalty to a second religious group, the

GPCC, which is not a part of his own church background.
local congregation usually has

soc~alized

However, the

its better members into a

primary loyalty for its own goals, doctrine and denomination. 'For the
local church member's religious dedication, the GPCC seldom runs more
than a distant second, third or fourth.
The precariousness of the layman's loyalty to ,the GPCC easily comes
to a separating point, because the local pastor will not encourage, but
subtly discourage, his layman's participation in the GPee, if the pastor
must choose between building the strength of his own congregation, as
against the life'of the GPec.

The local congregation can neVer

escap~

its competitive situation, and the local pastor is judged primarily by
its success under
his leadership.
,
~

If the pastor's laymen are partici

pating actively in GPeC committees, or on the GPec's Board of
,

Dire~tors,

,

etc., at the expense of participating in the life of the con9regation,
and if the congregation is struggling to stay solvent, then the pastor
will usually not hesitate to discourage his laymanls participation in the
GPCC.

The GPCe would have to be contributing a great deal to the local

smaller congregation's survival solutions to demand even a strong
secondary 1oya1ty from stich pastors a'nd 1aymen.

Consequently, in the

case of many smaller congregations, the GPeC is looked upon as a competi
tive religious organization, even though the GPCC's first goal is to
reduce competition and aid cooperation between congregations. " Obviously,
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the tendency to look upon the GPCC as a competitor of the local congre
gation for its own talent 'and money is milch more prevalent amo.ng the
more conservative congregations.
As the, GPCC I S efforts became more and more slanted toward soci a1 .
action programs, the more conservative congregations took a decreasing
interest ;n the GPeCls semi-annual meetings.

Of course, the most con

servative congregations refused,to atte~d at all, followi-ng the GPCCls
multipl;'cation of. its church CAP's.

Instead of negative reaction, their

protest amounted to self-elimination.
The second form of insulation was the oligarchic assumption of
informal power primarily by William Cate and, secondly, by Paul Schulze.
One or two elected officers may be considered loosely to have been in .
this category of grasped author-jty, namely Robert Bonthius and Paul
Wright.

Because there was a vacuum of power at,the Executive

s~aff

level

for accomplishing.the new courses toward social action, the aggressive
personalities of Cate and Schulze quickly filled the opening.

Since the

Executive Directorts (Cate's) legal authority is almost completely
undefined, to accomplish the goals of a strong, determined leader, the.
new Executi ve ilgrasped" hi s author; ty in the
tional vacuum.

Due to

hi~

pres~nce

of that consti tu

ex-officio membership:on all committees,

including the Nominationg Committee, within his· first three Or four

I
1

I

ij

I

years at the GPCC, William Cate had established a Board of Directors
which was sympathetic to the,liberal views of church practice, if not
committed to social action.

The traditional

pr~ctice

of not nominating

anyone to the Board of Directors from the floor of the Annual Meeting has
remai'ned consistent throughout the 1960's, and has virtually
Cate of a friendly Board of Directors ..

~ssured
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In the opinion of the writer, Cate's use of a peculiar combination
of leadership qualities. gave him, to some degree, the charismatic'
character necessary to accomplish a significant--almost radical--change

in the GPec. Catets charisma was limited to the degree that he most
often tried to influence people on a personal, one-to-one basis.

His

approach was low key and gradual, and consciouslY directed to a few
important laymen of as many of the larger or important congregations as
he could reach.

Cate built up a personal following, a commitment, to

social action principles in a group of laymen who were willing to work
and serve on the GPCC's committees, etc.·
Although Caters control of the Board of Directors was only·
inf~rmal,

:

it was powerful in the area of promoting social action kinds

of policies.

Because of this broadly based social action. consensus on

the Board, which Cate had methodically established, the Board of

Direc~

tors especially, as well as th"e Commissions J chairmen and the Executive
staff, became an oligarchic, protective covering between the church
CAP's innovative social involvements and the critical church members"
of the GPCC.

If there is a "structural

ll

insulation in the GPCC, the

informal, oligarchic control by the Executive and staff and the" Board
of Directors is it.
The third form of insulation was the lack of communication in both

directions between the GPeG's leadarship and the uninvolved congregations
(in social action).

In this case, the Executive Director and his staff,

together with the Board of Directors, acted not so much as a barrier

~o

communication from the congregations, but rather as a filtering system,
which absorbed the criticism directed at some of the CAP programs or
other social action leaders.

The filtering process worked in the other
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direction also.

The GPCC's Executive staff has long put out a monthly

news letter, which interpreted the work of the separate CApis by toning
down any "radical

ll

actions by the CApls, always trying to place the

action within the context of solid theology, if not conservative
theological reasoning.

Intervie\'/ees have noted that Cate in his person

al appearances to dissident congregations was a llmaster" at reinterpre
ting the GPCC's controversial social policies and dispelling the con
servatives' criticisms.
The fourth aspect of insulation was the independent

~ources

of

money generously given directly to the· social action programs, apart from
the support of the local congregations.

As previously

mentioned~

the

national and regional levels of several denominations--the Oregon Dis
trict of the United Methodist Women, the Presbyterian Church, USA's
Board of Social Ministry, the Lutheran Church 'in

Ame~icals

Social

Minis~

try and more--have contributed large annual grants to the GPCCls church
CAP's and other social action work, such as the GPCC's new Center for
Urban Encounter (CUE).

Portland~s

United Good Neighbors'

put C-CAP and East-CAP on their budget.

~und

had also

Seldom were Cate and the Board

forced to go to the local congregations for special hand-outs to
finance the new social action goals.

Since the independent sources of
..

money released the Board from the necessity constantly to report to the
congregati ons how we 11 the money vias be; ng uti 1i zed in any exact manner,
the independent grants also released the Board from the conservative
restraints of the majority of the member congregations.

In fact,

accura te 1y detai 1ed accounts .of the speci fi c use of mon; es by the
church-CAP's was largely withheld from the Board of Directors itself.
The fifth kind of insulation for the GPCe's leadership and CAP's

. t
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action programs was their

inaccessibili~y,

provided by the social distance

inherent in the undefined organizational relationship of the church CAP's
to the GPGG.
Albina~

When Paul 'Schulze took over the first church CAP in

he knew that there was no constitutional provision for the CAP's

in the GPCC's

structu~e.

Schulze had almost a completely independent

hand in developing the first CAP's, so he began to create the CAP's in
the image of his ideal IIparish clusters. u

Schulze-~always

in consultation

with Cate--decided to develop a local board of administration for each
local CAP, made up Qf delegates from those local area congregations
actively involved in the work of that particular'CAP. ',Each local board
was eventually to make the individual CAP's' increasingly autonomous from
the GPCC·s leadership.

The degree of independence was determined by the

amount of local, independent financial income each local, CAP had.

For

instance, ,Hub-CAP had, access from wi th in its own a rea to spec; a1 contri bu
tions by several of the largest downtown congregations in the city.

The

spec; a1 grants to CAP's programs from denominati,ona 1 foundati ons were
most often given to the GPCC to divide, as it saw fit, among the CAP's.
This financial control gave the GPCC leadership a greater control over
some of the CAP's than 'over those more financi ally independent. ,
Because the GPCC published more frequently tn the later S1xties
that each 1oca 1 church, CAP had its own cctioh program speci ali zed for its
own area and guided by its own board of directors, apart from the

I
t

I
j

I

~,

the city's conservative congregations were' increasingly unable, to identify
the GPCC itself as the target for their 'reactions.

Because the CAP's

never were a constitutional part of the GPCC until 1969, the amount of
unofficial authority the GPCC staff exerted over each individual CAP's
policies was largely a mYstery, even to members

of

the Board.

The

177

undefined, semi-bureaucratic relationship of the CAP's, to the GPCC's
executives served to blur the
l1beral activities.

CAP~s

responsibilities for their own

Therefore, the quasi-autonomous distance separating

the CAP's from the,GPCC confused most members outside of the executive
circle, and became a source of bureaucratic insulation against local
church reactions.
The sixth aspect of, insulation within the GPCC is the increased
secularization of pastors serving local parishes among a wider number and
'variety of church denominations.

Applied to the ministry, "seculariza

tion" does not mean that these men are less "sp iritual,1I or more
materialistic, but that they are more sympathetic with social change
through the

chur~h's

involvement in social action.

Several of the

studies of clergy, mentioned in Chapter 1, in the first part of this
chapter give a perspective about those ministers ~ho are, or were, in
parishes and took active parts in controversial social actions.

However,

there are also indications that a growing number of ministers who do
not become activists are becoming more sympathetic with the church's
social actions.
In his 1967 nationa.l survey of 7,441 Protestant clergy, Hadden

I

found that regardless of theology, conservative or liberal, clergymen
were

"~verwhelmingly"

sympathetic to the Negroes I right to achieve com

plete social justice in America. 1 However, those of 'conservative
theological background continued to be more

I
I
i

issues.

Hadden asked three questions.

conservat~ve

on social

The first, "I basically dis

approve of the civil rights movement in America,u was almost completely
rejected in every denomination.

From a low of four per cent of

Presbyterians to a high of eight per cent of Methodists and Missouri

I

,

,I
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Synod Lutherans agreed with the statement.

r

The second question of the survey was, "For the

mos~

part, the

churches have been woefully inadequate. in facing up to the civil rights
issue.

II

Agreement to the statement was at a high of 77 per cent among

American Baptists to a low of 69 per cent among Missouri Synod Lutherans.
When the "probably agree" responses are added, the over-all proportion
rises to 85 per cent.
The third question was, "Many whites pretend to be very Christian
while in reality ·their racial attitudes demonstrate their lack of or
misunderstanding of Christianity,." Agreement with the third statement
ranged from 78 per cent by Missouri Synod Lutherans to 83 per cent for
Ameri can Bapti s ts and Pres byte ri ans.

The "probab ly &gree II responses

raise the total sympathetic group to at least 90 per cent in every
denomination.
This cross-section of American Protestant clergy, most of whom are
serving
cerned

pari~hes,
abo~t

demonstrates that more parish pastors are now con

real social changes within civil rights issues, even

though a minority of those serving parishes become outspoken and per
sonally involved.

The broad spectrum of parish pastors· favorable

attitude toward the church, i.e., the GP.CC as the church ecumenical
participating in the local social action work, has helped to moderate
the irate reactions of conservative

parishoners~

In many ways since the

GPCC's progressive social involvement', moderately tfsecularizedll pastors
of member congregations have absorbed their laymen's cri·tical reactions
by personally giving a constructive explanation of the GPCC's program
ing.

By calming reactionary laymen, instead of siding with their con
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servativism, many parish pastors have become part of the insulation pro
cess

whic~

protects the GPCC.

The seventh form of insulation is the GPeC's ambivalence in pre
senting simultaneously to the public both an avowed conservative posture,
while devoting its greatest efforts to liberal social actions.

Because

it pervades and influences all the ather insulative forms, this con
tradictory word against action is probably the most important aspect "of
insulation.

It was to this "game" of playing it both ways that William

Cate studiously styled his administrative efforts.

Cate deliberately

avoided antagonizing conservative churchmen from the time he arrived.
Cate was 'a tireless spokesman .to a wide variety of church meetings
throughout the city, reassuring the apprehensive congregations that the
GPCC's new Community Action Programs were not taking over the GPCC's
primary goals.

Cate also minimized the

incr~asing

social involvement

by reinterpreting it into conservative ("solid") theological terms.
Paul Schulze and Robert Menzel (Hub-CAP),. both of whom were ministers in
the very conservative Missouri Synod Lutheran Church, were of a great
aid to Cate and the GPCC in preparing IIposition" papers on sticky
issues, giving

~he

theological justification for the proposed GPCC

action,- or socfal stand.
I nterna lly, then, the GPCC worked fi erce.ly to increase the effec
tiveness of its social action programs, while externally the GPeC was
widely propagandizing to the

c~nservative

churchmen and public that it

was still using the more traditional programs that honored the status
va~ues

of the local congregations.

~

On the one hand, the GPCC leadership

forcefully committed the organization to social action goals; while

~

the other hand, they revived many of the older programs that assisted

OSl

CHAPTER XI
INSULATION--PREVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION
Two Theories of Legitimation
Although fewer liberal parish pastors are willing to risk the
reactionary consequences from their own aroused laymen by becoming ac
tive in socio-political causes, another IIbrand" of minister has become
socially active--the non-parish minister.

Examples of such activist,

non-parish ministers are exemplified in the GPCC s church CAP's, such
1

as Paul Schulze and Robert Menzel. Apparently this pattern developed
because of the insulation a non-parish church organization provides
these activist-ministers.

If this is true, how does the insulation of

the larger organization legitimate these ministers' controversial
activities?
The key question becomes" what is legitimation? Max Weber con
ceived of legitimacy in terms of sociology of .politics, and therefore,
in the context of the relationship between command and obedience, power
and authority.

Weber asked the question, "How is political lea,dership

established--that is, legitimated?" He has given a classical description
of the three ways by which a leader's authority may be legitimated:
rational-legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority.
They are described in Chapter 9 relative to authority.
In his study of the American Baptist Convention, Paul Harrison has
found a fourth type of authority, which stands alone in its own style of

..
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legitimation..

He calls it II ra tional-pragmatic lJ authority..

(This defini

tion is also briefly discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of authority.)
The power that comes to this office holder is not legally authorized by
the organization, or its constitution.

Usually such an office is given

a certain amount of responsibilities, but very little legitimate author
ity over other parts of the organization..

In order to "get things done ll

and carry out responsibilities, the office hoJder begins to exercise
power

in the

vacuum where no power was legally authorized.

Harrison

called it "power grasped. It Harrison's ,study points out that voluntary
organizations are less likely to develop elaborate enough constitutions
to spell out specifications of II ra tional-legal li authority, rational
pragmatic authority.

The power he grasps. is legitimated by its very use.

As Berger and Luckmann would say, it is lI objectivated li into a facticity.
Weber said that authority is legitimated power •. Harrison shows that
new power is acquired by a leader often because he has the temerity to
"grasp" and exercise new power.

Because he gets away with it, the power

is changed into author; ty, and it becomes a II fact.

\I

More'recent writers in the sociology of knowledge interpret
"l egi ~imation II as a much more comprehensive

process--~

process that .

explains and justifies our whole social order. 'All socially objecti
vated "knowledge is legitimating.
ll

An objectivation" is any human
lI

activity attaining a rea lity that confronts its original producers as
II

, a facti ci ty externa 1 to and other than' themselves" III
Legitimation is essentially processua), because any Ilknowledge"
that is socially objectivated into

practi~al

life is legitimating.

Language names and evaluates social objects, and thereby places them
into a social order.

Then in return, language imposes its own order upon

"
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social things to the point that it builds up a cognitive and normative
structure!) wh·i ch becomes the knowl edge of its pa rti cul ar s'oci ety. 2 In a
processual dialectic, man creates his society and its order, principally

through language, and society1s order, in turn, recreates the

peopl~

who

first produced that pattern of society. :
I have noted before that by the continual outpourirg of himself,

physically and mentally, man externalizes his inner person to society.
Some of these products ,of his social interaction become objectivated,.
or factually real.

These social objects confront men as real natural

objects, as .being separate from' man's own production.
be seen as the process of institutional~zation.)

(This may also

Finally, the internal

ization of social objects is man's transformation, or

appropriatio~,

of

his own objectivated social structures into his own subjective con
sciousness.

The total interaction process of man with his own

socially constructed world is dialectic, since although he is the con
structor of his own social structures, the same structures turn back
upon man and coerce him into new positions (physically, mentally and
socially) within the social order.

The social objects, or institutions,

in effect, create and recreate men.

The process of legitimation is the

knowledge of these objectivated social structures, which is constantly
used to explain and stabilize the'already established social order.
More specifi,cally,
legitimation is the continual re-telling
and
re
,
-exp.l ai ning the meani ngs of the soci a1 lI'facts II already accepted--but now
weakening. 3 Legitim~tion is the process of continued social mainten
ance.
In the light of this dialectic process, it becomes clearer that'
the objectivity of a social order is, at first,

self-leg;ti~atinQ.

By
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simply being there, an establis.hed institution .habitualizes its own
acceptance into being self-evident.

B~t

legitimating facticity ;s never complete.

on-a- further level, this self
The taken-far.-granted

r

objectivity of an institution is periodically- challenged by the up
coming generation, the new under-classmen, or new members of a group.
During those times when events lead to a crisis, which forces the mem
bers of the group to question the reasons as to 'the why of the institu
\

ticn, or why its norms are followed, again and again the old legitimating
·formula must be repeated.

It is precisely during crises when strong

challenges occur and when strong legitimating reasons must be offered.
So the objectivations within

~

social group--the institutions, norms,

the whole social order--are self-legitimating
serious challenges.

~

long

~

there

~

no

The GPec's leaders tried to do just that--prevent

serious challenges to the new social action 'programs.
A Paradigm of Structural Insulation
From a sociology of knowledge point of view, the intensity with
which a group needs to maintain its particular $ocial order depends upon
the intensity of. the questions and challenges directed at its ordered
practices.

The actions that a social group undertakes t.o maintain its

own social constructions are the processes of legitimation.

In order to

contrast the Weberian-based structural-functionalist understanding of
how churches maintain, or legitimate, their authority as'against the
interactionist's "knowledge" theory interprets it, I will use a recent
study 'by James R. Wood as an illustration.

Wood discusses how insulation

fits into legitimating a church body's authority, but he views it
through a structural interpretation.

What is the relation of "social

~

r-:I
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insulation

ll

to legitimation?

Most church laymen have little or no contact with their national
church body.

Few laymen know or understand the relationships and work·

ings of the national agencies, departments and high offices of their
church denominations.

Yet, this social distance does not always

insulate the national church1s high, policy-making leaders from the
local laymen·s negative reactions.

In a.recent study, James R. Wood

compares the degree of formal authority built into different denomina
. tions' polity and how this degree of hierarchical authority affects
the willingness of local congregations to carry out the liberal racial
integration policies of the larger church body.
stated:

Woodis

hypo~hesis

liThe strength of racial integration policy varies directly

with the degree to which leader control is legitimated by denominational
polity.1I4 Wood argues that when a sufficiently controversial policy is
made by a denomination and it acts upon the policy (civil' rights
actions, etc.) through congregations, then the members will be aroused
from the i r apa thy.
leaders.

The 1a i ty wi .11 then cha 11 enge the authori ty of the

In these cases, .Wood reasoned, membership apathy would no

longer protect the policy makers, and the determining factor supporting
the policy makers· controversial policy would.·be formal authority from
the organization.
In his findings, Wood concludes that when members are aroused from
their apathy to challenge leadership policy, informal power deteriorates,
but formal authority becomes the crucial determinant of policy

co~trol.

Leaders are more likely to press for policy in controversial
areas when they have 'formal authority insulating· them from mem
ber resistance.
I'
I

I
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Data from 28 major religious bodies supported this logic.
The association bet\'/een denominational polity and strength of
policy' in the highly controversial area of racial i.ntegration
failed to disappear even when theology) regional membership,
and size were held constant. Furthermore, the relationship was
strongest in those circumstances (fundamentalis~, Southern
membership and small size) where disturbance of apathy would
appear to make policymakers most vulnerable.
Viewed in the light of previous ,studies indicating that'offi
cials in congregational bodies normally have control over policy
comparable to that of hierar'chical officials, these findings
suggest that, the Hiron law of oligarchy" is not a law at all but
an empirical generalization which does not hold in such circum
stances' as extreme controversy. When there is controversy,
leaders tend to retrench their control of policy to that level
, which is anchored in the mandate of their offices. This retrench
ment leads to an important differentiation of power based ,on the
degree of authority. As hinted earlier, hierarchical leaders can
better face controversy for at least two reasons: (1) While hier
archical leaders may use their most powerful sanctions as little as
possible (because of their alienating character), such sanctions'
are significant as a backdrop for persuasive efforts, and they'may
be used when necessary. For example, in most hierarchical denomi
nations a rebellious congregation must surrender its property upon
withdrawal (or expulsion) from the parent body. Knowledge of this
fact often tempers rebellion. (2) Even in a voluntary association
to which an individual is free to belong 'or not to belong~ a mem
ber is not free to reject the authority exercised by other indi
viduals in accordance with the norms of the association (Bierstedt,
1954:81). Hierarchical leaders have a solid resource in the norms
of du,e process and orderliness inherent in their polity. 5
'
Woodis study is a good example of how organizational insulation works
to protect the clergy who are in the higher echelons of a church' organiza
tion.

Wood does not include the parish pastor as

a member

of the "leaders ll

of the denomination ,II who are protected by the formal authority of the
organizationa1 structure.

So it is in the larger organization, super

ceding the local congregation) which gives the'organizational insulation
to the denomination1s policy

~akers.

Wood does not claim that the national

church body's formal authority serves to insu,late the local pastor from
lay reprisals.

Wood's study does not consider the local

pasto~

as a

"l eader" in the national organization.
Woodis independent variable was polity.

He contrasted the IIformal
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authorityll of hierarchical church bodies against the ulocal autonomY" of
congregational governed bodies.

The results of WoodIs 'investigation

demonstrated that the hierarchical organizations give the policy makers
the legitimate power to make'policies which are controversial and to
insist the congregations enact such policies. 6 On the other hand, he
found those church bodies with a congregational type of polity did not
press for contr'oversial policies such as civil rights enactments.
Woodis findings

~hould

demonstrate that the GPeC is unable to take a

stand on' civil rights, and certainly not be able to carry out any 10ng
term civil rights activities.

In contrast to hierarchical denominations,

the GPCC's polity is radically congregational.
formal authority over its members.

Its leaders are without

The fact is, however, the GPeC has

taken a strong stand on civil rights and enacted several, vigorous
Communi ty Acti on Programs for mi nori ty groups,.

The di fference is that

the GPCC has not tried to compel its co'ngregations individually to take
liberal stands, nor even participate.

Instead"tne GPCC used several

methods to avC?id directly challenging the 'laymen's conservative, socio
religious ideas.
Wood emphasized the "fQrmal ll authority of the organization's
(hierarchical) structure.
gations.

The GPCC has no formal authority over congre
.'

However, GPCC leaders have developed a limited informal author

ity over their own bureaucracy--church-CAP's, GPCC commissions and com
mittees.
It is well known that most religiOUS and voluntary kinds of organi-" -.. ~
zations exercise control over their members primarily through normative
power.

The leaders appeal to the high ideals and religious standards to

bring the

"

devi~nt

members under control.

-.',

However~

among the large church

·

I
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bodies with strong hierarchical polity, the formal authority entrusted

I

to the policy-making leaders can be significant when exerted against

I

deviating congregations.

J. R. Wood points out that the hierarchical

churches possess some very real coercive sanctions, such as:

(1) con

fiscation of property if the congregation tries to withdraw from the
church body, and (2) strong order lines inherent in the polity, which
gives due process. 7 The rest is norma~ive power, but it is deeply com
pelling for those who have been socia1ized into those normative ideals
since childhood.

Hierarchical church leaders

posses~,

then, a combina

tion of coercive-normative power over their constituency.

In contrast,

the GPCC has no formal authority and its normative powers are circum
scribed on every side where one church body member may differ signifi
cantly with another member church.

As previously noted, the GPCC is

extreme in its volunteer character.
In his study of different churches' authority to enforce racial
integration policies, J. R. Wood clearly concludes that hierarchical
"leaders are more likely to press for policy in cO!1troversial areas when
they have formal authority insulating them from member resist~nce.1I8
More specifically, he says, the degree to which church leaders press,
for controversial policies (racial integration) varies directly with the
degree of the leaders' authority.

Apparently viewing'it from a struc

tural-functionalist point of view, Wood consistently equates

II

formal

structure of the organization with "hierarchical'authority" of the
leaders.

His view of insulation is one of "structural insulation." Wood

says, "Authority is important not only because it legitimates certain
formal sanctions to be used against resisters, but also, and possibly
more important, it gives the policymakers the support of persons who dis

;,t~
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agree with their policies but uphold the political structure giving them
the ri,ght to make such policies. 1J9
Wood's use of the term "insulation", poses a'basic difference from
my view of insulation, as applied to the GPCG.

First, the protective

covering which the insulation provides in the GPCC is much more of a,
covering of the whole program of 'libera1 social 'actions, rather than a
protecti on of the 1i bera 1 1eaders who deci ded upon it and enacted i,t. 'In
other words, the insulation for the GPGG is not to legitimate ,the
authority of the leaders of the GPCC so that the leaders·

authorit~tive

orders would have the power of the organization·s structure behind it .
to give it coercive impact.

Rather, the insulation in the'§E££ provided

legitimation for the social action policies and

~ograms.

in contrast to

legitimating the people as leaders (Cate, Schulze, etc.), who are to have
the legal authority to impose the action programs.

Certainly it is

impossible' ,to divorce the people, as authority figures, from the liberal
action programs, but there is a significant difference between the GPeets '
action programs, which are removed from the laymen, and Woodis hier
archical organizations, which impose their racial integration
The practical difference between the GPCG's

~ivil

pro~rams.

rights (integra

tion) ,actions as against the hierarchical denominations is that the GPCG
did not try to pressure, or enforce, its member congregations individu
ally to enact any particular policies of liberal social action.

On the

contrary, the GPGC's leaders avoided directly challenging their laymen's
conservative views, religiously and socially.

I

This was accomplished

t'

through their own process of insulation.

\

In contrast to the "structural insulation" of Wood's study, I -view
,
the GPeC's insulation ~ essentially processual irr nature. Wood views
,

I
I

::l

,

i

I
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the insulation, provided by the formal structure of the organization, as
legitimation of the authority of the hierarchical church leaders.
Legitimation is already built into the formal organization of the hier
archical structure, which in turn gives to its leaders the rational
,



legal authority of potential coercive power to enact the integration pro
gram at the laymen's level.

The GPee's social action programs, on the

other 'hand, were not enacted by formal authority, but by the combination.
,

of several interacting groups and socia1 conditions, which combined to
insulate the social action programs from conservative reaction. .These
several interacting IIfactors" of insulation worked together to be the
legitimating process for the GPee's new, liberal program.

The-leaders,

Cate, Schulze, etc., never sought, nor obtained, coercive power--at least,
over the member congregations.

In the hierarchical organization there

is no real process of legitimation operative in the insulation around
the leaders, 'since the formal structure's power to force compliance
insures the leaders' new program.
How Do the Individual Categories of Insulation Legitimate Such a
Precarious, New Social Action?
Taken individually, the seven farms of insulation did not act to
1egitimate the 'GPCC's social involvement policy.

Taken

toget~er

as an

interacting whole, however, they have, for a short period of years, legi
timated new and unorthodox programs.
individual insulation forms in

~hapter

The separate definitions of the
10 imply that some of the forms are

controlled or manipulated by the leaders, while some of the ·o.thers are
inert parts of the organization's social·system.

The categories of

(1) members' apathy, (5) the semi-autonomous relationship of the CAP's
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to the GPCC, and (6) the general secularization of many parish pastors are
obviously not categories of leaders' deliberate manipulation of the
organization, but are more a part of the organization1s given social

environment. It;s certainly a valid interpretation of the leaders' oli
garchic

~ethods

that they have manipulated the intercommunication systems

in the GPCC deliberately to exert II control ll or guide the valueS and
practices of the organization.

While agreeing to this point, it is not

to say that the specific goal-seeking actions of the leaders involved
should be interpreted as being functionaries of IIstructuraJII power and
authority.

No one leader in the GPCC wielded the kind of authority as

"legitimated power ll that would make him the causal determinant of the
GPCC's new policies.

No significant authoritative coercion was exerted

to accomplish goals.

The power inherent in organizational constraints

of reward and punishment were minimal, because they were so unavai.1able
to the executives.
Instead of the leaders· built-in mechanisms of control, the GPCC's
new social .inVolvement policy emerged out of the interrelations and

inter~

actions of their legitimating elements--insulation--with the actors who
most influence them.
For example, the first insulation category described earlier is
."

membership apathy.

If legitimation is the process of matntaining a

social order's objectivity, then membership
moting legitimation.

Because it

miti~ates

~pathy

neatly fits into pro

against those criticisms and

embarrassing questions, which the GPCC1s "radical ll new policies engen
dered, apathy automatically reduces the number of people who could become
offended by the new social involvement.

Since a large percentage of

members' apathy allowed the discrepancy to continue between the leaders'
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goal-seeking, as against the traditional, non-activist goals, new social'
action experiments began to result in the remapping and reorganizing of
the GPCCis total program and goals; The increased apathy was correlated
with leaders' lack of organizational dedication to older definitions of
goals, and conversely, the less democratic

(repr~sentative)

pressure

brought to bear on the officers, the easier the officers' found it to
manipulate the definitions of organizational norms and goals.
On the other hand, the second and third categories of insulations
listed before as (2) the leaders· oligarchic methods and (3) ·the lack of
i nter-organi zati anal communi cati on, need further expl anati on" as II marl i
pulated ll categories.

Considering oligarchic methods first, it could be

argued that Cate did obtain such a high degree of informal authority over
the GPCC, his rational-pragmatic authority'may have contained more
coercive

powe~

than that· of church leaders

who operate with rational-legal

authority~

the concluding pages' of his study of the

i~

hierarchical denominations

Paul Harrison noted this in.

Ameri~an

Baptist Convention.

But no group can function without (formally defined) leadership,
and it has been argued that when leaders are divested of author
ity they will necessarily seek and gain power in order to meet
their responsibilities; the power'they acquire may exceed that
which ordinarily accrues to leaders in non-totalitarian, hier
archical institutions. 10
In one senSe Harrison's analysis does fit the GPCC, since there is some
question whether Cate could have accomplished the radical turn-around to
liberal goals without individually taking over informal, personal power.
. "

.

It is true that Cate gradually grasped an inordinate amount of informal
author; ty wi thin the GPCC to i nfl uence its adopt; on of hi s .pol i ci es of
social involvement.

However, there is no evidence that Cate used coer

cive power on members of the Board to impose his will upon their decision
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making;

In the area of administration, in the case of the CAP's,

Chapter 5 revealed Cate did use a heavy hand in trying to "take over u
the C-CAP in Albina (from Robert Nelson) after ihe 1968 Blatk Crisis
program.
, Yet, in

de~ermining

the goals of the organization, no sanctions nor

other forms of naked power were evident.
ting approach.

Cate did not need this aliena

His methodical groundwork had laid a strong foundation

for great personal and informal authority.

Through his control of the

Nominating Committee and through the apathy of the great, majority of, mem
ber congregations, Cate developed an oligarchic Board of Directors which
was sympathetic ideologically toward 1ii?eraliz'ing' the GPCC's goals.

These

Board members usually supported Cate in his proposals, largely because
they believed in him so thoroughly.

Without much doubt, Cate had solidi

fied his organizational strength through personal charismatic authority.
(Cate also came to lean on Schulze for his social, action expertise, for
hi s practi c;a1 management abi 1i ty to make idea's work, and for hi s abi 1i ty
to translat.e social action problems' into acceptable conservative
theology.

I"n the process, Schulze also attracted a large amount of per-,

sonal admiration from within the GPCC.)
Probably the best example of Catels organizational charisma is the
.~

fact that ,not one of the 19 Board members who were interviewed for this
study knew what the organizational relationship of the CAP's was to the
GPCC.

They did not know what kind, nor degree, of authority the Board

had over the CAP IS.

With three or four exceptions, they implicitly

trusted Cate and Schulze to know and administer this fuzzy, semi
autonomous relationship.
Instead of coercive sanctions wielded from the power structure of

:rr
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his office upon those who would oppose his

ideas~

Cate relied on slowly

building his social involvement concepts into the dominant majority of
people--key people-who controlled the policy-making body, the Board of
Directors.

The strength radically to change goals did not de.rive from

the power inherent in the organization's

structure~

per

~,

but from an

interaction of people and events which changed the attitude and expecta
tions of enough policy makers to change what the .organ,ization stood for- ...
its very meaning.

First, in 1963-1964 they ,adopted and put into app1i

cation the practical change in action programs, and by 1969' thes~
policy makers recognized that the change to social action goals was
accepted enough--legitimated--by members so that the organization!s con
stitution was rewritten around the new goals.
Talcott Parsons' classical functionalist concept of power as force-
lithe control of the use and organization of force relative to territory
is alway's a crucial focus of the politica1 power system . . • "--went
hand in hand with his Weberian concept of authoritY.,ll

IIAuthority to

bind and to coerce a member of the collectivity is, in this respect, of
the same fundamental character as authority to assume a treaty obliga
tion.,,12

In other words, authority is society's legal right to use

coercive power.

(I realize Parsons later modified his definition of power

to emphasize II ccl1ective .goals ll as motivation of social 'control and
thereby deemphasized authority as legalized force.

However, I think his

original commitment to the Weberian definition of authority still stands.)
, Authority must be understood as legitimated power; however, without
force, there is no authority.
Parsons later

stat~d

Much the same as Paul Harrison said above,

that authority in the political system is the

"power . . . to get things done . . . for . . . the . .'. collectivity

iI;

.

,

u13
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In trying to dispel the functionalists' concepts of "systemic
necessities," "societal forces,1J etc., Walter Buckley comes close to
saying that power is changed into authority, not through coercion, but
through willing consent of the

gover~ed.

What Buckley ends up saying

is that power and authority are relational:

"inasmuch as power and

authority are relational concepts, what may be a system of authority to
some actors may be a system of power to. others. ,,14 However, he gets
hung up on what is the difference between u willing consent" to authority
and the "legitimation" of it.

He states that the real meaning of

legitimation for authority isJ"voluntary compliance. 1I15
I certainly agree with Buckley that power and authority have a
"relational and hence relative

n~ture"

and that for l.egitimation of

authority to take place there must be something of a practical compli
ance. 16 However, the way I have tried to present legitimation in these
pages is not as "willing" consent, or "consensus,1I by the working
majority, but rather, it is the lack of successful or serious challenges
to the powers that be--"to the way things are done around here. II
Wi 11 i am Cate, Paul Schul ze and others "grasped authori ty," but
nev~r

obtained, nor used enough coercive power to change GPCC goals.

The leaders did not change organizational goals.
forces,

~

larger process.

It was. due to several

The more gradual process that changed the

organization's goals was the dialectic of'legitimation, vaci1lating
between challenge-resistance-retrenchment-reestablishment and challenge
reconsideration of possible changes-challenge-change.
The third category of insulation--filtered or lack of communication-
is also an example of the leaders' partial ability to impose C'control ll )
the legitimation of their own goals upon the organization.

In this case,
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they controlled it by managing the inter-organizational communication
system.

The leaders did it by suppressing or greatly minimizing any ac

tions in the new CAP's which would be considered too" controversial.

Organizationally, the CAP's are removed from out of view and out of
influence of the congregations and laymen.

The leaders controlled the

communications system by filtering it in both directions.

Since the

CAP's are bureaucratically related to the"GPCC's head offices, member
churches are forced largely to rely on the GPCC·s own public relations'
interpretations of the CAP's more controversial activities.

This rein

terpretation of questionable social action activities into more conserva
tive acceptability may be viewed as a regular part· of the GPec's
Ustructural" system.

In Parsonian terms, the executives' action of

filtering the organization's communication between the organization's
working units where the controversial actions' take place (CAP's) and the
organization's member churches is fulfilling the Ilneed" to attain maxi
mum organizational equilibrium through IItension.management" in order to
achieve the collective goals.
There was certainly more to the effectiveness of insulation as part
of an overall process of legitimation than merely a coercively imposed
break i"n communications.

The leaders' manipulation of inter-communica

tions waS not an outgrowth of their authority, but it was .the other way
around.

Consequently, the constant use of communications as public rela

tions was done quite subtly.

The information going out to the constitu

ents in the churches was generally self-complimentary about the CAP's
and avoided stating in detail their work with controversial issues.
Neither was negative feedback from members authoritatively cut off.
Rather, conservative reaction was often nipped close to the grass roots

h-~"
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by liberal pastors and laymen, who placated angry conservatives in their
own congregations with the defensive arguments learned from the GPCC's
theological "position papers. 1I
active forms of insulation.

Feedback was filtered through the inter

Outgoing propaganda reinterpreted, and

minimized the radicalness of their action programs.
Generally, the GPCC was not characteri zed by authori tative struc
turing of its people in the organization with a regimented system of
roles, norms, status, authorities, etc.

These social orders are present

in the GPCC, as ;n any social organization, but they are loosely present
as the cond i ti ons whi ch shape the context of i nterac ti on's between the
units--people.

Controls of communication, for instance, are between

the core group of "actives,1I as against the inactive member churches.
Within the internal organization, the looseness of the inter-relation
ships of

activ~

participants permitted their dialectic interaction to

create and recreate new meanings and goals for the organization.

Conse

quently, the stream of new situations which arose out of the GPCC's
change to

comm~nity

action efforts brought on further unstructured and

unregularized conditions within their organizatiori.

These were the

chaDges that, although constructive to some, appeared threatening to
conservative members.

,"

'I

!

Insulation--the Process of Prevention
At first by not requesting extra money for the churches, and by not
bringing the issue of sponsorship of the new community action

p~ogram

before the General Assembly, the Executive Director and other leaders
did not arouse the conservative membership.

By minimizing the liberal

nature of the new church CAP's through minimum exposure before the gen
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I'
I

eral membership, and by maintaining the central importance of the old,

1

conservat.f.ve goal of helping to preserve the existence of the member con-·
gregations (as a facade), the leaders began the erocess of elimi,nating

challenges to their programing, and i.e., to their change-over to liberal
goals.

The GPCCls long-range effort to

~et

and eliminate challenges to

its soci a1 acti ons I have chosen to' call the proces s of i nsu1a ti on__

By

preventing questions and criticisms to become serious challenges to the
new church-CAP's themselves', the insulation process prevented
fledgling social action programs from being fatally disrupted.

th~

It is

important to note here that because the insulation was primarily a pre
ventive agent, acting to maintain the objective reality of the new pro
graming, it was essential.ly a negative. form of legitimation.

Although

the seven forms of insulation acted in various capacities to protect the
GPec's new policies, some more positively than others, their over- .
riding purpose was to prevent and protect, rather than to promote and
educate.

The insulation process may be described as the GPCC's multiple

defense. line (for its new objectivated uknowledge") against the forces of
conservative reaction.
The prevention of strong external criticism to focus too intensely
upon the new liberal action programs was also the objective meaning of
legitimation.

There is both an objective and subjective aspect to

legitimation.

As long as the member churches accepted,without challenging,

the. GPce's new policies, merely
~ the fact that they were there, being
.
.
performed as a 1egi ti rna te pa.rt of the GPeC,' the new acti vi ti es became
an objectively real part of the institution.
and grew.

They were self-legitimating.

They worked.

They remained

The new policies became more and

more equated with the GPCC; therefore, they became objectivated "know

.,
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ledge" within the group.
However, it is not at all certain whether the new style of organi
zation has,been internalized and accepted as subjectively real by the

greater proporti on of the GPCC I S member churches.. Camp 1ete and effec
tive legitimation has a good balance between both objective and subjec
tive defi ni ti ons of the new real i ty.' Before the GPCC I S new soc; al
action program CQuld be accepted internally by members, it had to be
explained as being the "correctll interpretation of what the church
.

,

organization's purpose really was.
first.

In a word, it had to be objectivated

Religions usually remain above the large proportion of day-to

day criticism for the very reason. that their institutional orders are
presented as unchangeable, as part and parcel of divine manifestation,
existent from the beginning of time.

Because the sacred is immutable,

or objective, by its very definition, religious institutions and their
goals are equated with this objectivity.

The almost imperceptible

change in the interpretation of a religion's practical goals (which
takes place in all religions if they are to maintain their releyance in
their changing societies) are reinterpreted as having been the "real"
meaning of its goals from the beginning.

In othe'r. words, a'religious

institution constantly legitimates, itself and other necessary groups by
."

defining their goals within a sacred, cosmic reference, which trans
cends history and man.

Change in religious organizations, objective and

subjective, is understandably difficult and slow.

Consequently"leaders'

of the GPCC, as a religiously based group, who would have tried to
engineer a relatively quick change in their general member'S subjective
understanding of their group's specific goals, almost certainly would
have faced defeat.

This is exactly what \OJilliam Cate and his fellow
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leaders worked to avoid.

They took advantage of the GPCC's divided

constituency--its membership's nsplit personality.

II

Instead of

attempting to reach the GPCC's generally inactive membership of
churches, they concentrated on the inner core of active participants.
At the level of selected, loyal worker-leaders, an unhurried, but
intensive socialization into social acti'on goals was directed at this
core group.

These people were allowed to internalize the new goals.

During the first half of the 1960's, Cate, Schulze, Menzel and other
leaders answered the objections of the Board members, and explained how
direct social action worked by enthusiastically demonstrating it at
C-CAP.

Because a great percentage of this group did internalize the

changed interpretati ons., the organi zation was able to act forcefully
during the last half of the Sixties.
After the core group had subjectively made the social action goals
their own, things began to happen in the GPCC.

As soon as the first

CAP was established in Albina, the effort to legitimate the program's
objective

~~ality

went into operation.

essentially by one general means:

Challenges were prevented'

the minimization, if not prevention,

of communication between· the conservative congregations and the· activist

I.

leaders in the GPCC, especially the Board of Dire.ctors.

The impression

mus t not be gi ven tha't the GPCC IS 1eadershi p made no effort to carry out
a

positiv~

campaign to propagandize and sell the general membership on

accepting the new ofganizational goals.

However, the abundant regular

mailings and all other forms of public relations accomplished it in the
rryanner bes t descri bed by the modern po 1i ti ca 1 ,term, IImanaged news.

II

The

GPCC's communications with the Board membership and public did an excel
lent job of presenting to mass media a positive vie\-, of its social action
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accomplishments.

The internal turmoil and criticisms were well con

tained within the Board of Directors, and often even kept from the
Board.
1

I.
I

This management of the communications was the foundation of the

process/of insulation. Seven various forms of insulation have been.
listed earlier.

Three of these forms, as noted before,. are grounded tn

the GPeC's social 'environment:

four are due to the individual efforts

of a few, aggressive leaders.

The effect, however, of all seven of the

insulation processes have been the same:

to legitimate the GPCC's

social action efforts by pacifying the -criticisms of the more conserva
tive members.

The insulation dampened the negative feedback so that no

important challenges were mounted against the GPCC's liberal policies.
The criticisms were usually unpublicized and kept within a relatively
small group of leaders.

The liberal Board of Directors seldom con

sidered any of these'conservative
discussiori:time.
vehement

att~ck

com~laints

worthy of their meetings'

There were three major exceptions:

(1) City Hall's

in 1968 upon the GPCCls downtown Youth Ministry program;

(2) the 1965 dispute over the GPCC's support ~f HB 1307, which ca11ed

for busing disadvantaged children to other schools with better programs;
(3) the 1968-1969 internal conflict about the over-use of funds for the

preceding Summer Crisis programs.

As pOinted.. out in Chapter 9, the

Board of Directors generally sustained William Cate's policies and the
CApis progressive action programs,

i.e~,

Robert Menzel in the downtown

Youth t4i.nistry and Colden Brown with the' Black Crisis in Albina.

The

Board, which had contro) of both the output and 'feedback mechanisms to
and from,the members, was able to manage to placate most serious
criticisms coming from the broad number of

congr~gations.

Within the

Board of Directors it was a different story in each of the above three
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instances.

There was serious internal

r~action

and conflict in each

case, but also in each case, Cate had a core group of very strong and
able supporters on the Board, which stood by Cate and his progressive

social action policies. With the challenges,stifled within the Board,
the.process of self-legitimation continued.

The organization's social

action programs were reaffirmed, and thus objectivated as legitimate.
policy_

The different forms of insulatton had done their work in the

process of legitimation--to the degree that it preserved the
policies and goal of community action involvement .

.

n~w

programs;,

CHAPTER XII
A MORPHOGENESIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
A certain kind of organizational morphogenesis took.place within
the GPCC between 1960 and 1970.. As the

goal~

of the organi.zation .

change9 from assisting its members in meeting their competitive demands
for self-preservat;-on over to the goal of social action,- so a change
took place within the structure's inter-relationship between the volun
tary members and the leadership.

The change was essentially in communi-·

cation between its member congregati ons and the organi zati o'n s center of
I

authority.

As the GPCC became more olig"archic, with authority more

firmly in the hands of the Executive Director and Board of Directors,
it also became more communicative with those congregations involved with
. social action and less so with those congregations not involved.

Those

congregations, whose goals and practices did not change to match the
changing ~oals and practices of the GPec's new social action orientation,
were those congregations which lost communication with those in authority
at the GPec.

.

As documented previously, before the 1960·s the GPCCls conserva
tive goals' were nbviously uninvolved, socio-politically." The GPec's
programs were studiously non-controversial, but rather, geared to offer
adequate rewards to the local congregations so as to insure their con
tinued support of the GPCC.

Due to religious

plur~lism,

the exclusively

defined plausibility structures of individual churches were being torn
asunder, so Portland's various

reli~ious

marketing agencies have found
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that their IIproduct" needed to be standardized for mutual protection.
Before the 1960's, survival demands forced many c,ongregations to sup
port the GPCC in exchange for the reward that the GPCC help each congre

gation satisfy consumers' (prospective members') demands. Before the
changeover, the GPeC's congregational-centered programs were geared to
help its participant congregations to rationalize the competition
between themselves, and thus prevent irratjonal competition and
possibly mutual annihilation.

Portland's mainline, Protestant congre

gations "needed ll the GPCC, and the GPCC needed them.

This mutual

responsibility between members and organization fostered a mutually
increasing communication between each other. ,The GPCC needed the finan
cial support of each congregation, as well.
the better.

The bigger the congregation,

In return the GPCC offered the good ,rewards of its coopera

tive educational programs (released time and teacher training), along
with the latent reward for participating clergymen, e.g., their mutual'
social and psychological

s~pport,

instead of competitive suspicion.

Because ,any voluntary organizat"ron relies heavily upon membership

I

support, the leaders must make available some kind of rewards (often

I
I

latent), or continually reconvince the members of the organization's

~

l'
I

stated goals.

If the organization changes its goals, it must either

reconvince the membership of the value of the new goals, or offer suit
able

r~ards--or

recruit a\new set of

~mbers.

Since each of the member congregations has only marginal ,loyalty
to the GPCC, compared to the primary formal ties with their own denomi-

I

nations, membership in the GPCC is one of

I

strength and source of the congregations' values and norms are in their
own denomination.

extr~me

voluntarism.

The

The denomination's theology and practices are deeply
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traditional,.and each of the denomination's pastors are schooled and
socialized quite thoroughly into the value system of that church's
background.

Because of the congregations' extreme voluntarism towar4 the GPCC,
Figure 12.1 tries.to demonstrate that before 1964 the larger congre
'gations most

interest~d

and active in the GPCG were the source of

and authority in the GPCC.

Those

c~ngregatiqns

which participated most

actively in the GPCC's politics attended in force

~t

the annval.meetings

to elect their own congregations' members to the GPCC's Board
Directors.

po~er

o~

Admittedly, they were from the more progressive, enumenical1y

minded denominations.

These strong congregations controlled the GPCC

before the 1960· s, but di d so conservati ve ly to obta.i!!. the support of
more of the city·s congregations as potential members.

Although there

\4/as a large degree of disinterest and apathy among member congregations
before

th~

1960·s, those few, active congregations did not attempt ·to

cut off the inactive congregation.s in an oligarch·ic manner.

It appears

that the GPCC's Board of Directors then tried .to communicate with all
congregations by informing them of the GPCC's programmed assistance for
congregations.
I

Before the 1960 s, apathy of the majority of other member congre-'
1

I
I
I

gations appears to have been the greatest deterrent to feedback; however,
the GPCC provided no organizational machinery for. feedback, and thus
discQuraged it.

The movement of information outward was motivated by

the GPCC's precarious need for financial

~upport.

The GPCC theri sent

out frequent bulletins, propagandizing the GPCC's current types of
as.sistance for member congregations· programs.
merely advertizing the reward$. of membership.

The GPCC's leaders were

I

.j

.
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Late 1958's and Early 1960 l s
Figure 12.1 illustrates the source of authority by the double lines
emanating from those few congregations which were most involved in govern

ing the earlier GPCC.

The single arrows demonstrate the" source and

direction of communications with the organization.

The double-lined

arrows demonstrate the informal authority, which those larger and most
politically active congreg?tions in the GPee came to exert within the
Board of Directors.

The constant plight o'f financial instability during

the pre-1960 ' s forced the GPeC to be greatly dependent upon those

con~

gregations contributing the largest sums.
Also organizational communication was primarily in one direction,
originating in the several larger churches which supplied most of the
GPeC's elected leaders.

Combined with the apathy of the majority

o~

other member congregations, there was little means of feedback of
information to the Board from these "outside" congregations.

However,

because of the constant need for financial support, the GPCC then sent
out a steady flow of information to all congregations, advertizing the
advantages of membership in the GPCC.
The Period from 1963 to 1968
Figure 12.2 indicates the complete change of direction in the flow
of communication and,authority.

The hard, unfiltered information was'

communicated within the Board among its members; thereby, automatically
excluding any person from the uninvolved, conservative congregations.
First, that information purposely disseminated to the general mem
bership was managed information in the sense that the Executive staff
filtered the information concerning the CApis most controversial activi

lDT

II
,

Board of
~irectors
"" i

Fi gure 12.1
The GPCC, Late 1950 l s and Early 1960'5

Finances - Very small budget.
Programs - Congregational centered.
Participation of members - High degree' of apathy.
Intercommunication - One-way publicity. to the congregations about rewards
and advantages given to them by the GPeC's activities.
Goals - Conservative, non-controversial.
.
Authority - Larger urban congregations dominated GPec.
(Double lines above indicate direction of authority.)
-'
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Figure 12.2
GPeC, From 1963 Through 1968

Fi nances - ~lany new, /loutsi de" independent sources.·
Programs - Community Action Programs (CAP's) becarne,central.
Participatio~ of members - General decrease of apathy.
f\uthority' -- Shifted to ne\\} Executive Director and his staff.
Intercommunication ... Primarily bet\veen activist congregations and staff;
uninvolved congr~gations excl~ded.
Goals - Radical ch~nge to social action.
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ties.

The leaders thus were able to present a less objectionable picture

of the CAP's programs to the conservative congregations.

Negative feed

back from member conservatives was also effectively stymied from return
i ng· to the Board.

The two ...way fi 1teri ng of 'communi cati on between general

membership and the Board

becam~

extremely effecti.ve as an insulation

process without· formal implementation.
Secondly, because Paul Schulze consulted regularly with Cate, the
CAP's during this period carried out their activities with Caters
'fairly complete knowledge and consent.
Thirdly, the 1960's witnessed an almost complete reversal of the
lines of

au~hority

from that illustrated in Figure .12.1.

Membership on

the Board became more thoroughly liberal, and·the Executive more firmly
grasped the reigns of authority in guiding policy decisions.

As these

lJinside ll communication lines became more engrained, more people and con
gregations appeared to support the Executive's

~uthority

to set social

action policies.
Fourth, when the GPCC's leadership (Executive staff and Board of
Directors) implemented the new social action goals into the

1968

Summer.

Crisis programs, the activities (and thus the goals) became controversial
enough to stimulate significant public

rea~~ion

throughout the city.

However, as illustrated in Figure 12.2, the negative feedback loops from
the conservative congregatio.ns to the Board, etc., sheltered (insulated)
the leadership from criticism.
The Period from 1968 to 1970
Although social action had come to dominate, informally, the GPeC's
previous goals in the 1960's, in 1968 the change of goals was formalized
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with the adoption of the new constitution.
in three ways:

It strengthened social action

(1) It added to the Board a representative from each

church denomlnation that had five or more of their own congregations as

members of the GPCC .. (2) The CAP's,were given separate, voting repre
sentation on the Board.

(3) The GPCC was reorganized around three new

working divisions, the most important being the Center for Urban
Encounter (CUE).
CUE was a completely new piece of organizational machinery, which,
unlike the CAP's, did not evolve or

It was mostly the product

uhapp~n.1I

of the ima.gination and work of Paul Schulze.

He realized the essential

conservativism of most of the member congregations and church laymen.
Schulze came to feel strongly that if the GPCC's social action work was
to be educated and convinced about the Christian necessity for socia'l
action to be carried out through local churches.

Schulze wanted CUE to

do this education job, thereby changing the laymen's conservative, '
critical attitude toward social involvement.

CUE's stated purpose is '

lito challenge and equip people in parishes for a relevant ministry to the
city. II

CUE now provides a wide variety of intensive training sessions,

geared mostly to "parfsh clusters" and the new Metropolitan Ministries'
community involvements.

.

A fourth change during this time was the CAP's individual movements
toward autonomy, apart from the GPCC.

Figure 12.3 shows the Executive's

author; ty, ill us trated by daub 1eli nes, to be moved toward CUE and no
longer extended to the CAP's.
Our three Figures sho",/ the GPCC's morphogenesis by illustrating
organizational changes in the
and authority.

1960~s

in the GPCC's intercommunication

In corporate types of organizations, increased communica-
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From 1969 through 1970
#~

Finances - Foundations and private sources decrease~ gifts--specificly
for CApls.
'Programs_ ... Social action remained, but shifted main efforts from CAP's
to CUE.
Participation of members - Apathy of members began to increase ,again.
Authority- - CApls asserted own autonomy, ,but new division, CUE, is under
formal authority of Board and Executive. Informal authority
still in Executive.
Intercommunication - Continues primarily wltn involved, urban larger
congregations; membership on Board of Directors
greatly enhances it.
Goals - Overt pursuit ov social action goa1s diminishing, while some
.,~conser:~a~ive, goals being revived.
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tions between'the leaders and employees increases the leaders' ability
;

to know about environmental changes.

This allows the organization more

I

!'

quickly and efficiently to adapt to the changing environment. However,
the GPCC is not corporately organized, but democratically (representa
tively) governed.

The GPCC does not have a planned cybernetic system of

feedback loops, which

funnel~

cessing office for analysis.

information back to a central data

pro~

The GPCC leaders do not manage a' feedback

system in a pre-planned sense.

Usual,ly" in corporate ,organizations, it

is assumed that the leaders will be the conservers of the organization's
,

,

status 9uo--tha.t the leaders need the specially tailored intercommunica
tion system to perceive the organizationls ecological contingencie's and'

I
I
I

innovations.

The leaders then, possibly, understand the need for

~

I

I

organizational adaption--for morphogenesis.
In the GPCC and mai n1i ne Protestant denomi nat; ons, it is the 1ay ,
members \,/ho tend to be most conservati ve, not the leaders. ' Consequently
in the GPCC, the leaders' management of communication
be better

~bl~

I
II

I
I
l

not so much to

to adapt· to changes within the organization's changing

environment, but to prevent the

I
I

~

m

members· resistance to the leaders'

proposed liberal changes.
The GPCCls leaders had increasingly ·become aware of new contingency
situations, especially in proximity to Portlandls
They saw the need for

organiza~ional

downto~~n

churches.

innovations to be made in the GPCC

to meet the changes presenting serious social problems to the community.
The leaders wanted the GPCC to become involved.

Conservative members

did not want the change from "religious to secu1ar ll values.

Instead of

the GPCCls ordinary members, laymen, making i.nnovative, practical adapta
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tions (religiously) to the changing environment, which are usually the
first signs of needed change-adaptations (noted by the cybernetic feed
back system) within corporate groups, the GPCC's leaders have taken the
initiative for new organizational changes.

Primarily

by

informally

managing the organization's intercommunications (a method of i.nsulation),
the leaders have been able to move the GPCC out from conservative socio
religious values and actions into new socially oriented goals and role
patterns.

!
I

,
I

I

I

I.
I
J

!
I
I"

I

I

I

I
I
l
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CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
'Generally, manls relationship to society is 'a. continuous dialecti
cal process.
society.
dox.

I

I
I
I
~

j

I

Society is'a product of man; yet man is a' product'of-'

This basic social dilemma of man leads to a

f~ndamental

para

Soci'ety has no reality or meaning except that which is bestowed

upon it by human acts.

On the other ,hand, alJ that we know about man is

in the context of society.

So every individual develops and attains his

own personhood and conducts hi s 1i fe acti v;-ti es to form hi s i denti ty-
as a result of the total social processes in which he is immersed.
cannot exist ap,art from society.

Man

Yet, he himself creates it, and it

recreates h.i m.
Society appears to common sense as something independent of human

I

acti vi ty and as bei ng a pa rt of the inert gi veness 'of nature.

I
I
I
I
I

reality the structure of society is human meanings externalized in

In

1

human acti vi ty'.

Therefore, part of the tensi on between man and ,the

social world he creates is the false independence "lith which man imagines
his'social constructions are endowed, but which in reality, are appropri
ated by man himself.

Man loses the human meaning, of his own social

!

structions, and thereby is alienated from his own society.

I

subservient to it.

con~

He becomes

So man's own works, insofar as they are part of a social world,
become part of a real action world; his social constructs become a real-,
ity other than himself.

In other words, aliet)ation "is the process

_"ii'';
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whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and the world
is lost to consciousness. l The individual forgets that this world was
and continues to
between man and

b~

th~

co-produced by him.

There is an unresolved tension

human world which he creates, but which is now

estranged and now turns back on him to rule man.

Alienation is the over

extension of the process of objectivation, whereby the human objectivity
of the

soci~l

world is.transformed in- consciousness into the non-human

objectivity of nature.
The essence of alienation is the imposition of a fictitious
inexorability upon the humanly constructed world.

The innumerable con

tingencies of human existence are transformed into inevitable revelations
of universal law.

Activity becomes process.

Choices become destiny.

These powers become independent of the men who have constructed them.
When alienation,is religiouslt legitimated, the independence of these
powers is vastly undergirded, both in the social order and· in the indi
vidual' consciousness.

When man is alienated from his own world so that

he cannot make free choices regarding the reality of the relationship of
man to society and other men, then alienation results in a polar repulsion.

I

I
I
I
It

However, it must not be thought that religious formations have only
to be alienating, inert, mechanical reflections of their socia·l base.
Actually, some religions have proved the ability to de-alienate social
structures and to give religious legitimation to the

de-ali~natton.

De-alienation by religion is relatively rare but it has historical
validity.2

In the Biblical tradition, the confrontation of ·the social

I

order with the majesty of the Hebrew's

\

to be relativized to such an extent that one may validly speak of de

transcend~nt

God caused society

1

alienation--in. the sense that, before the face of God, the institutions
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are revealed as nothing but human works, devoid of inherent sanctity or
immortality (Nathan confronting David, etc.).
Peter Berger's concept of alienation and de-alienation describes

the fundamental paradox which accompanies secularization. On one hand,
religion most generally legitimates the humanly constructed social struc
tures as being immutable and sacred

\.

co~s.

On the other hand, when

religion withdraws its support'of traditional social structures and·
1

reveals them to be really human constructs and not immutable IIfactici

I
I

ties of the world, then religion secularizes, de-alienates, causes

~

l

ll

social change, and in some cases, encourages

I
I
I

The prophetic

tradition in the Old Testament contains many cases of this relativizing,
and resulting process.

1

~evoluti.on.

Therefore, a de-al·;enating. religion secularizes'

by removi ng its own web of re 1i g.; ous sancti ons strung through much of the
soci a1 order'.

When re 1i gi on acts in thi s double manner, it reveals a

basic, pervading ambivalence in relation to secularization.
ambivalent poles are between

statu~~

Religion's.

and relativized social structures,

I

a world-maintaining compared to a world-shaking force, conservativism

I

compared to secularization.·

I

In the United States as in previous history, once a religion has

I

est~blished

I

structures \vhich men have constructed into social IIfacticities. 1I Religion

I

thus provides a posltive function by supporting the established social

itself, it in turn legitimates the predominating social

order, but inherent within this superficial support is the process of
alienation.

The established order turns back on the religion and prevents

the religion from becoming dis-establishmentarian.

Vlhen "established"

social constructs determine and coerce the religion which support the
society, the humanly constructed social order is revealed to be against'
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man himself (the human being).
alienated against man.

The social order reveals itself to be

In the degree that the conservative elements of

a religious group take the part of the established social orders and
resist the prophetic actions for change of other elements of the same
relJgious group, then the society's religious order, as part of the con
servative social structures, acts to alienate further society's struc
tures against man, as man . .When the GPCC's new program stepped ou·tside
of the established social norms, society's constructions--the police,
churches, newspapers, the public, etc.--reacted indignantly.

On the o'ne

hand, there are those in the GPeC who remain true to the traditional
Protestant posture--that the church support, not challeRge, 10ng
established community norms and institutions.

These conservative church

men tend to foster false consciousness (reify) toward man's humanly con
structed norms, institutions and ideologies as being objectively part'
of the given, n.atural world.
process of-alienation.

In this stance they'participate in the'

On the other hand, those GPCC liberals who have

used the GPCC to challenge those same social qbjectivations as being
merely representations of human activity have promoted the process of
de-alienation.

Consequently, the GPCC dialectly acts and reacts

ambivalently toward society.

~

It becomes more evident from' the preceding theory about the GPCC
that the alienation of "secular" social structures is aicied by religion
when we recognize that established religious groups contribute to the
ossification of humanly produced social structures by lending their
special ability to deify, Or make the, social construct appear inexorable.
This kind of religious legitimation of status
than not.

~

order is more normal

Until the 1960's, the GPCC played its conservative role of

1I/MIfIl'
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legitimating Portland's more established social order.

However, when the

GPCC moved into its new soc,ial action programs, instead of giving
unqualified support, the GPCC's programs openly questioned several of
the city's important social norms.

In contradiction to most religious

groups wi thi n the ci ty, the GPCC began' to act as an agent for soci a1
de'-a1; enati on.
To the degree tha t the GPCC' s acti on programs de-ali enated soci ety.,
the GPCC contributed to secularization.

That is, the GPCC revealed that

local government and law enforcement, b~siness and education'~re only
human, social products--not immutable facts.

In so doing, the GPCC

removed its own religious legitimation of these structures, ',and forced
the process of secularization, in essence, social change. '
Because de-alienation of a group·s norms often threatenes it with
the loss of its fundamental meaning before the rest of society, the
group is also subject to the threat of its own anomy.

As we have seen,

the threat of basic change to the goals and practices of political,
economic and educational groups did foster anomY and social tension
among them.

The city's law

enforcem~nt

agency over-seeing juvenile

social deviants viewed the GPCC's Youth Ministry as a real threat to
its authority.
business men.

The GPGG-led Grape Boycott (1969) greatly threatened local
The GPec lobbied for the legislative bill, HB 1307 (1965),

which provided busing for minorities in schools 'without educational
opportunities, so it became a' threat to the cityls upper middle-class
and their better high schools.

The GPGC's C-GAP assisted black juvenile

deviants and "revolutionary" black cultural projects, threatening police
and whi tes.

The; r anomy gave way to overt rea'cti on.

S1 nee the threat

of anomy means a certain amount of social chaos (normlessness) within the
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threatened group, those seen to be the source of this threat (GPCC) were
regarded with suspicion and distrust.

Documentation in Chapter 7 shows

that the Women's Protective Division, City Councilmen and other city
government. officials were distrustful and angered .by the church CAp1s
successful infringement upon their law enforcement activities, etc.
Result:
The

tension, conflict and reaction against the GPCC.
GP~CIS

.primary ecumenical goal, stated in its pre-1969 ,con

stitution, was to increase the areas of cooperation between the member
congregations.

Sociologically interpreted, its purpose was to reduce

tension between its competing members.

Following 1964, the GPCC's

practical 9Q£l shifted from tension reduction between congregations

~

to, in effect, increasing social tension between some secu1ar structures
and the churches.

Although William Cate and other GPCC leaders went to

great 1engths to minimize that tension by mollifying the City fathers
and the churches with the assurance that the GPCC's community action
programs were not a ureal threat U to the established community power
structures, the latent, undeniable product of the church CAP's activi
ties was often increased anomy and tension.

Even though unintentional,

the work of the church eApls did expose the humanne$and thus the rela
tiveness of some widely accepted norms for treating deviant youth and
black segregation in Portland.

Unwittingly, the GPee radically moved to

become an instrument of de-alienation and secularization.
The research here has shown there was a· significant negative reac
tion by the public--by several secular groups in the city--against the
GPCe's aggressive social action programs.

Fo11owing the front page

newspaper stories about the GPee's 'Youth Ministry to runaways and drug
users in the downtown area, several public organizations withdrew support

~
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of the GPCC or publicly chastized the GPCC's actions.

Why was there not

a substantial reaction from the conservative member congregations? Some
evidence has indicated that there probably was a greater reaction among
the church members than was actually registered upon those interviewed
for, our sample (mostly former and present Board members).

Some of this

member reaction got through to the Board,. but most of it was mi nim; zed
at the grass ,roots, filtered through the insulation process.
words, there was a

c~hservative

In other

member reaction actually registered' at

the leadership level, but it was minimal.

Yet, other studies quoted here

(Chap'ter 1) have shown that congrega ti ons across the country have reacted
vehemently against their own pastors' direct involvement in social
actions and causes.
In searching for the reason for the

discr~pancy

in the conservative

religious reaction against the GPCC, I have concluded that the GPCC's
multiple process of insulation effectivelt minimized its members' .£Q!l
servative reaction.

The insulation has served.to remove from view--to

"hide ll --the GPCe's de-alienating social involvements from the conserva
tive congregations.

The GPCC has demonstrated itself to be a specific

exception to local church members' reactions.

The Hinsulation ll of the

GPee and its l,eaders allowed for the excepti on.
Since no

cO,ng~egations

were coerced into social action participa

ti on, no conserva ti ve congr:ega ti 'on was forced

~ nto

and seei.ng itsel f as a religious legitimator of the
social order (local government, etc.).

re-eva 1ua ti ng i tse1f
~

"secularH

The several forms of insulation

screened the de-alienating social actions from the uninvolved members.
The filtered communication between the GPCe's offices and the conserva
tives prevented any coordination of wide conservatlve disaffection against

I.
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the GPCC.

The process of minimizing conservative members' challenges to

the GPCC's liberal action programs is summarized in the ·forms of insula

tion (viz. Chapter 10).
The form of insulation listed last (seventh) in Chapter lO--the
GPCC's ambivalent policy of changing its primary goal to direct 'involve
ment in community actions, while publicizing .its conservative, congrega
tional-centered programs for those churches which wanted them--describe
in microcosm the plight of the GPCC's overall interrelationship with its
community.

Sociologically, the GPCC was pursuing two contradictory goals.

Formerly a conservative organization, the GPCC turned to serve the con
tradictory goal of challenging its own .community's institutions,
practices and values.

If the evidence from this investigation does

indicate a real, although qualified, disconfirmation of Durkheim's theory
of social conservation by religion, the paper makes no claim to general
ize this finding toward wider social worlds.

If anything, the study

does demonstrate an important exception to the general conservative role
of local religion in one community.
Equally important, the same evidence indicated that, while not
conserving but de-alienating its secular social order, this ecumenical
religious group was in the process of pursuing paradoxical organizational
goals.

The social catalyst that permitted the organization to do it was

the process of insulation.

The GPCC was going in two

directio~s

at once.

As its social acti.on programs de-alienated some of the city's most
taken-for-granted, lIestablished" institutions, the GPCC had the latent
effect of relativizing those institutions,

i~e.,

local

gov~rnment

(law

enforcement), education (school busing for racial equality), businesses
(secondary, local grape boycott).,
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Unintentionally, the GPCC had come to play this role of de-a1iena
tion, because Cate and other leaders did not appear to have realized then
that their commitment to socially controversi.al causes would necessarily
involve having to choose to withdraw their own organization's (rel~gious)'
sanctions from community power structures, i.e., effect de-alienation.
The GPCC's Board was embarrassed by its CAP's social actions which
offended conservative community values and norms.

Paradoxically, the

GPCC tried to offset in the eyes of its conservative constituency the
GPCC's liberal social involvements by reassuring members that its own
actions were not the apostate's steps from orthodox IIChristian" values
and its conservative social norms.

The GPeC's leaders indicated in

several interviews that they were exceptionally sensitive to the conser
vatives' old criticism that the GPCC was IImixing religion with politics."
They attempted to disprove this accusation.

I view this attempt to give

the appearance to conservatives that the GPCC was socially anQ politi
cally neutral as being the GPec's reversal back to co~serving those old
power structures.

In order to prevent members ' social anomy and conse

quent reaction against itself, the GPCC brought back some of its tradi
tional programs and tended to legitimate the present social structures,
rather than de-alienate them.
Sociologically, conservative denominations have one thing in
common.

They are, whether Catholic, Protestant. or Jewish, reactionary on

socio-political issues.

Silence and neutrality are the hallmarks of

religious conservativism on such issues, viz. the church in Germany
during the early years of Hitler's take-over.

As noted earlier, the

1ack of cha11 enge· to the way th i ngs are done--and to those who do them-
indicates that silence itself

legiti~ates

those patterns. of doing things ..
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Quiescence, neutrality, or compliance, by group members legitimates the
powers that be.

In this manner, the religious conservatives conserve the

established .values and· norms of society.
Although the GPeC had steadily increased until 1968 the number of
"position papers" (to be sent· to the press, etc.) on some.local prob
lems, since then it became neutral on most political issues.

Not long

after the' ci ty pol ice made charges again'st the GPCC I S downtown Youth
Ministry program in .1968, this researcher asked the GpeC Executive
Director, William Cate, about the GPCC's goals in the light of their
recent controversy with law enforcement..

Cate answered, liThe Church has

always been the supporter of things good and decent.

We are a coopera

tive church group, worki ng for better c.ooperati on among peopl e, for
better lines of communication--a healthier Portland.
is justified as part of the state.

The police's role

We need law and order.

The state's .

purpose ;s to keep order, harmony and just laws--as part of God1s plan
for peace.

II

Cate added, IIHowever, God's church has 'loya1ties that

transcend ohedience to the state.

Conscience sometimes transcends-

and speaks--and demands obedience."
Cate's response summarizes the GPCC's ambivalence.

On the conser

vative side, although two of the GPCC's church CApis programs have run '
afoul of some established community norms, the GPeC Executive here
presents the Council itse1f as supporting the community's common
va1ues--what is IIgood and decent."

Gate also describes the work of the

police, law and order and th'e GPGC--all on the same side.

Gate. is say

ing that the GPec is, politically, a ,conservative force in the community.
Gate is also reassuring the local congregations of the GPeC that the
GPeC helps and strengthens each of the congregations in their common

:.ill

224

cause--to [keep their own members and get more.

On the liberal side, Dr. Gate applied the transcendent standard to

the church and to the GPCC"saying the church must have a higher loyalty
to God rather than to the state.

In calling back to the radica1 trans

cendentalization of God and the church's primary responsibility to this
"completely other" value, Gate is harking back to the ancient Isra'elite
prophets.

To that deg'ree, the GPCG is' relying on a standard which com-'

pletely relativizes all other values and norms.

Before the transcendent,

God, all institutions are revealed as nothing but human works.
Religious institutions rarely challenge their own established
social order, largely because the leaders sense the conservative wrath
built into their own organizations, as well as that of their own society's
power structures.

A few modern religious b9dies have contributed

energetically to both social change, as well as to the ossification of
the

status~.

William Cate and the GPeC tried to straddle this socio

religious"p~radox--on the one hand, to conserve the established social

order (integrate society), and on the other, to challenge society to
change (diSintegration). ' Gate recognized the danger of reaction against
By galvanizing the GPGC1s ever-increasing commi,tment

j,

being too prophetic.

I

to social action' types of programs with a generous amount of propaganda

I

about their great effort to promote a few old; conservative-pleasing
programs, Gate was able to maintain the appearance that the GPeC was
not rejecting its traditional goals for radical ones.

This ambivalent

appearance was an important insulating quality.
Within Western religion is the seed of protest, the potential for
vital change in the face of any society_

That potential to beget social

change resides in a religion1s own grasp of a transcendent standard, by

J

iIIoIooJ: • ~

'.
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which all other values are gauged.

Without this transcendence, there is

no ultimate meaning given to man1s humanly made structures. Only if

religions of transcendence do not become so well accommodated to
society that their sense of the transcendent standard is not lost, can
they maintain this basis for criticism and dissent pgainst domtnant
vested interests of ruling and influential elites.

Consequently, if

church'institutions (GPCC), which claim loyalty ,to a transcendent stand
ard, are to contribute positively to a democratic society where social
change and secularization are encouraged, then

~

substantial degree of

unadjustment between religion and society must remain, despite the fact
that the unadjustment itself will be the source of some anomy, tension
and conflict.
Theoretically, the actions of the GPCC a,re, 'a description of the
ambivalent social power of a local (ecumenical) religious group to
divide, as well as unite; to disintegrate, as well as integrate, the
old order of society; to liberate, as well as conserve; to de-alienate,
as well as reduce social anomY.

The GPCC i'llustrates this paradoxical

impact on a local society. The evidence, which largely disconfirmed the
study's original working hypothesis, also confirmed that by dividing
its goals between b,eing a world-maintaining along with a world-shaking
force, the GPCC was indeed successful at side-stepping serious, conser
vative reaction.
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